

5 CONTROL AREA SERVICES: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS

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For discussion at April 24, 2019 MC

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5.1 Control Area Services

The ISO will provide Control Area Services in accordance with the standards and criteria of NERC and NPCC, the Reliability Rules of the NYSRC, and Good Utility Practice. The Control Area Services provided by the ISO include, but are not limited to, the following:

- (a) Developing and implementing procedures to maintain the reliability of NYS Power System;
- (b) Coordinating operations with other Control Area operators;
- (c) Arranging for reserve sharing agreements with other ISOs and other Control Areas to enhance reliability during abnormal operating conditions;
- (d) Coordinating the outage schedules for generating units and Installed Capacity Suppliers within the NYCA to maintain system reliability;
- (e) Committing adequate generation resources to ensure the reliability of the NYS Power System;
- (f) Taking command and control of the NYCA resources during Emergency conditions and coordinating operations with Transmission Owners;
- (g) Maintaining and Operating a central control center and performing the functions of the NERC security control center for the NYCA under Emergency operating conditions;
- (h) Defining the Installed Capacity requirements for LSEs, inclusive of individual customers taking services directly from the ISO, within the NYCA;
- (i) Determining Locational Installed Capacity requirements for LSEs to ensure the reliable operation of the NYCA;
- (j) Administering of an Installed Capacity mMarket;

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- (k) Training the operating personnel of the ISO and Transmission Owner control rooms; and
- (l) Administering the mandatory NERC reliability compliance process.

5.1.1 Customer Compliance with Reliability Standards; Penalties

5.1.1.1 Customer Compliance with Reliability Standards:

In accordance with applicable requirements in this Tariff and the ISO Procedures, all Customers shall conform to all applicable reliability criteria, policies, standards, rules, regulations and other requirements of NERC, NPCC, NYSRC, any applicable regional council, or their successors, the ISO's specific reliability requirements and ISO Procedures, and applicable operating guidelines and all applicable requirements of federal and state regulatory authorities. Failure to conform to these requirements may subject a Customer to direct assignment of penalties assessed against the ISO by FERC, NERC, NPCC or any other federal or state regulatory authority as a result of such Customer's failure to conform.

5.1.1.2 Direct Assignment of Penalty Costs:

The ISO's compliance with applicable reliability criteria, policies, standards, rules, regulations and other requirements is sometimes dependent on timely, accurate and adequate information and/or action on the part of a Customer. If the ISO is found to be non-compliant with respect to any applicable reliability criteria, policies, standards, rules, regulations and other requirements as a result of a Customer's actions or failure to act in violation of an obligation imposed by the ISO Tariffs, ISO Procedures, or ISO Related Agreements, the ISO may seek to directly assign to the Customer the cost of a penalty imposed on the ISO as a consequence of its non-compliance. If the Customer is found to be non-compliant with respect to any applicable

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reliability criteria, policies, standards, rules, regulations and other requirements as a result of the ISO's actions or failure to act in violation of an obligation imposed by the ISO Tariffs, ISO Procedures, or ISO Related Agreements, the Customer may seek to directly assign to the ISO the cost of a penalty imposed on the Customer as a consequence of the ISO's non-compliance. Any direct assignment of penalty costs must first be approved by FERC, as provided in Schedule 6.11 of the OATT.

5.1.1.3 ISO's Recovery of Penalty Costs Through Schedule 11:

If direct assignment to a particular Customer is not possible or if the ISO is directly responsible for a violation because of its own action or inaction, the ISO may seek to recover such penalty costs in Schedule 6.11 Section 6.11.3 of the ISO OATT. Any inclusion of penalty costs in Schedule 6.11 must first be approved by FERC on a case-by-case basis, as provided in Schedule 6.11 of the ISO OATT. Prior to seeking FERC authorization for recovery of a penalty in Schedule 6.11 Section 6.11.3 of the ISO OATT, the ISO shall consult with the Management Committee and any appropriate subcommittee or working groups designated by the Management Committee, regarding the recovery and allocation of such penalty before filing at FERC. Any recommendation by the Management Committee regarding a proposed penalty recovery shall be reported by the ISO to FERC in any ISO filing seeking penalty recovery.

5.1.2 Incorporation of Certain Business Practice Standards

- (a) Pursuant to Commission Order No. 676-H, the ISO incorporates by reference the following business practice standards developed by the North American Energy Standards Board's Wholesale Electric Quadrant:

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WEQ-000, Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Definition of Terms, WEQ Version 003, July 31, 2012, as modified by NAESB final actions ratified on Oct. 4, 2012, Nov. 28, 2012 and Dec. 28, 2012 (with minor corrections applied Nov. 26, 2013);

WEQ-001, Open Access Same-Time Information Systems (OASIS), OASIS Version 2.0, WEQ Version 003, July 31, 2012 as modified by NAESB final actions ratified on Dec. 28, 2012 (with minor corrections applied November 26, 2013) excluding Standards WEQ-001-9.5, WEQ-001-10.5, WEQ-001-14.1.3, WEQ-001-15.1.2 and WEQ-001-106.2.5, except as provided below;

WEQ-004, Coordinate Interchange, WEQ Version 003, July 31, 2012 (with Final Action ratified on December 28, 2012), except as provided below;

WEQ-005, Area Control Error (ACE) Equation Special Cases, WEQ Version 003, July 31, 2012

WEQ-006, Manual Time Error Correction, WEQ Version 003, July 31, 2012;

WEQ-007, Inadvertent Interchange Payback, WEQ Version 003, July 31, 2012;

WEQ-008, Transmission Loading Relief - Eastern Interconnection, WEQ Version 003, July 31, 2012 (with minor corrections applied November 28, 2012);

WEQ-011, Gas/Electric Coordination, WEQ Version 003, July 31, 2012;

WEQ-012, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), WEQ Version 003, July 31, 2012, (as modified by NAESB final actions ratified on Oct. 4, 2012), except as provided below (NYISO compliance to begin May 15, 2017, pursuant to *New York Independent System Operator, Inc.*, FERC Docket No. ER15-550-000, Notice Granting Extension (April 15, 2015);

WEQ-015, Measurement and Verification of Wholesale Electricity Demand Response, WEQ Version 003, July 31, 2012 (with minor corrections applied November 26, 2013); and

WEQ-021, Measurement and Verification of Energy Efficiency Products, WEQ Version 003, July 31, 2012.

- (b) The ISO is not required to comply with the following Standards:

WEQ-001, Open Access Same-Time Information Systems (OASIS), OASIS Version 2.0, WEQ Version 003, July 31, 2012 (with minor corrections applied November 26, 2013): Standards 001-2, 001-3, 001-4, 001-5, 001-6, 001-7, 001-8, 001-9, 001-10, 001-011, 001-012, 001-13.1.2, 001-13.1.3(b) and (c), 001-014, 001-015, 001-016, 001-017, 001-018, 001-019, 001-020, 001-021, 001-022, 001-23, 001-101 through 001-107.3.1, 001-Appendix A, 001-Appendix B, and 001-

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Appendix D, pursuant to *New York Independent System Operator, Inc.*, 151 FERC ¶ 61,157 (May 19, 2015);

WEQ-002, Open Access Same-Time Information Systems (OASIS) Business Practice Standards & Communication Protocols (S&CP), OASIS Version 2.0, WEQ Version 003, July 31, 2012, as modified by NAESB final actions ratified on Nov. 28, 2012 and Dec. 28, 2012(with minor corrections applied November 26, 2013), pursuant to *New York Independent System Operator, Inc.*, 151 FERC ¶ 61,157 (May 19, 2015);

WEQ-003, Open Access Same-Time Information Systems (OASIS) Data Dictionary Business Practice Standards, OASIS Version 2.0, WEQ Version 003, July 31, 2012, as modified by NAESB final actions ratified on Nov. 28, 2012 and Dec. 28, 2012 (with minor corrections applied November 26, 2013), pursuant to *New York Independent System Operator, Inc.*, 151 FERC ¶ 61,157 (May 19, 2015);

WEQ-004, Coordinate Interchange, WEQ Version 003, July 31, 2012 (with Final Action ratified on December 28, 2012): Standards 004-3, 004-18, and 004-Appendix A and 004-Appendix C, pursuant to *New York Independent System Operator, Inc.*, 151 FERC ¶ 61,157 (May 19, 2015); and

WEQ-013, Open Access Same-Time Information Systems (OASIS) Implementation Guide, OASIS Version 2.0, WEQ Version 003, July 31, 2012, as modified by NAESB final actions ratified on Dec. 28, 2012 (with minor corrections applied November 26, 2013), pursuant to *New York Independent System Operator, Inc.*, 151 FERC ¶ 61,157 (May 19, 2015).

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5.2 Independent System Operator Authority

The ISO will act as the Control Area operator, as defined by NERC, for the NYCA. The ISO will provide all Control Area Services in the NYCA. Control Area Services provided by the ISO will be in accordance with the terms of the ISO Services Tariff, the Reliability Rules, the ISO Related Agreements and Good Utility Practice. The ISO will act with other Control Area operators as required to modify External Transactions pursuant to this Tariff and to ensure the effective and reliable coordination with the interconnected Control Areas. In acting as the Control Area operator, the ISO will be responsible for maintaining the safety and the short-term reliability of the NYCA and for the implementation of reliability standards promulgated by NERC and NPCC and for the Reliability Rules promulgated by the NYSRC. To be included within NYCA, a Market Participant must meet the requirements of Section 5.6. Each Market Participant that (1) withdraws Energy to supply Load within the NYCA; or (2) provides Installed Capacity to an LSE serving Load within the NYCA, benefits from the Control Area Services provided by the ISO and from the reliability achieved as a result of ISO Control Area Services and therefore must take service as a Customer under the Tariff. To be included within NYCA, a Market Participant must meet the requirements of Section 5.6. A Market Participant that is not included within the NYCA may take service as a Customer under the Tariff, provided that it meets the requirements of Section 5.7.

5.2.1 Suspension of Virtual Transactions

The ISO may temporarily suspend Virtual Transactions if it determines that:

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- 5.2.1.1 The financial exposure of customers engaged in Virtual Transactions cannot be determined with a reasonable degree of accuracy or to factors such as software or system failures;
- 5.2.1.2 A market aberration associated with Virtual Transactions substantially impairs the functioning of the ISO-administered markets; or
- 5.2.1.3 Virtual Transactions substantially impair the ability of the ISO to maintain the reliability of the electric system.

As soon as reasonably practicable, the ISO shall notify the Commission and Market Participants of the reason(s) for any suspension of Virtual Transactions, the action(s) necessary to restore Virtual Transactions, and the estimated time required to restore Virtual Transactions.

5.2.2 Suspension of the Ability of Generators to Increase Their Bids in Real-Time

The ISO may temporarily suspend the ability to submit Incremental Energy Bids in the real-time market that exceed the Incremental Energy Bids submitted in the Day-Ahead Market or the mitigated Day-Ahead Incremental Energy Bids where appropriate for the portions of Generators' Capacity that were scheduled in the Day-Ahead Market, if the ISO determines that:

- 5.2.2.1 a market aberration associated with Incremental Energy Bids submitted in the real-time market that exceed the Incremental Energy Bids submitted in the Day-Ahead Market for the portions of Generators' Capacity that were scheduled in the Day-Ahead Market substantially impairs the functioning of the ISO-administered markets; or
- 5.2.2.2 Permitting Incremental Energy Bids submitted in the real-time market to exceed the Incremental Energy Bids submitted in the Day-Ahead Market or the mitigated Day-Ahead Incremental Energy Bids where appropriate, for portions of

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Generators' Capacity that were scheduled in the Day-Ahead Market substantially impairs the ability of the ISO to maintain the reliability of the electric system.

As soon as reasonably practicable, the ISO shall notify the Commission and Market Participants of the reason(s) for any suspension of the ability for Incremental Energy Bids submitted in the real-time market to exceed the Incremental Energy Bids submitted in the Day-Ahead Market or the mitigated Day-Ahead Incremental Energy Bids where appropriate, for portions of Generators' Capacity that were scheduled in the Day-Ahead Market; the action(s) necessary to restore this feature to the ISO-Administered Markets; and the estimated time required to restore this feature to the ISO-Administered Markets.

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5.3 Control Center Operation

The ISO will maintain and operate a control center in order to monitor the power flows on and across the NYCA, coordinate the flow of electricity within the NYCA, respond to Emergency situations, monitor power flows between the NYCA and neighboring Control Areas and maintain reliability.

5.3.1 Back-Up Operation

The ISO shall develop Back-Up Operation procedures that will carry out the intent and purposes of this ISO Services Tariff, to the extent practical, in circumstances under which the normal communications or computer systems of the ISO are not fully functional. Such procedures shall include testing requirements and training for the ISO staff, Transmission Owner staff, and Market Participants. If a communication or computer system malfunction results in the ISO's inability to operate the NYCA in accordance with ISO Procedures or under approved testing procedures, the ISO will direct the Transmission Owners to assume the responsibility to operate their respective systems, including facilities that a Transmission Owner has agreed to operate and maintain in accordance with an operation and maintenance agreement, in accordance with Good Utility Practice to facilitate the operation of the NYCA in a safe and reliable manner. The Transmission Owners will continue to operate their respective systems, including facilities that a Transmission Owner has agreed to operate and maintain in accordance with an operation and maintenance agreement, until such time that the ISO is ready to resume control. During Back-Up Operation, the Transmission Owner control centers will operate to maintain the Desired Net Interchange ("DNI") within each Transmission District. Generator Bid curves will be provided by the ISO to the individual Transmission Owners in order to permit dispatch by the

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Transmission Owners subject to the Transmission Owner code of conduct to the extent applicable. Normal Day-Ahead Market and Real-Time Market operations may be halted, if required.

5.3.2 Market Participant and Customer Obligations

During Back-Up Operation, Customers and other Market Participants shall comply with any and all instructions and orders issued by the ISO or the Transmission Owners.

5.3.3 Billing and Settlement

In the event that Back-Up Operation is implemented, the billing and settlement procedures contained in Article 7 of this ISO Services Tariff shall apply only to the extent they can be implemented under the Back-Up Operation procedures. The ISO will follow specific billing and settlement procedures for use under these specific circumstances that required Back-Up Operation. The ISO shall gather necessary information, manually reconstruct the billing information as soon as practical, and submit invoices to Customers. The ISO shall be under no obligation to comply with the billing procedure time limits specified in Article 7. Neither the ISO nor the Transmission Owners shall be liable, under any circumstances, for any economic losses suffered by any Customer, Market Participant, or third party, resulting from the implementation by the ISO of Back-Up Operation, or from compliance with orders issued by the ISO or Transmission Owners that were necessary to operate the NYCA in a safe and reliable manner. Such orders may include, without limitation, instructions to generation facilities to increase or decrease output, and instructions to Load to reduce or interrupt service.

5.4 Operation Under Adverse Conditions

The ISO shall operate the NYS Power System during Adverse Conditions, including, but not limited to, thunder storms, hurricanes, tornadoes, solar magnetic flares and threat of terrorist activities, in accordance with the Reliability Rules, inclusive of Local Reliability Rules and related PSC orders. Consistent with such Reliability Rules, the ISO shall maintain reliability of the NYS Power System by directing the adjustment of the Generator output levels and controllable transmission devices in certain areas of the system to reduce power flows across transmission lines vulnerable to outages due to these Adverse Conditions, thereby reducing the likelihood of major power system disturbances.

The ISO shall have the sole authority to declare that Adverse Conditions are imminent or present and invoke the appropriate operating procedure(s) affecting the NYS Power System in response to those conditions. Activation of a procedure in compliance with a Local Reliability Rule shall involve a two (2) step process. The Transmission Owner directly involved with such Local Reliability Rule, such as Storm Watch, shall advise the ISO that Adverse Conditions are imminent or present and recommend to the ISO the activation of procedures in support of that Local Reliability Rule. Consistent with the Local Reliability Rule, the ISO shall declare the activation of the appropriate procedures.

The Transmission Owner and the ISO shall coordinate the implementation of the applicable procedures to the extent that Transmission Facilities under ISO Operational Control are impacted. Records pertaining to the activation of such procedures and the response in accordance with those procedures shall be maintained and made available upon request.

The Real-Time LBMPs shall be based on adjusted Generator levels set in response to activation of these procedures. Revenue shortfalls may occur if the redispatch of the system

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Curtailed Energy scheduled Day-Ahead and more expensive Energy is dispatched subsequent to the Day-Ahead Settlement. These revenue shortfalls shall be recovered by the ISO through the Rate Schedule 1 charge under the ISO OATT.

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5.5 Major Emergency State

In the event of, or in order to prevent, a Major Emergency State, Customers shall comply with all ISO Procedures and Reliability Rules applicable to a Major Emergency State.

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5.6 Requirements For Inclusion Within The New York Control Area

To be included within the NYCA a Supplier or a Load must meet the following requirements:

- (a) Its facilities must be included within the NYCA.
- (b) It must accept and comply with NYCA standards with respect to system design, equipment ratings, operating practices and maintenance practices as set forth in the ISO Procedures so that sufficient electrical equipment control capability, information and communication are available to the ISO for planning and operation of the NYCA.
- (c) Its facilities must be able to respond to command and control instructions from the ISO.
- (d) It must have compatible operational communication mechanisms, maintained at its expense, to interact with the ISO and for Internal requirements.
- (e) It must ensure the continued compatibility of its local Energy management system, system monitoring and telecommunications systems to satisfy the technical requirements of interacting with the ISO as the ISO directs the operation of the NYCA.

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5.7 Requirements For Entities Not Located Within The New York Control Area

In order for a Supplier or a Load that is not included within the NYCA to take services under the Tariff, it must be contained, in whole or in part, within a separate Control Area that meets all of the requirements for a Control Area defined by NERC, NPCC and any succeeding organizations. An entity that is contained in a Control Area other than the NYCA may take services under the ISO Services Tariff for the purpose of engaging in Control Area to Control Area Capacity and Energy Transactions with the ISO. In order for a Supplier or a Load not contained in the NYCA to take services under the ISO Services Tariff, an inter-Control Area agreement between the Control Area in which the entity is located and the ISO, that satisfies the reasonable requirements of both Control Area operators, must be in place. Energy Storage Resources, Intermittent Power Resources, and Limited Control Run of River Hydro Resources that are not electrically located within the NYCA are not eligible to participate in the ISO Installed Capacity market. Resources in External Control Areas that have an Energy Duration Limitation or are seeking to participate in the ISO's markets in an Aggregation are not eligible to participate in the ISO's Installed Capacity market.

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5.8 Communication and Metering Requirements for Control Area Services

The ISO shall arrange for and maintain reliable communications and metering facilities between the ISO and the Transmission Owners in the NYCA and the Control Area operators of all neighboring interconnected Control Areas. Such facilities may consist of data circuits, voice lines, meters and other facilities deemed necessary by the ISO to maintain reliable communication links for the sole purpose of transmitting operations and reliability data and instructions. The ISO shall be responsible for the specification, installation and maintenance of the required facilities according to ISO Procedures. The costs incurred by the ISO to establish communications facilities between the ISO and a Security Coordinators of a neighboring Control Area shall be borne by the Control Area that requested the establishment of the communications facilities unless a different arrangement is agreed to by both Control Areas. The total cost of the communications facilities between the ISO and the Transmission Owners and the portion of the cost of inter-Control Area communication facilities assigned to the ISO shall be collected from all Customers in accordance with Rate Schedule 15.1 of the ISO Services Tariff. Transmission Owners with communications requirements which exceed those required by the ISO shall procure and maintain such additional facilities at their own expense.

Generators, Suppliers and Loads are required to exchange certain operating and reliability data with the ISO and the Transmission Owners' Control Centers in accordance with the ISO Agreement and the ISO/TO Agreement, applicable ISO operating and reliability requirements, and in conjunction with any requirements for interconnection with the Transmission Owner.

In addition, Suppliers wishing to submit Bids in the RTC for Energy or Regulation Service must make provision to receive command and control information from the ISO. Those Generators or Suppliers currently providing this capability via a Transmission Owner may

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continue to do so. Those requiring installation of this capability must contract with the ISO or with the interconnected Transmission Owner and must comply with applicable ISO or Transmission Owner data and other technical requirements.

Suppliers with multiple units at a single location must maintain a consistent representation of the plant with the ISO with respect to ~~aggregation~~ the combination of all of the units at the single location, for purposes of bidding. If a single Bid is to be provided for a group of specific units at a plant and those units are bidding in the RTC, or providing Regulation Service, then the ISO shall model those units as a single group for purposes of dispatch, control and security modeling. The ISO will provide a single Base Point Signal and unit control error. If, however, the Supplier wishes to dispatch units individually, then it must configure both its bidding and data interfaces accordingly. Each Supplier must initially specify the configuration of the plant for purposes of bidding aggregation and must then maintain bidding and data interfaces consistent with that configuration. Similar modeling, control and bidding Constraints apply to an LSE that bids Load that is dispatchable by the ISO.

5.8.1 Collection and Communication of Energy Forecasting Data by Intermittent Power Resources that Depend on Wind or Solar Energy as Their Fuel

Pursuant to ISO Procedures, Intermittent Power Resources that depend on wind or solar energy as their fuel shall maintain in good working order equipment to collect data required for energy forecasting and shall provide the ISO, or its agent, with this data in the manner identified by the ISO, provided however this requirement shall not apply to (i) any Intermittent Power Resource in commercial operation as of January 1, 2002 with nameplate capacity of 12 MWs or fewer, and (ii) an Intermittent Power Resource depending on wind as its fuel that participates in a DER Aggregation. An Intermittent Power Resource (except an Intermittent Power Resource

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participating in a DER Aggregation) that depends on wind as its fuel shall, in accordance with ISO Procedures, provide the ISO with wind speed and wind direction data for its site, and maximum available megawatt data. An Intermittent Power Resource (except an Intermittent Power Resource participating in a DER Aggregation) that depends on solar energy as its fuel shall, in accordance with ISO Procedures, provide the ISO with plane of array irradiance and back panel temperature data for its site, and maximum available megawatt data. Each Intermittent Power Resource subject to this Section shall be responsible for the cost of installing and maintaining such equipment at its site, as well as the cost of installing and maintaining the software and hardware necessary to provide the required data described above, in accordance with ISO Procedures.

The ISO may impose financial sanctions for failure to provide the required data described above.

Upon a determination of failure to provide the required data, the ISO shall take the following actions. The ISO shall notify the Intermittent Power Resource by written notice of its determination of failure to provide the required data and that the ISO may impose financial sanctions if the failure is not corrected. The ISO shall offer a reasonable opportunity to correct the failure to provide the required data. If, following such reasonable opportunity to cure, such failure is not cured, the ISO may impose daily sanctions of the greater of \$500 or \$20/MW of nameplate capacity until such failure is cured. The ISO shall offer the Intermittent Power Resource an opportunity to be heard by senior officers of the ISO prior to imposing sanctions.

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5.9 Installed Capacity and Locational Export Capacity

5.9.1 Sections 5.10 through 5.17 of this Tariff, implementing the Installed Capacity market design, shall govern LSE Unforced Capacity Obligations, the qualification of Installed Capacity Suppliers, and the ISO's administration of Installed Capacity auctions.

5.9.2 Provisions applicable to Locational Export Capacity. Nothing in this Section alters the requirements in the ISO Tariffs or ISO Procedures generally applicable to Installed Capacity Suppliers and Generators.

5.9.2.2 Eligibility. In order to be eligible to export capacity from an Import Constrained Locality for an Obligation Procurement Period, the Market Participant for a Generator must:

5.9.2.2.1 Notify the ISO on or before the first business day of the month prior to the month of the export, specify the quantity of MW in ICAP, and the Control Area that will be entitled to the exported capacity, such notice in accordance with ISO Procedures; and

5.9.2.2.2 Provide all data and other information to the ISO required in accordance with Services Tariff Section 23.4.5.

5.9.2.3 During any month a Resource ~~Generator~~ has Locational Export Capacity, the Market Participant for it shall Bid the Locational Export Capacity into the in-day market when the ISO issues a Supplemental Resource Evaluation request (an SRE), unless the entity has a bid pending in the Real-Time Market when the SRE request is made or is unable to bid in response to the SRE request due to an

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outage as defined in the ISO Procedures, or due to other operational issues, or due to temperature related deratings.

5.10 NYCA Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement

The NYCA Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement is derived from the NYCA Installed Reserve Margin, which is established each year by the NYSRC. The NYCA Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement for the Capability Year beginning each May 1 will be established by multiplying the NYCA peak Load forecasted by the ISO by the quantity of one plus the NYCA Installed Reserve Margin. The ISO shall translate the NYCA Installed Reserve Margin, and thus the NYCA Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement, into a NYCA Minimum Unforced Capacity Requirement. For each Capability Period, the NYCA Minimum Unforced Capacity Requirement shall equal the product of the NYCA Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement and the ratio of (1) the total amount of Unforced Capacity that the specified Resources are qualified to provide during such Capability Period, as of the time the NYCA Minimum Unforced Capacity Requirement is determined as specified in ISO Procedures, to (2) the sum of the ~~DMNCs-Adjusted~~ **Installed Capacity values** used to determine the Unforced Capacities of such Resources for such Capability Period. The foregoing calculation shall be determined using the Resources in the NYCA in the most recent final version of the ISO's annual Load and Capacity Data Report, with the addition of Resources commencing commercial operation since completion of that report and the deletion of Resources with scheduled or planned retirement dates before or during such Capability Period.

The NYCA Minimum Unforced Capacity Requirement represents a minimum level of Unforced Capacity that must be secured by LSEs in the NYCA for each Obligation Procurement Period. Under the provisions of this Services Tariff and the ISO Procedures, each LSE will be obligated to procure its LSE Unforced Capacity Obligation. The LSE Unforced Capacity Obligation will be determined for each Obligation Procurement Period by the ICAP Spot Market

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Auction, in accordance with ISO Procedures. ~~Installed Capacity Suppliers~~ ~~Qualified Resources~~ will have the opportunity to supply amounts of Unforced Capacity to meet the LSE Unforced Capacity Obligation as established by the ICAP Spot Market Auction.

The ISO will calculate a NYCA peak Load each year by applying regional Load growth factors to the prior calendar year's Adjusted Actual Peak Load. Regional Load growth factors shall be proposed by the Transmission Owners and reviewed by the ISO pursuant to procedures agreed to by Market Participants and described in the ISO Procedures. Disputes concerning the development of regional Load growth factors shall be resolved through the Expedited Dispute Resolution Procedures set forth in Section 5.17 of this Tariff.

The ISO shall determine the amount of Unforced Capacity that must be sited within the NYCA, and within each Locality, and the amount of Unforced Capacity that may be procured from areas External to the NYCA, in a manner consistent with the Reliability Rules. New Transmission projects to which the NYISO has granted UDRs will not affect the determination by the NYISO of the amount of Unforced Capacity that must be located within the NYCA or within each Locality of the NYCA.

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5.11 Requirements Applicable to LSEs

5.11.1 Allocation of the NYCA Minimum Unforced Capacity Requirement

Each Transmission Owner and each municipal electric utility will submit to the ISO, for its review pursuant to mutually agreed upon procedures which shall be described in the ISO Procedures, the weather-adjusted Load within its Transmission District during the hour in which actual Load in the NYCA was highest (the “NYCA peak Load”) for the current Capability Year. ~~(Municipal electric utilities may elect not to submit weather-adjusted data, in which case, weather adjustments shall be performed per ISO procedures).~~ The ISO shall use these data to determine the Adjusted Actual Load at the time of the NYCA peak Load for each Transmission District and municipal electric utility pursuant to ISO Procedures, which shall ensure that transmission losses and the effects of demand reduction programs and the other elements of Adjusted Actual Load are treated in a consistent manner and that all weather normalization procedures meet a minimum criterion described in the ISO Procedures. The ISO shall consider, in accordance with ISO Procedures, the effects of Demand Reductions by DER participating in the Installed Capacity market to determine the Adjusted Actual Load to prevent double-counting the Demand Reduction in the LSE Unforced Capacity Obligation. Each Transmission District or municipal electric utility Load forecast coincident with the NYCA peak shall be the product of that Transmission District or municipal electric utility’s Adjusted Actual Load at the time of the NYCA peak Load multiplied by one plus the regional Load growth factor for that Transmission District or municipal electric utility developed pursuant to Section 5.10 of this Tariff. After calculating each Transmission District or municipal electric utility Load forecast, if the ISO determines that an Adjusted Actual Load determined for a Transmission District or municipal electric utility does not reflect reasonable expectations of what Load might reasonably have been

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expected to occur in that Transmission District or area served by that municipal electric utility in that Capability Year, after taking into consideration the adjustments to account for weather normalization, transmission losses, ~~and~~ demand response programs, and Demand Reductions from DER Aggregations and other elements of Adjusted Actual Load that are described in the ISO Procedures, the ISO Procedures shall also authorize the ISO to substitute its own measures of Adjusted Actual Load for that Transmission District or area serviced by that municipal electric utility in this calculation, subject to the outcome of dispute resolution procedures if invoked. The ISO's measure of Adjusted Actual Load shall be binding unless otherwise determined as the result of dispute resolution procedures that may be invoked. Each Transmission Owner must also submit aggregate Adjusted Load data, coincident with the NYCA peak hour, for all customers served by each LSE active within its Transmission District. The aggregate Load data may be derived from direct meters or Load profiles of the customers served. Each Transmission Owner shall be required to submit such forecasts and aggregate peak Load data in accordance with the ISO Procedures. Each municipal electric utility may choose to submit its peak Load forecast based on the Transmission District's peak Load forecast provided by a Transmission Owner or to provide its own. Any disputes arising out of the submittals required in this paragraph shall be resolved through the Expedited Dispute Resolution Procedures set forth in Section 5.17 of this Tariff.

All aggregate Load data submitted by a Transmission Owner must be accompanied by documentation indicating that each affected LSE has been provided the data regarding the assignment of customers to the affected LSE. Any disputes between LSEs and Transmission Owners regarding such data or assignments shall be resolved through the Expedited Dispute

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Resolution Procedures set forth in Section 5.17 of this Tariff, or the Transmission Owner's retail access procedures, as applicable.

The ISO shall allocate the NYCA Minimum Unforced Capacity Requirement among all LSEs serving Load in the NYCA prior to the beginning of each Capability Year. It shall then adjust the NYCA Minimum Unforced Capacity Requirement and reallocate it among LSEs before each Winter Capability Period as necessary to reflect changes in the factors used to translate ICAP requirements into Unforced Capacity requirements. Each LSE's share of the NYCA Minimum Unforced Capacity Requirement will equal the product of: (i) the NYCA Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement as translated into a NYCA Minimum Unforced Capacity Requirement; and (ii) the ratio of the sum of the Load forecasts coincident with the NYCA peak Load for that LSE's customers in each Transmission District to the NYCA peak Load forecast.

Each LSE Unforced Capacity Obligation will equal the product of (i) the ratio of that LSE's share of the NYCA Minimum Unforced Capacity Requirement to the total NYCA Minimum Unforced Capacity Requirement and (ii) the total of all of the LSE Unforced Capacity Obligations for the NYCA established by the ICAP Spot Market Auction. The LSE Unforced Capacity Obligation will be determined in each Obligation Procurement Period by the ICAP Spot Market Auction, in accordance with the ISO Procedures. Each LSE will be responsible for acquiring sufficient Unforced Capacity to satisfy its LSE Unforced Capacity Obligations. LSEs with Load in more than one Locality will have an LSE Unforced Capacity Obligation for each Locality.

Prior to the beginning of each Capability Period, Transmission Owners shall submit the required Load-shifting information to the ISO and to each LSE affected by the Load-shifting, in

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accordance with the ISO Procedures. In the event that there is a pending dispute regarding a Transmission Owner's forecast, the ISO shall nevertheless establish each LSE's portion of the NYCA Minimum Unforced Capacity Requirement applicable at the beginning of each Capability Period in accordance with the schedule established in the ISO Procedures, subject to possible adjustments that may be required as a result of resolution of the dispute through the Expedited Dispute Resolution Procedures set forth in Section 5.17 of this Tariff.

Each month, as Transmission Owners report customers gained and lost by LSEs through Load-shifting, the ISO will adjust each LSE's portion of the NYCA Minimum Unforced Capacity Requirement such that (i) the total Transmission District Installed Capacity requirement remains constant and (ii) an individual LSE's allocated portion reflects the gains and losses. If an LSE loses a customer as a result of that customer leaving the Transmission District, the Load-losing LSE shall be relieved of its obligation to procure Unforced Capacity to cover the Load associated with the departing customer as of the date that the customer's departure is accepted by the ISO and shall be free to sell any excess Unforced Capacity. In addition, when a customer leaves the Transmission District, the ISO will adjust each LSE's portion of the NYCA Minimum Unforced Capacity Requirement so that the total Transmission District's share of the NYCA Minimum Unforced Capacity Requirement remains constant.

5.11.2 LSE Obligations

Each LSE must procure Unforced Capacity in an amount equal to its LSE Unforced Capacity Obligation from any Installed Capacity Supplier through Bilateral Transactions with purchases in ISO-administered Installed Capacity auctions, by self-supply from qualified sources, or by a combination of these methods. Each LSE must certify the amount of Unforced Capacity it has or has obtained prior to the beginning of each Obligation Procurement Period by

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submitting completed Installed Capacity certification forms to the ISO by the date specified in the ISO Procedures. The Installed Capacity certification forms submitted by the LSEs shall be in the format and include all the information prescribed by the ISO Procedures.

All LSEs shall participate in the ICAP Spot Market Auction pursuant to Section 5.14.1 of this Tariff.

5.11.3 Load-Shifting Adjustments

The ISO shall account for Load-shifting among LSEs each month using the best available information provided to it and the affected LSEs by the individual Transmission Owners. The ISO shall, upon notice of Load-shifting by a Transmission Owner and verification by the relevant Load-losing LSE, increase the Load-gaining LSE's LSE Unforced Capacity Obligation, as applicable, and decrease the Load-losing LSE's LSE Unforced Capacity Obligation, as applicable, to reflect the Load-shifting.

The Load-gaining LSE shall pay the Load-losing LSE an amount, pro-rated on a daily basis, based on the Market-Clearing Price of Unforced Capacity determined in the most recent previous applicable ICAP Spot Market Auction until the first day of the month after the nearest following Monthly Installed Capacity Auction is held. The amount paid by a Load-gaining LSE shall reflect any portion of the Load-losing LSE's LSE Unforced Capacity Obligation that is attributable to the shifting Load for the applicable Obligation Procurement Period, in accordance with the ISO Procedures. In addition, the amount paid by a Load-gaining LSE shall be reduced by the Load-losing LSE's share of any rebate associated with the lost Load paid pursuant to Section 5.15 of this Tariff.

Each Transmission Owner shall report to the ISO and to each LSE serving Load in its Transmission District the updated, aggregated LSE Loads with documentation in accordance

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with and by the date set forth in the ISO Procedures. The ISO shall reallocate a portion of the NYCA Minimum Unforced Capacity Requirement and the Locational Minimum Unforced Capacity Requirement, as applicable, to each LSE for the following Obligation Procurement Period, which shall reflect all documented Load-shifts as of the end of the current Obligation Procurement Period. Any disputes among Market Participants concerning Load-shifting shall be resolved through the Expedited Dispute Resolution Procedures set forth in Section 5.17 of this Tariff, or the Transmission Owner's retail access procedures, as applicable. In the event of a pending dispute concerning a Load-shift, the ISO shall make its Obligation Procurement Period Installed Capacity adjustments as if the Load-shift reported by the Transmission Owners had occurred, or if the dispute pertains to the timing of a Load-shift, as if the Load-shift occurred on the effective date reported by the Transmission Owner, but will retroactively modify these allocations, as necessary, based on determinations made pursuant to the Expedited Dispute Resolution Procedures set forth in Section 5.17 of this Tariff, or the Transmission Owner's retail access procedures, as applicable.

5.11.4 LSE Locational Minimum Installed Capacity Requirements

The ISO will determine the Locational Minimum Installed Capacity Requirements, stated as a percentage of the Locality's forecasted Capability Year peak Load and expressed in Unforced Capacity terms, that shall be uniformly applicable to each LSE serving Load within a Locality. In establishing Locational Minimum Installed Capacity Requirements, the ISO will take into account all relevant considerations, including the total NYCA Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement, the NYS Power System transmission Interface Transfer Capability, the election by the holder of rights to UDRs that can provide Capacity from an External Control Area with a capability year start date that is different than the corresponding ISO Capability Year

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start date (“dissimilar capability year”), the Reliability Rules and any other FERC-approved Locational Minimum Installed Capacity Requirements.

The Installed Capacity Supplier holding rights to UDRs from an External Control Area with a dissimilar capability year shall have one opportunity for a Capability Year in which the Scheduled Line will first be used to offer Capacity associated with the UDRs, to elect that the ISO determine Locational Minimum Installed Capacity Requirements without a quantity of MW from the UDRs for the first month in the Capability Year, and with the same quantity of MW as Unforced Capacity for the remaining months, in each case (a) consistent with and as demonstrated by a contractual arrangement to utilize the UDRs to import the quantity of MW of Capacity into a Locality, and (b) in accordance with ISO Procedures (a “capability year adjustment election”). If there is more than one Installed Capacity Supplier holding rights to UDRs concurrently, an Installed Capacity Supplier’s election pursuant to the preceding sentence (x) shall be binding on the entity to which the NYISO granted the UDRs up to the quantity of MW to which the Installed Capacity Supplier holds rights, and a subsequent assignment of these UDRs to another rights holder will not create the option for another one-time election by the new UDR rights holder, and (y) shall not affect the right another Installed Capacity Supplier may have to make an election. The right to make an election shall remain unless and until an election has been made by one or more holders of rights to the total quantity of MW corresponding to the UDRs. Absent this one-time election, the UDRs shall be modeled consistently for all months in each Capability Year as elected by the UDR rights holder in its notification to the ISO in accordance with ISO Procedures. Upon such an election, the ISO shall determine the Locational Minimum Unforced Capacity Requirement (i) for the first month of the Capability Year without the quantity of MW of Capacity associated with the UDRs, and (ii) for the remaining eleven

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months as Unforced Capacity. After the Installed Capacity Supplier has made its one-time election for a quantity of MW, the quantity of MW associated with the UDRs held by the Installed Capacity Supplier shall be modeled consistently for all months in any future Capability Period.

The Locational Minimum Unforced Capacity Requirement represents a minimum level of Unforced Capacity that must be secured by LSEs in each Locality in which it has Load for each Obligation Procurement Period. The Locational Minimum Unforced Capacity Requirement for each Locality shall equal the product of the Locational Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement for a given Locality ((A) with or without the UDRs if there is a capability year adjustment election by a rights holder and (B) without the Locality Exchange MW) and the ratio of (1) the total amount of Unforced Capacity that the specified Resources are qualified to provide (with or without the UDRs associated with dissimilar capability periods, as so elected by the rights holder) during each month in the Capability Period, as of the time the Locational Minimum Unforced Capacity Requirement is determined as specified in ISO Procedures, to (2) the sum of the ~~DMNCs-Adjusted~~ **Installed Capacity** values used to determine the Unforced Capacities of such Resources for such Capability Period (with or without the DMNCs associated with the UDRs, as so elected by the rights holder).

The foregoing calculation shall be determined using the Resources in the given Locality in the most recent final version of the ISO's annual Load and Capacity Data Report, with the addition of Resources commencing commercial operation since completion of that report and the deletion of Resources with scheduled or planned retirement dates before or during such Capability Period. The ISO will apply the Locality Exchange Factor for the applicable External Control Area to the MW of Locational Export Capacity that are the lesser of (i) the lesser of the

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Generator's CRIS and its most recent DMNC, and (ii) the MW pursuant to the notice provided pursuant to Section 5.9.2.2.1 of this Services Tariff.

Under the provisions of this Services Tariff and the ISO Procedures, each LSE will be obligated to procure its LSE Unforced Capacity Obligation. The LSE Unforced Capacity Obligation will be determined for each Obligation Procurement Period by the ICAP Spot Market Auction, in accordance with the ISO Procedures.

Installed Capacity Suppliers ~~Qualified Resources~~ will have the opportunity to supply amounts of Unforced Capacity to meet the LSE Unforced Capacity Obligation as established by the ICAP Spot Market Auction.

To be counted towards the locational component of the LSE Unforced Capacity Obligation, Unforced Capacity owned by the holder of UDRs or contractually combined with UDRs must be deliverable to the NYCA interface with the UDR transmission facility pursuant to NYISO requirements and consistent with the election of the holder of the rights to the UDRs set forth in this Section.

In addition, any Customer that purchases Unforced Capacity associated with any Installed Capacity Supplier ~~generation~~ that is subject to Ceapacity market mitigation measures in an ISO-administered auction may not resell that Unforced Capacity in a subsequent auction at a price greater than the annual mitigated price cap, as applied in accordance with the ISO Procedures in accordance with Sections 5.13.2, 5.13.3, and 5.14.1 of this Tariff. The ISO shall inform Customers that purchase Unforced Capacity in an ISO-administered auction of the amount of Unforced Capacity they have purchased that is subject to Ceapacity market mitigation measures.

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The ISO shall have the right to audit all executed Installed Capacity contracts and related documentation of arrangements by an LSE to use its own generation to meet its Locational Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement for an upcoming Obligation Procurement Period.

5.11.4.1 Determination of Locality Exchange Factor:

No later than January 31 each year, the ISO shall determine the Locality Exchange Factor for each Import Constrained Locality relative to each neighboring Control Area.

The ISO shall make each such determination by performing a power flow based analysis according to applicable transmission system planning practices for the determination of interface transfer limits used for the resource adequacy topology. Base case data from the most recent reliability planning process will be incorporated. The Locality Exchange Factor is the ratio of the shift factor on the applicable NYCA interface of a transfer from the Import Constrained Locality to the respective neighboring Control Area, to the shift factor of a transfer from Rest of State to the Import Constrained Locality, calculated in accordance with ISO Procedures. Only the AC circuits comprising the respective neighboring Control Area's interface with the NYCA will participate in the shift. The ISO shall post its Locality Exchange Factors on its website prior to the opening of the Summer Capability Period Auction, and notify the New York State Reliability Council.

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5.12 Requirements Applicable to Installed Capacity Suppliers

5.12.1 Installed Capacity Supplier Qualification Requirements

In order to qualify as an Installed Capacity Supplier or be part of an Aggregation that is qualified as an Installed Capacity Supplier, Generators, ~~and~~ controllable transmission projects electrically located in the NYCA, ~~and~~ transmission projects with associated incremental transfer capability, and Distributed Energy Resources that have the ability to inject Energy must have obtained Capacity Resource Interconnection Service (“CRIS”) pursuant to the applicable provisions of Attachment S to the ISO OATT and have entered service: controllable transmission projects must also have obtained Unforced Capacity Deliverability Rights and transmission projects with associated incremental transfer capability must also have obtained External-to-ROS Deliverability Rights. Even if a Resource Generator has otherwise satisfied the requirements to participate in the ISO’s Installed Capacity market, a Resource Generator in Inactive Reserves, an ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage, a Mothball Outage, or that is Retired is ineligible to participate in the ISO’s Installed Capacity market. A Resource Generator that elects to participate in the ICAP Market, and is within a defined electrical boundary, electrically interconnected with, and routinely serves a Host Load (which Host Load does not consist solely of Station Power) at a single PTID ~~can may~~ only participate in the Installed Capacity market as a Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource. In order to participate as part of an Aggregation or as an Energy Storage Resource, such a resource may not participate with the Behind-The-Meter Net Generation configuration.

In addition, to qualify as an Installed Capacity Supplier in the NYCA, Energy Limited Resources, Generators, Installed Capacity Marketers, Intermittent Power Resources, Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resources, Limited Control Run-of-River Hydro Resources, and System

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Resources rated 1 MW or greater other than External System Resources and Control Area System Resources which have agreed to certain Curtailment conditions as set forth in the last paragraph of Section 5.12.1 below, Responsible Interface Parties, existing municipally-owned generation, Energy Limited Resources, Intermittent Power Resources, to the extent those entities are subject to the requirements of Section 5.12.11 of this Tariff, Aggregations with a capacity rating of 0.1 MW or greater, and Energy Storage Resources with a nameplate capacity rating that allows a minimum injection to the NYS Transmission System or distribution system of 0.1 MW or greater shall:

- 5.12.1.1 provide information reasonably requested by the ISO including the name and location of Resources-Generators, and System Resources;
- 5.12.1.2 in accordance with the ISO Procedures, perform DMNC or DMGC tests and submit the results to the ISO, or provide to the ISO appropriate historical production data;
- 5.12.1.3 abide by the ISO Generator maintenance coordination procedures;
- 5.12.1.4 provide the expected return date from any outages (including partial outages) to the ISO;
- 5.12.1.5 in accordance with the ISO Procedures,
 - 5.12.1.5.1 provide documentation demonstrating that it will not use the same Unforced Capacity for more than one (1) buyer at the same time, and
 - 5.12.1.5.2 in the event that the Installed Capacity Supplier supplies more Unforced Capacity than it is qualified to supply in any specific month (*i.e.*, is short on Capacity), documentation that it has procured sufficient Unforced Capacity to cover this shortfall.

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- 5.12.1.6 except for Installed Capacity Marketers and Intermittent Power Resources that depend upon wind or solar as their fuel or Aggregations that are comprised of Intermittent Power Resources that depend on the same type of fuel, with that fuel being wind or solar, Bid into the Day-Ahead Market, unless the Energy Limited Resource, Generator, Aggregation, Limited Control Run-of-River Hydro Resource or System Resource is unable to do so due to an outage as defined in the ISO Procedures or due to temperature related de-ratings. Resources ~~Generators~~ may also enter into the MIS an upper operating limit that would define the operating limit under normal system conditions. The circumstances under which the ISO will direct a Resource ~~Generator~~ to exceed its upper operating limit are described in the ISO Procedures;
- 5.12.1.7 provide Operating Data in accordance with Section 5.12.5 of this Tariff;
- 5.12.1.8 provide notice to the ISO of any proposed transfers of deliverability rights to be carried out pursuant to Sections 25.9.4 - 25.9.6 of Attachment S to the ISO OATT, on the Class Year Start Date if a request to transfer CRIS at a different location, and upon the submission of the request if it is a request to transfer CRIS at the same location;
- 5.12.1.9 comply with the ISO Procedures;
- 5.12.1.10 when the ISO issues a Supplemental Resource Evaluation request (an SRE), Bid into the in-day market unless the entity has a bid pending in the Real-Time Market when the SRE request is made or is unable to bid in response to the SRE request due to an outage as defined in the ISO Procedures, or due to other operational issues, or due to temperature related deratings; and

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5.12.1.11 Installed Capacity Suppliers located East of Central-East shall Bid in the Day-Ahead and Real-Time Markets all Capacity available for supplying 10-Minute Non-Synchronized Reserve (unless the Generator or Aggregation is unable to meet its commitment because of an outage as defined in the ISO Procedures), except for the Resources ~~Generators~~ described in Subsections 5.12.1.11.1, 5.12.1.11.2 and 5.12.1.11.3 below:

5.12.1.11.1 Generators providing Energy under contracts executed and effective on or before November 18, 1999 (including PURPA contracts) in which the power purchasers do not control the operation of the supply source but would be responsible for penalties for being off-schedule, with the exception of Generators under must-take PURPA contracts executed and effective on or before November 18, 1999, who have not provided telemetering to their local TO and historically have not been eligible to participate in the NYPP market, which will continue to be treated as TO Load modifiers under the ISO-administered markets;

5.12.1.11.2 Existing topping turbine Generators and extraction turbine Generators producing Energy resulting from the supply of steam to the district steam system located in New York City (LBMP Zone J) in operation on or before November 18, 1999 and/or topping or extraction turbine Generators used in replacing or repowering steam supplies from such units (in accordance with good engineering and economic design) that cannot follow schedules, up to a maximum total of 523 MW of such units; and

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5.12.1.11.3 ~~Resources Units~~ that have demonstrated to the ISO that they are subject to environmental, contractual or other legal or physical requirements that would otherwise preclude them from providing 10-Minute NSR;

5.12.1.12 A Resource that was determined by the ISO to be qualified as a Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource and for which Net Unforced Capacity was calculated by the ISO for a Capability Year can annually, by written notice received by the NYISO prior to August 1, elect not to participate in the ISO Administered Markets as a Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource. Such notice shall be in accordance with ISO Procedures. A Resource that makes such an election cannot participate as a Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource for the entire Capability Year for which it made the election, but can, however, prior to August 1 of any subsequent Capability Year, provide all required information in order to seek to re-qualify as a Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource;

5.12.1.13 For Energy Storage Resources, or Aggregations comprised entirely of Energy Storage Resources, ~~be capable of running for a minimum of four (4) consecutive hours each day (except for days when it is not capable of doing so because of an outage reported pursuant to Sections 5.12.3, 5.12.5.3, 5.12.5.4, 5.12.7 and in accordance with ISO Procedures), and~~ elect the ISO-Managed Energy Level bidding parameter for each Day-Ahead Market Bid.

5.12.1.14 ~~Energy Limited Resources, Energy Storage Resources,~~ Aggregations comprised entirely of Energy Storage Resources, DER Aggregations, and Aggregations that are Energy Limited Resources must elect an Energy Duration Limitation which corresponds to a Duration Adjustment Factor, as described in Section 5.12.14 below, and

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validate the Energy Duration Limitation pursuant to Section 5.12.1.2 above. An Installed Capacity Supplier may elect any Energy Duration Limitation that it can demonstrate pursuant to Section 5.12.1.2

The ISO shall inform each potential Installed Capacity Supplier that the ISO must receive and approve DMNC or DMGC data, as applicable of its approved DMNC or DMGC ratings for the Summer Capability Period and the Winter Capability Period in accordance with the ISO Procedures.

Requirements to qualify as Installed Capacity Suppliers for External System Resources and Control Area System Resources located in External Control Areas that have agreed not to Curtail the Energy associated with such Installed Capacity or to afford it the same Curtailment priority that it affords its own Control Area Load shall be established in the ISO Procedures.

External Installed Capacity not associated with UDRs, including capacity associated with External CRIS Rights, EDRs, Grandfathered External Installed Capacity Agreements listed in Attachment E of the ISO Installed Capacity Manual, the Existing Transmission Capacity for Native Load listed for New York State Electric & Gas Corporation in Table 3 of Attachment L to the ISO OATT, Import Rights, and External System Resources, is only qualified to satisfy a NYCA Minimum Unforced Capacity Requirement and is not eligible to satisfy a Locational Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement.

Not later than 30 days prior to each ICAP Spot Market Auction, each Market Participant that may make offers to sell Unforced Capacity in such auction shall submit information to the ISO, in accordance with ISO Procedures and in the format specified by the ISO that identifies each Affiliated Entity, as that term is defined in Section 23.2.1 of Attachment H of the Services Tariff, of the Market Party or with which the Market Party is an Affiliated Entity. The names of

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entities that are Affiliated Entities shall not be treated as Confidential Information, but such treatment may be requested for the existence of an Affiliated Entity relationship. The information submitted to the ISO shall identify the nature of the Affiliated Entity relationship by the applicable category specified in the definition of “Affiliated Entity” in Section 23.2.1 of Attachment H of the Services Tariff.

5.12.2 Additional Provisions Applicable to External Installed Capacity Suppliers

Terms in this Section 5.12.2 not defined in the Services Tariff have the meaning set forth in the OATT.

5.12.2.1 Provisions Addressing the Applicable External Control Area

External Generators, External System Resources, and Control Area System Resources qualify as Installed Capacity Suppliers if they demonstrate to the satisfaction of the NYISO that the Installed Capacity Equivalent of their Unforced Capacity is deliverable to the NYCA; in the case of an entity using a UDR to meet a Locational Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement, to the NYCA interface associated with that UDR transmission facility and will not be recalled or curtailed by an External Control Area to satisfy its own Control Area Loads; in the case of an EDR, to the NYCA interface over which it creates increased transfer capability; and in the case of Control Area System Resources, if they demonstrate that the External Control Area will afford the NYCA Load the same curtailment priority that they afford their own Control Area Native Load Customers. The amount of Unforced Capacity that may be supplied by such entities qualifying pursuant to the alternative criteria may be reduced by the ISO, pursuant to ISO Procedures, to reflect the possibility of curtailment. External Installed Capacity associated with

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Import Rights, EDRs or UDRs is subject to the same deliverability requirements applied to Internal Installed Capacity Suppliers associated with UDRs.

5.12.2.2 Additional Provisions Addressing Internal Deliverability and Import Rights

In addition to the provisions contained in Section 5.12.2.1 above, External Installed Capacity not associated with UDRs, EDRs, or External CRIS Rights will be subject to the deliverability test in Section 25.7.8 and 25.7.9 of Attachment S to the ISO OATT. The deliverability of External Installed Capacity not associated with UDRs, EDRs, or External CRIS Rights will be evaluated annually as a part of the process that sets import rights for the upcoming Capability Year, to determine the amount of External Installed Capacity that can be imported to the New York Control Area across any individual External Interface and across all of those External Interfaces, taken together. The External Installed Capacity deliverability test will be performed using the ISO's forecast, for the upcoming Capability Year, of New York Control Area CRIS resources, transmission facilities, and load. Under this process (i) Grandfathered External Installed Capacity Agreements listed in Attachment E of the ISO Installed Capacity Manual, and (ii) the Existing Transmission Capacity for Native Load listed for New York State Electric & Gas Corporation in Table 3 of Attachment L to the ISO OATT, will be considered deliverable within the Rest of State. Additionally, 1090 MW of imports made over the Quebec (via Chateauguay) Interface will be considered to be deliverable until the end of the 2010 Summer Capability Period.

The import limit set for External Installed Capacity not associated with UDRs, EDRs or External CRIS Rights will be set no higher than the amount of imports deliverable into Rest of State that (i) would not increase the LOLE as determined in the upcoming Capability Year IRM

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consistent with Section 2.7 of the NYISO Installed Capacity Manual, “Limitations on Unforced Capacity Flow in External Control Areas,” (ii) are deliverable within the Rest of State Capacity Region when evaluated with the New York Control Area CRIS resources (including EDRs and UDRs) and External CRIS Rights forecast for the upcoming Capability Year, and (iii) would not degrade the transfer capability of any Other Interface by more than the threshold identified in Section 25.7.9 of Attachment S to the ISO OATT. Import limits set for External Installed Capacity will reflect the modeling of awarded External CRIS rights, but the awarded External CRIS rights will not be adjusted as part of import limit-setting process. Procedures for qualifying selling, and delivery of External Installed Capacity are detailed in the Installed Capacity Manual.

Until the grandfathered import rights over the Quebec (via Chateauguay) Interface expire at the end of the 2010 Summer Capability Period, the 1090 MW of grandfathered import rights will be made available on a first-come, first-served basis pursuant to ISO Procedures. Any of the grandfathered import rights over the Quebec (via Chateauguay) Interface not utilized for a Capability Period will be made available to other external resources for that Capability Period, pursuant to ISO Procedures, to the extent the unutilized amount is determined to be deliverable.

Additionally, any of the Existing Transmission Capacity for Native Load listed for New York State Electric & Gas Corporation not utilized by New York State Electric & Gas Corporation for a Capability Period will be made available to other external resources for that Capability Period, pursuant to ISO procedures, to the extent the unutilized amount is determined to be deliverable within the Rest of State Capacity Region.

LSEs with External Installed Capacity as of the effective date of this Tariff will be entitled to designate External Installed Capacity at the same NYCA Interface with another

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Control Area, in the same amounts in effect on the effective date of this Tariff. To the extent such External Installed Capacity corresponds to Existing Transmission Capacity for Native Load as reflected in Table 3 of Attachment L to the ISO OATT, these External Installed Capacity rights will continue without term and shall be allocated to the LSE's retail access customers in accordance with the LSE's retail access program on file with the PSC and subject to any necessary filings with the Commission. External Installed Capacity rights existing as of September 17, 1999 that do not correspond to Table 3 of Attachment L to the ISO OATT shall survive for the term of the relevant External Installed Capacity contract or until the relevant External Generator is retired.

5.12.2.3 One-Time Conversion of Grandfathered Quebec (via Chateauguay) Interface Rights.

An entity can request to convert a specified number of MW, up to 1090 MW over the Quebec External Interface (via Chateauguay), into External CRIS Rights by making either a Contract Commitment or Non-Contract Commitment that satisfies the requirements of Section 25.7.11.1 of Attachment S to the ISO OATT. The converted number of MW will not be subject to further evaluation for deliverability within a Class Year Deliverability Study under Attachment S to the ISO OATT, as long as the External CRIS Rights are in effect.

5.12.2.3.1 The External CRIS Rights awarded under this conversion process will first become effective for the 2010-2011 Winter Capability Period.

5.12.2.3.2 Requests to convert these grandfathered rights must be received by the NYISO on or before 5:00 pm Eastern Time on February 1, 2010, with the following information: (a) a statement that the entity is electing to convert by satisfying the requirements of a Contract Commitment or a Non-Contract

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Commitment in accordance with Section 25.7.11.1 of Attachment S to the ISO OATT; (b) the length of the commitment in years; (c) for the Summer Capability Period, the requested number of MW; (d) for the Winter Capability Period, the Specified Winter Months, if any, and the requested number of MW; and (e) a minimum number of MW the entity will accept if granted (“Specified Minimum”) for the Summer Capability Period and for all Specified Winter Months, if any.

5.12.2.3.3 An entity cannot submit one or more requests to convert in the aggregate more than 1090 MW in any single month.

5.12.2.3.4 If requests to convert that satisfy all other requirements stated herein are equal to or less than the 1090 MW limit, all requesting entities will be awarded the requested number of MW of External CRIS Rights. If conversion requests exceed the 1090 MW limit, the NYISO will prorate the allocation based on the weighted average of the requested MW times the length of the contract/commitment (*i.e.*, number of Summer Capability Periods) in accordance with the following formula:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Rights allocated to entity } i \\ &= 1090 \\ & \quad * (MW_i * \text{contract/commitment length}_i) \\ & \quad / \sum_j (MW_j * \text{contract/commitment length}_j) \end{aligned}$$

$j = 1, \dots, \#$ entities requesting import rights

In the formula, contract/commitment length means the lesser of the requested contract/commitment length and twenty (20) years. The NYISO will perform separate calculations for the Summer and Winter Capability Periods. The NYISO will determine whether the prorated allocated number of MW for any requesting

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entity is less than the entity's Specified Minimum. If any allocation is less, the NYISO will remove such request(s) and recalculate the prorated allocations among the remaining requesting entities using the above formula. This process will continue until the prorated allocation meets or exceeds the specified minimum for all remaining requests.

- 5.12.2.3.5 Any portion of the previously grandfathered 1090 MW not converted through this process will no longer be grandfathered from deliverability. Previously grandfathered rights converted to External CRIS Rights but then terminated will no longer be grandfathered from deliverability.

5.12.2.4 Offer Cap Applicable to Certain External CRIS Rights

Notwithstanding any other capacity mitigation measures or obligations that may apply, the offers of External Installed Capacity submitted pursuant to a Non-Contract Commitment, as described in Section 25.7.11.1.2 of Attachment S of the ISO OATT, will be subject to an offer cap in each month of the Summer Capability Period and for all Specified Winter Months. This offer cap will be determined as the higher of:

- 5.12.2.4.1 1.1 times the price corresponding to all available Unforced Capacity determined from the NYCA ICAP Demand Curve for that Period; and
- 5.12.2.4.2 The most recent auction clearing price (a) in the External market supplying the External Installed Capacity, if any, and if none, then the most recent auction clearing price in an External market to which the capacity may be wheeled, less (b) any transmission reservation costs in the External market associated with providing the Installed Capacity, in accordance with ISO Procedures.

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5.12.3 Installed Capacity Supplier Outage Scheduling Requirements

All Installed Capacity Suppliers, except for Control Area System Resources and Responsible Interface Parties, that intend to supply Unforced Capacity to the NYCA shall submit a confidential notification to the ISO of their proposed outage schedules in accordance with the ISO Procedures. Transmission Owners will be notified of these and subsequently revised outage schedules. Based upon a reliability assessment, if Operating Reserve deficiencies are projected to occur in certain weeks for the upcoming calendar year, the ISO will request voluntary rescheduling of outages. In the case of Installed Capacity Suppliers ~~Generators~~ actually supplying Unforced Capacity to the NYCA, if voluntary rescheduling is ineffective, the ISO will invoke forced rescheduling of their outages to ensure that projected Operating Reserves over the upcoming year are adequate.

An Installed Capacity Supplier ~~Generator~~ that refuses a forced rescheduling of its outages for any unit shall be prevented from supplying Unforced Capacity in the NYCA with that unit during any month where it undertakes such outages. The rescheduling process is described in the ISO Procedures.

An Installed Capacity Supplier ~~Generator~~ that intends to supply Unforced Capacity in a given month that did not qualify as an Installed Capacity Supplier prior to the beginning of the Capability Period must notify the ISO in accordance with the ISO Procedures so that it may be subject to forced rescheduling of its proposed outages in order to qualify as an Installed Capacity Supplier. A Resource Supplier ~~Generator~~ that refuses the ISO's forced rescheduling of its proposed outages shall not qualify as an Installed Capacity Supplier for that unit for any month during which it schedules or conducts an outage.

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Outage schedules for External System Resources and Control Area System Resources shall be coordinated by the External Control Area and the ISO in accordance with the ISO Procedures.

5.12.4 Required Certification for Installed Capacity

- (a) Each Installed Capacity Supplier must confirm to the ISO, in accordance with ISO Procedures that the Unforced Capacity it has certified has not been sold for use in an External Control Area.
- (b) Each Installed Capacity Supplier holding rights to UDRs or EDRs from an External Control Area must confirm to the ISO, in accordance with ISO Procedures, that it will not use as self-supply or offer, and has not sold, Installed Capacity associated with the quantity of MW for which it has not made its one time capability adjustment year election pursuant to Section 5.11.4 (if applicable.)
- (c) On and after the execution of an RMR Agreement, and for the duration of its term, an RMR Generator shall not enter into any new agreement or extend any other agreement that impairs or otherwise diminishes its ability to comply with its obligation under an RMR Agreement, or that limits its ability to provide Energy, Capacity, or Ancillary Services directly to the ISO Administered Markets. An Interim Service Provider shall not enter into any new agreement or extend any other agreement that limits its ability to provide Energy, Capacity, or Ancillary Services directly to the ISO Administered Markets or otherwise meet its obligations as an Interim Service Provider.

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5.12.5 Operating Data Reporting Requirements

To qualify as Installed Capacity Suppliers in the NYCA, Resources shall submit to the ISO Operating Data in accordance with this Section 5.12.5 and the ISO Procedures. Resources that do not submit Operating Data in accordance with the following subsections and the ISO Procedures may be subject to the sanctions provided in Section 5.12.12.1 of this Tariff.

Resources that were not in operation on January 1, 2000 shall submit Operating Data to the ISO no later than one month after such Resources commence commercial operation, and in accordance with the ISO Procedures and the following subsections as applicable.

5.12.5.1 Generators, System Resources, Energy Limited Resources, Energy Storage Resources, Responsible Interface Parties, Intermittent Power Resources, Limited Control Run-of-River Hydro Resources, ~~and~~ Municipally Owned Generation and Distributed Energy Resources

To qualify as Installed Capacity Suppliers in the NYCA, Generators, External Generators, System Resources, External System Resources, Energy Limited Resources, Responsible Interface Parties, Intermittent Power Resources, Limited Control Run-of-River Hydro Resources, Energy Storage Resources, municipally owned generation and Distributed Energy Resources or the purchasers of Unforced Capacity associated with those Resources shall submit GADS Data, data equivalent to GADS Data, and/or other Operating Data to the ISO in accordance with the ISO Procedures. Prior to the successful implementation of a software modification that allows gas turbines to submit multiple bid points, these units shall not be considered to be forced out for any hours that the unit was available at its base load capability in accordance with the ISO Procedures. This section shall also apply to any Installed Capacity Supplier, External or Internal, using UDRs to meet Locational Minimum Installed Capacity Requirements.

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5.12.5.2 Control Area System Resources

To qualify as Installed Capacity Suppliers in the NYCA, Control Area System Resources, or the purchasers of Unforced Capacity associated with those Resources, shall submit CARL Data and actual system failure occurrences data to the ISO each month in accordance with the ISO Procedures.

5.12.5.3 Transmission Projects Granted Unforced Capacity Deliverability Rights

An owner of a transmission project that receives UDRs must, among other obligations, submit outage data or other operational information in accordance with the ISO procedures to allow the ISO to determine the number of UDRs associated with the transmission facility.

5.12.5.4 Transmission Projects Granted External-to ROS Deliverability Rights

An owner of a transmission project that receives EDRs must, among other obligations, submit outage data or other operational information when determined applicable by the ISO and in accordance with ISO Procedures.

5.12.6 Capacity Calculations, Operating Data Default, Value and Collection

5.12.6.1 ICAP Calculation for Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resources

The ISO shall calculate the amount of Net-ICAP for each Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource as the Adjusted DMGC of the Generator of the Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource minus the Resource's Adjusted Host Load in accordance with this Tariff and ISO Procedures.

5.12.6.1.1 Adjusted DMGC

The ISO's calculation of the Adjusted DMGC of a Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource shall be the least of: (i) its DMGC for the Capability Period; (ii) its Adjusted Host

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Load plus its applicable Injection Limit; and (iii) its Adjusted Host Load plus the number of MW of CRIS it has obtained, as determined in accordance with OATT Section 25 (OATT Attachment S) and ISO Procedures.

If the Station Power of a Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource is separately metered from all other Load of the Resource, such that the Station Power Load can be independently measured and verified, the Generator of a Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource may elect to perform a DMNC Test instead of a DMGC Test pursuant to ISO Procedures. Such election must be made in writing to the ISO prior to the start of the DMNC Test Period.

If a Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource elects to take a DMNC Test, the Station Power measured during such DMNC Test shall not be included in the Resource's Host Load. A Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource's DMNC value for the Capability Period shall be used in lieu of a DMGC value in the calculation of the Resource's Adjusted DMGC for the purposes of Sections 5.12.6.1 and 5.12.6.2 of this Services Tariff.

5.12.6.1.2 Adjusted Host Load

A Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource's Adjusted Host Load shall be equal to the product of the Average Coincident Host Load multiplied by one plus the Installed Reserve Margin.

The Adjusted Host Load shall be calculated by the ISO on an annual basis prior to the start of the Summer Capability Period and in accordance with ISO Procedures, based upon the Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource's Average Coincident Host Load for the prior Summer Capability Period and the Winter Capability Period before that.

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5.12.6.1.2.1 Average Coincident Host Load

The ISO must receive the Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource's applicable metered Load data required to calculate an Average Coincident Host Load in accordance with ISO Procedures. The ISO shall compute the Average Coincident Host Load for each Capability Year (i) using the metered Host Load data for the applicable NYCA peak Load hours, except as provided below in this Section, and (ii) adjusted for weather normalization and Load growth as determined by the ISO in relation to developing the NYCA Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement in accordance with ISO Procedures.

For each Capability Year, the NYISO shall use the average of the highest twenty (20) one-hour peak Loads of the Host Load of the Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource that occur during the top forty (40) NYCA peak Load hours of the prior Summer Capability Period and the Winter Capability Period before that to calculate the Average Coincident Host Load.

If a facility meets the criteria to be, and has not previously been, a Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource, but does not have all of the appropriate meter data, its Average Coincident Host Load shall be a value forecasted by the Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource. The Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource's forecast shall be based on actual meter data, or if not available, billing data or other business data of the Host Load. An estimated Average Coincident Host Load can only be applicable to a Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource until actual data becomes available, but in any event no longer than three (3) consecutive Capability Years beginning with the Capability Year it is first an Installed Capacity Supplier.

5.12.6.1.2.2 Determination of Adjusted Host Load

After the ISO has calculated a Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource's Average Coincident Host Load, it shall then apply the NYCA Installed Reserve Margin. The Behind-the-

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Meter Net Generation Resource's Adjusted Host Load will be established by multiplying the Resource's Average Coincident Host Load for the Capability Year by the quantity of one plus the NYCA Installed Reserve Margin.

5.12.6.2 UCAP Calculations

The ISO shall calculate for each Resource the amount of Unforced Capacity that each Installed Capacity Supplier is qualified to supply in the NYCA in accordance with formulae provided in the ISO Procedures. A Resource's Unforced Capacity will be the applicable Adjusted Installed Capacity multiplied by the quantity of 1 minus the Resource's derating factor.

The amount of Unforced Capacity that each Generator, except for the Generator of a Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource, System Resource, Energy Limited Resource, Special Case Resource, and municipally-owned generation is authorized to supply in the NYCA shall be based on the ISO's calculations of individual Equivalent Demand Forced Outage Rates. The amount of Unforced Capacity that each Energy Storage Resource, Aggregation that is comprised entirely of Energy Storage Resources, and DER Aggregation is authorized to supply in the NYCA shall be based on the individual availability of the Energy Storage Resource or the availability of the Aggregation in the Real-Time Market and calculated by the ISO in accordance with ISO Procedures. Except as provided in Section 5.12.6.2.1 of this Services Tariff, this calculation shall not include hours in any month that the Energy Storage Resource or Aggregation was in an outage state that started on or after May 1, 2015 and that precluded its eligibility to participate in the Installed Capacity market. The amount of Unforced Capacity that each Control Area System Resource is authorized to supply in the NYCA shall be based on the ISO's calculation of each Control Area System Resource's availability. The amount of Unforced Capacity that each Intermittent Power Resource or an Aggregation that is entirely comprised of

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Intermittent Power Resources that depend on the same type of fuel is authorized to supply in the NYCA shall be based on the NYISO's calculation of the amount of capacity that the Intermittent Power Resource or an Aggregation that is entirely comprised of Intermittent Power Resources that depend on the same type of fuel can reliably provide during system peak Load hours in accordance with ISO Procedures. Except as provided in Section 5.12.6.2.1 of this Services Tariff, this calculation shall not include hours in any month that the Intermittent Power Resource or an Aggregation that is entirely comprised of Intermittent Power Resources that depend on the same type of fuel was in an outage state that started on or after May 1, 2015 and that precluded its eligibility to participate in the Installed Capacity market. The amount of Unforced Capacity that each Limited Control Run-of-River Hydro Resource is authorized to provide in the NYCA shall be determined separately for Summer and Winter Capability Periods as the rolling average of the hourly net Energy provided by each such Resource during the 20 highest NYCA integrated real-time load hours in each of the five previous Summer or Winter Capability Periods, as appropriate, stated in megawatts. Except as provided in Section 5.12.6.2.1 of this Services Tariff, for a Limited Control Run-of-River Hydro Resource in an outage state that started on or after May 1, 2015 and that precluded its eligibility to participate in the Installed Capacity market during one of the 20 highest NYCA integrated real-time load hours in any one of the five previous Summer or Winter Capability Periods, the ISO shall replace that Winter or Summer Capability Period, as appropriate, with the next most recent Winter or Summer Capability Period such that the rolling average of the hourly net Energy provided by each such Resource shall be calculated from the 20 highest NYCA integrated real-time load hours in the five most recent prior Summer or Winter Capability Periods in which the Resource was not in an

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outage state that precluded its eligibility to participate in the Installed Capacity market on one of the 20 highest NYCA integrated real-time load hours in that Capability Period.

The ISO shall calculate separate Summer and Winter Capability Period Unforced Capacity values for each Generator, System Resource, Special Case Resource, Energy Limited Resource, and municipally owned generation and update them periodically using a twelve-month calculation in accordance with formulae provided in the ISO Procedures; provided, however, except as provided in Section 5.12.6.2.1 of this Services Tariff, for a Generator in an outage state that started on or after May 1, 2015 and that precluded its eligibility to participate in the Installed Capacity market at any time during any month from which GADS or other operating data would otherwise be used to calculate an individual Equivalent Demand Forced Outage Rate, the ISO shall replace such month's GADS or other operating data with GADS or other operating data from the most recent prior month in which the Generator was not in an outage state that precluded its eligibility to participate in the Installed Capacity market.

The ISO shall calculate separate Summer and Winter Capability Period Unforced Capacity values for Energy Storage Resources and individual Distributed Energy Resources and update them seasonally as described in ISO Procedures.

The ISO shall calculate separate Summer and Winter Capability Period Unforced Capacity values for Intermittent Power Resources and update them seasonally as described in ISO Procedures.

The amount of Unforced Capacity that each Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource is authorized to supply in the NYCA shall be its Net-UCAP. Net-UCAP is the lesser of (i) the ISO's calculation of the Generator of the Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource Adjusted DMGC multiplied by one minus its Equivalent Demand Forced Outage Rate, and then decreased

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by its Adjusted Host Load translated into Unforced Capacity terms consistent with Section 5.11.1 of this Tariff, and (ii) the Resource's Net-ICAP.

5.12.6.2.1 Exceptions

A Resource ~~Generator~~ returning to the Energy market after taking an outage that precluded its participation in the Installed Capacity market and which returns with modifications to its operating characteristics determined by the ISO to be material and which, therefore, requires the submission of a new Interconnection Request will receive, as the initial derating factor for calculation of the Resource's ~~Generator's~~ Unforced Capacity upon its return to service, the derating factor it would have received as a newly connecting unit in lieu of a derating factor developed from unit-specific data. A Resource ~~Generator~~ returning to the Energy market after taking an outage that precluded its participation in the Installed Capacity market and which, upon its return, uses as its primary fuel a fuel not previously used at the facility for any purpose other than for ignition purposes will receive, as the initial derating factor for calculation of the Resource's ~~Generator's~~ Unforced Capacity upon its return to service, the ~~NERC-class~~ averagedefault derating factor in lieu of a derating factor developed from unit-specific data even if the modifications to allow use of a new primary fuel are not material and do not require the submission of a new Interconnection Request.

This Section 5.12.6.2.1 shall apply to a Resource ~~Generator~~ returning to the Energy market after taking an outage that started on or after May 1, 2015 and that precluded its participation in the Installed Capacity market.

5.12.6.3 Default Unforced Capacity

In its calculation of Unforced Capacity, the ISO shall deem a Resource to be completely forced out for each month for which the Resource has not submitted its Operating Data in

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accordance with Section 5.12.5 of this Tariff and the ISO Procedures. A Resource that has been deemed completely forced out for a particular month may submit new Operating Data, for that month, to the ISO at any time. The ISO will use such new Operating Data when calculating, in a timely manner in accordance with the ISO Procedures, an Unforced Capacity value for the Resource.

Upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances, the ISO retains the discretion to accept at any time Operating Data which have not been submitted in a timely manner, or which do not fully conform with the ISO Procedures.

5.12.6.4 Exception for Certain Equipment Failures

When a Generator, Special Case Resource, Energy Limited Resource, or System Resource is forced into an outage by an equipment failure that involves equipment located on the high voltage side of the electric network beyond the step-up transformer, and including such step-up transformer, the outage will not be counted for purposes of calculating that Resource's Equivalent Demand Forced Outage Rate.

**5.12.6.5 Unforced Capacity, Outage Data and Operational Information
Associated with External-to-ROS Deliverability Rights**

The ISO shall calculate the availability of the External interface associated with each project granted EDRs, in accordance with ISO Procedures. The availability factor (percentage) of the interface will be used to reduce the amount of EDRs for which Unforced Capacity may be offered. This calculation is distinct from and in addition to the calculation the ISO performs for each Installed Capacity Resource qualified for use with EDRs.

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5.12.7 Availability Requirements

Subsequent to qualifying, each Installed Capacity Supplier shall, except as noted in Section 5.12.11 of this Tariff, on a daily basis: (i) schedule a Bilateral Transaction; (ii) Bid Energy in each hour of the Day-Ahead Market in accordance with the applicable provisions of Section 5.12.1 of this Tariff; or (iii) notify the ISO of any outages. Installed Capacity Suppliers with Energy Duration Limitations corresponding to a Duration Adjustment Factor, as described in Section 5.12.14 below, must on a daily basis during the Peak Load Window and for the number of consecutive hours that correspond to its Energy Duration Limitation, or for the entirety of the Peak Load Window for an Energy Storage Resource or an Aggregation comprised entirely of Energy Storage Resources: (i) schedule a Bilateral Transaction; (ii) Bid Energy in the Day-Ahead Market in accordance with the applicable provisions of Section 5.12.1 of this Tariff; or (iii) notify the ISO of any outages. The ISO may adjust the Peak Load Window that Installed Capacity Suppliers with Energy Duration Limitations will be responsible for scheduling, bidding, or notifying for, with scheduling or bidding in hours outside the Peak Load Window in Section 5.12.14. An RMR Generator can only schedule a Bilateral Transaction to the extent expressly authorized in its RMR Agreement. The total amount of Energy that an Installed Capacity Supplier schedules, bids, or declares to be unavailable on a given day must equal or exceed the Installed Capacity Equivalent of the Unforced Capacity it supplies.

5.12.8 Unforced Capacity Sales

Each Installed Capacity Supplier will, after satisfying the deliverability requirements set forth in the applicable provisions of Attachment X, Attachment Z and Attachment S to the ISO OATT, be authorized to supply an amount of Unforced Capacity during each Obligation Procurement Period, based on separate seasonal Unforced Capacity calculations performed by

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the ISO for the Summer and Winter Capability Periods. Unforced Capacity may be sold in six-month strips, or in monthly, or multi-monthly segments.

External Unforced Capacity (except External Installed Capacity associated with UDRs) may only be offered into Capability Period Auctions or Monthly Auctions for the Rest of State, and ICAP Spot Market Auctions for the NYCA, and may not be offered into a Locality for an ICAP Auction. Bilateral Transactions which certify External Unforced Capacity using Import Rights, EDRs, or External CRIS Rights may not be used to satisfy a Locational Minimum Unforced Capacity Requirement.

UCAP from an RMR Generator may only be offered into the ICAP Spot Market Auction, except and only to the extent that the RMR Agreement expressly permits the RMR Generator's UCAP to be certified in a Bilateral Transaction.

If an Energy Limited Resource's, Generator's, System Resource's, Control Area System Resource's, or Aggregation's DMNC rating, or the DMGC rating of a Generator of a Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource, if applicable, is determined to have increased during an Obligation Procurement Period, pursuant to testing procedures described in the ISO Procedures, the amount of Unforced Capacity that it shall be authorized to supply in that or future Obligation Procurement Periods shall also be increased on a prospective basis in accordance with the schedule set forth in the ISO Procedures provided that it first has satisfied the deliverability requirements set forth in the applicable provisions of Attachment X, Attachment Z and Attachment S to the ISO OATT.

New ~~Resources Generators~~ and ~~Resources Generators~~ that have increased their Capacity since the previous Summer Capability Period due to changes in their generating equipment and/or Demand Reduction capabilities may, after satisfying the deliverability requirements set

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forth in the applicable provisions of Attachment X, Attachment Z and Attachment S to the ISO OATT, qualify to supply Unforced Capacity on a foregoing basis during the Summer Capability Period based upon a DMNC test, or the DMGC test of a Resource Generator of a Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource, that is performed and reported to the ISO after March 1 and prior to the beginning of the Summer Capability Period DMNC Test Period. The Resource Generator will be required to verify the claimed DMNC or DMGC rating by performing an additional test during the Summer DMNC Test Period. Any shortfall between the amount of Unforced Capacity supplied by the Resource Generator for the Summer Capability Period and the amount verified during the Summer DMNC Test Period will be subject to deficiency charges pursuant to Section 5.14.2 of this Tariff. The deficiency charges will be applied to no more than the difference between the Resource's Generator's previous Summer Capability Period Unforced Capacity and the amount of Unforced Capacity equivalent the Resource Generator supplied for the Summer Capability Period.

New Resources Generators and Resources Generators that have increased their Capacity since the previous Winter Capability Period due to changes in their generating equipment and/or Demand Reduction capabilities may, after satisfying the deliverability requirements set forth in the applicable provisions of Attachment X, Attachment Z and Attachment S to the ISO OATT, qualify to supply Unforced Capacity on a foregoing basis during the Winter Capability Period based upon a DMNC test, or the DMGC test of a Resource Generator of a Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource, that is performed and reported to the ISO after September 1 and prior to the beginning of the Winter Capability Period DMNC Test Period. The Resource Generator will be required to verify the claimed DMNC or DMGC rating by performing an additional test during the Winter Capability Period DMNC Test Period. Any shortfall between the amount of

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Unforced Capacity certified by the ~~Resource Generator~~ for the Winter Capability Period and the amount verified during the Winter Capability Period DMNC Test Period will be subject to deficiency charges pursuant to Section 5.14.2 of this Tariff. The deficiency charges will be applied to no more than the difference between the ~~Resource's Generator's~~ previous Winter Capability Period Unforced Capacity and the amount of Unforced Capacity equivalent the ~~Resource Generator~~ supplied for the Winter Capability Period.

Any Installed Capacity Supplier, except as noted in Section 5.12.11 of this ISO Services Tariff, which fails on a daily basis to schedule, Bid, or declare to be unavailable in the Day-Ahead Market an amount of Unforced Capacity, expressed in terms of Installed Capacity Equivalent, that it certified for that day, rounded down to the nearest 0.1 MW, or rounded down to the nearest whole MW for an External Installed Capacity Supplier is subject to sanctions pursuant to Section 5.12.12.2 of this Tariff. If an entity other than the owner of an Energy Limited Resource, Generator, System Resource, Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource, ~~or~~ Control Area System Resource, or Aggregation that is providing Unforced Capacity is responsible for fulfilling bidding, scheduling, and notification requirements, the owner and that entity must designate to the ISO which of them will be responsible for complying with the scheduling, bidding, and notification requirements. The designated bidding and scheduling entity shall be subject to sanctions pursuant to Section 5.12.12.2 of this ISO Services Tariff.

5.12.9 Sales of Unforced Capacity by System Resources

Installed Capacity Suppliers offering to supply Unforced Capacity associated with Internal System Resources shall submit for each of their Resources the Operating Data and DMNC testing data or historical data described in Sections 5.12.1 and 5.12.5 of this ISO Services Tariff in accordance with the ISO Procedures. Such Installed Capacity Suppliers will

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be allowed to supply the amount of Unforced Capacity that the ISO determines pursuant to the ISO Procedures to reflect the appropriate Equivalent Demand Forced Outage Rate. Installed Capacity Suppliers offering to sell the Unforced Capacity associated with System Resources may only aggregate Resources in accordance with the ISO Procedures.

5.12.10 Curtailment of External Transactions In-Hour

All Unforced Capacity that is not out of service, or scheduled to serve the Internal NYCA Load in the Day-Ahead Market may be scheduled to supply Energy for use in External Transactions provided, however, that such External Transactions shall be subject to Curtailment within the hour, consistent with ISO Procedures. Such Curtailment shall not exceed the Installed Capacity Equivalent committed to the NYCA.

5.12.11 Responsible Interface Parties, Municipally-Owned Generation, Energy Limited Resources, ~~and Intermittent Power Resources, and Installed Capacity Suppliers with Energy Duration Limitations~~

5.12.11.1 Responsible Interface Parties

Responsible Interface Parties may qualify as Installed Capacity Suppliers, without having to comply with the daily bidding, scheduling, and notification requirements set forth in Section 5.12.7 of this Tariff, if their Special Case Resources are available to operate at the direction of the ISO in order to reduce Load from the NYS Transmission System and/or the distribution system for a minimum of four (4) consecutive hours each day, ~~except for those subject to operating limitations established by environmental permits, which will not be required to operate in excess of two (2) hours and which will be derated by the ISO pursuant to ISO Procedures to account for the Load serving equivalence of the hours actually available,~~ following notice of the potential need to operate twenty-one (21) hours in advance if notification is

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provided by 3:00 P.M. ET, or twenty-four (24) hours in advance otherwise, and a notification to operate two (2) hours ahead. Special Case Resources will be considered to have a four (4) hour Energy Duration Limitation to align with their obligation. In order for a Responsible Interface Party to enroll an SCR that uses an eligible Local Generator, any amount of generation that can reduce Load from the NYS Transmission System and/or distribution system at the direction of the ISO that was produced by the Local Generator during the hour coincident with the NYCA or Locality peaks, upon which the LSE Unforced Capacity Obligation of the LSE that serves that SCR is based, must be accounted for when the LSE's Unforced Capacity Obligation for the upcoming Capability Year is established. Responsible Interface Parties must provide this generator data in accordance with ISO Procedures so that the ISO can adjust upwards the LSE Unforced Capacity Obligation to prevent double-counting.

Responsible Interface Parties supplying Unforced Capacity cannot offer the Demand Reduction associated with such Unforced Capacity in the Emergency Demand Response Program. A Resource with sufficient metering to distinguish MWs of Demand Reduction may participate as a Special Case Resource and in the Emergency Demand Response Program provided that the same MWs are not committed both as Unforced Capacity and to the Emergency Demand Response Program.

The ISO will have discretion, pursuant to ISO Procedures, to exempt Local Generators that are incapable of starting in two (2) hours from the requirement to operate on two (2) hours notification. Local Generators that can be operated to reduce Load from the NYS Transmission System and/or distribution system at the direction of the ISO and Loads capable of being interrupted upon demand, that are not available on certain hours or days will be derated by the

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ISO, pursuant to ISO Procedures, to reflect the Load serving equivalence of the hours they are actually available.

Responsible Interface Parties must submit a Minimum Payment Nomination, in accordance with ISO Procedures. The ISO may request Special Case Resource performance from less than the total number of Special Case Resources within the NYCA or a Load Zone in accordance with ISO Procedures.

Special Case Resources with Local Generators that can be operated to reduce Load from the NYS Transmission System and/or distribution system at the direction of the ISO and Special Case Resources with Loads capable of being interrupted upon demand will be required to comply with verification and validation procedures set forth in the ISO Procedures. Such procedures will not require metering other than interval billing meters on customer Load or testing other than DMNC or sustained disconnect, as appropriate, unless agreed to by the customer, except that Special Case Resources not called to supply Energy in a Capability Period will be required to run a test once every Capability Period in accordance with the ISO Procedures.

Unforced Capacity supplied in a Bilateral Transaction by a Special Case Resource pursuant to this subsection may only be resold if the purchasing entity or the Installed Capacity Marketer has agreed to become a Responsible Interface Party and comply with the ISO notification requirements for Special Case Resources. LSEs and Installed Capacity Marketers may become Responsible Interface Parties and aggregate Special Case Resources and sell the Unforced Capacity associated with them in an ISO-administered auction if they comply with ISO notification requirements for Special Case Resources.

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Responsible Interface Parties that were requested to reduce Load in any month shall submit performance data to the NYISO, within 75 days of each called event or test, in accordance with ISO Procedures. Failure by a Responsible Interface Party to submit performance data for any Special Case Resources required to respond to the event or test within the 75-day limit will result in zero performance attributed to those Special Case Resources for purposes of satisfying the Special Case Resource's capacity obligation as well as for determining energy payments. All performance data are subject to audit by the NYISO and its market monitoring unit. If the ISO determines that it has made an erroneous payment to a Responsible Interface Party, the ISO shall have the right to recover it either by reducing other payments to that Responsible Interface Parties or by resolving the issue pursuant to other provisions of this Services Tariff or other lawful means.

Provided the Responsible Interface Party supplies evidence of such reductions in 75 days, the ISO shall pay the Responsible Interface Party that, through their Special Case Resources, caused a verified Load reduction in response to (i) an ISO request to perform due to a forecast reserve shortage (ii) an ISO declared Major Emergency State, (iii) an ISO request to perform made in response to a request for assistance for Load relief purposes or as a result of a Local Reliability Rule, or (iv) a test called by the ISO, for such Load reduction, in accordance with ISO Procedures. Subject to performance evidence and verification, in the case of a response pursuant to clauses (i), (ii), of (iii) of this subsection, Suppliers that schedule Responsible Interface Parties shall be paid the zonal Real-Time LBMP for the period of requested performance or four (4) hours, whichever is greater, in accordance with ISO Procedures; ~~provided, however, Special Case Resource Capacity shall settle Demand Reductions, in the interval and for the capacity for which Special Case Resource Capacity has been scheduled Day Ahead to provide Operating~~

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~~Reserves, Regulation Service or Energy, as being provided by a Supplier of Operating Reserves, Regulation Service or Energy.~~

In the event that a Responsible Interface Party's Minimum Payment Nomination for a Special Case Resource, for the number of hours of requested performance or the minimum four (4) hour period, whichever is greater, exceeds the LBMP revenue received, the Special Case Resource will be eligible for a Bid Production Cost Guarantee to make up the difference, in accordance with Section 4.23 of this Services Tariff and ISO Procedures; ~~provided, however, the ISO shall set to zero the Minimum Payment Nomination for Special Case Resource Capacity in each interval in which such Capacity was scheduled Day Ahead to provide Operating Reserves, Regulation Service or Energy.~~ Subject to performance evidence and verification, in the case of a response pursuant to clause (iv) of this subsection, payment for participation in tests called by the ISO shall be equal to the zonal Real Time LBMP for the MWh of Energy reduced within the test period.

Transmission Owners that require assistance from enrolled Special Case Resources with Local Generators larger than 100 kW and Special Case Resources with Loads capable of being interrupted upon demand for Load relief purposes or as a result of a Local Reliability Rule, shall direct their requests for assistance to the ISO for implementation consistent with the terms of this section. Within Load Zone J, participation in response to an ISO request to perform made as a result of a request for assistance from a Transmission Owner for less than the total number of Special Case Resources, for Load relief purposes or as a result of a Local Reliability Rule, in accordance with ISO Procedures, shall be voluntary and the responsiveness of the Special Case Resource shall not be taken into account for performance measurement.

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5.12.11.1.1 Special Case Resource Average Coincident Load

The ISO must receive from the Responsible Interface Party that enrolls a Special Case Resource, the applicable metered Load data required to calculate an ACL for that SCR as provided below and in accordance with ISO Procedures. The ACL shall be computed using the metered Load for the applicable Capability Period SCR Load Zone Peak Hours that indicates the Load consumed by each SCR that is supplied by the NYS Transmission System and/or distribution system and is exclusive of any generation produced by a Local Generator, other behind-the-meter generator, or other supply source located behind the SCR's meter, that served some of the SCR's Load.

Beginning with the Winter 2011-2012 Capability Period and thereafter, the ISO shall use the average of the highest twenty (20) one-hour peak Loads of the SCR taken from the Load data reported for the Capability Period SCR Load Zone Peak Hours during the Prior Equivalent Capability Period, and taking into account the resource's reported verified Load reduction in a Transmission Owner's demand response program in hours coincident with any of these hours, to create a SCR ACL baseline. ~~In addition, beginning with the Summer 2014 Capability Period, the resource's verified Load reduction in either of the ISO's economic demand response programs (the Day Ahead Demand Response Program and the Demand Side Ancillary Services Program) in hours coincident with any of the applicable Capability Period SCR Load Zone Peak Hours will be taken into account when creating the SCR ACL. For the Day Ahead Demand Response Program, the verified Load reduction that occurred in response to a DADRP schedule shall be added to the Capability Period SCR Load Zone Peak Hour for which the reduction in response to a DADRP schedule occurred. For the Demand Side Ancillary Services Program, the Load value to be used in calculating the ACL for each hour during the Capability Period SCR Load Zone~~

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~~Peak Hours in which a non-zero Base Point Signal the ISO provides to the resource, shall be the greater of (a) the DSASP Baseline MW value in the interval immediately preceding the first non-zero Base Point Signal in the Capability Period SCR Load Zone Peak Hour and (b) the metered Load of the resource as reported by the RIP for the Capability Period SCR Load Zone Peak Hour. When the non-zero Base Point Signal dispatch of a DSASP resource begins in one hour and continues into consecutive hours, and the consecutive hour is identified as being a Capability Period SCR Load Zone Peak Hour, the DSASP Baseline MW value in effect at the beginning of the dispatch of the non-zero Base Point Signal shall be the MW value used for purposes of determining the applicable Load value for that Capability Period SCR Load Zone Peak Hour, in accordance with the preceding sentence.~~ The ISO will post to its website the Capability Period SCR Load Zone Peak Hours for each zone ninety (90) days prior to the beginning of the Capability Period for which the ACL will be in effect.

In the SCR enrollment file uploaded by the RIP each month within the Capability Period, among other required information, the RIP shall provide the SCR's metered Load values for the applicable Capability Period SCR Load Zone Peak Hours necessary to compute the ACL for each SCR.

The exception to this requirement to report the required metered Load data for the ACL, when enrolling a SCR prior to the Summer 2014 Capability Period, is if (i) the SCR has not previously been enrolled with the ISO and (ii) never had interval metering Load data for each month in the Prior Equivalent Capability Period needed to compute the SCR's ACL. Beginning with the Summer 2014 Capability Period, the exception to this requirement to report the required metered Load data for the ACL, is dependent upon one or more of the eligibility conditions for SCR enrollment with a Provisional ACL provided in Section 5.12.11.1.2 of this Services Tariff

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and ISO Procedures. For SCRs that meet the criteria to enroll with a Provisional ACL, the ISO must receive from the RIP a Provisional ACL as provided in Section 5.12.11.1.2 of this Services Tariff and in accordance with ISO Procedures.

Beginning with the Summer 2014 Capability Period, in addition to the requirement for RIPs to report each SCR's metered Load values that occurred during the Capability Period SCR Load Zone Peak Hours, in accordance with this Services Tariff and ISO Procedures during the enrollment process, any qualifying increase in a SCR's Load that will be supplied by the NYS Transmission System and/or distribution system may be reported as an Incremental ACL, subject to the limitations and verification reporting requirements provided in Section 5.12.11.1.5 of this Services Tariff and in accordance with ISO Procedures. Incremental ACL values must be reported using the required enrollment file that may be uploaded by the RIP during each month's enrollment period. RIPs may not report Incremental ACL values for any SCRs that are enrolled in the Capability Period with a Provisional ACL.

A reduction in a SCR's Load that is supplied by the NYS Transmission System and/or distribution system and meets the criteria for a SCR Change of Status must be reported as a SCR Change of Status as provided by Section 5.12.11.1.3 of this Services Tariff and in accordance with ISO Procedures.

The ACL is the basis for the upper limit of ICAP, except in circumstances when the SCR has reported a SCR Change of Status or reported an Incremental ACL pursuant to Sections 5.12.11.1.3 and 5.12.11.1.5 of this Services Tariff. The basis for the upper limit of ICAP for a SCR that has experienced a SCR Change of Status or reported an Incremental ACL shall be the Net ACL.

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5.12.11.1.2 Use of a Provisional Average Coincident Load

Prior to the Summer 2014 Capability Period, as provided in Section 5.12.11.1.1 of this Services Tariff, if a new Special Case Resource has not previously been enrolled with the ISO and never had interval billing meter data from the Prior Equivalent Capability Period, its Installed Capacity value shall be its Provisional Average Coincident Load for the Capability Period for which the new SCR is enrolled. The Provisional ACL may be applicable to a new SCR for a maximum of three (3) consecutive Capability Periods, beginning with the Capability Period in which the SCR is first enrolled.

Beginning with the Summer 2014 Capability Period, a SCR may be enrolled using a Provisional ACL in lieu of an ACL when one of the following conditions has been determined by the ISO to apply: (i) the SCR has not previously been enrolled with the ISO for the seasonal Capability Period for which the SCR enrollment with a Provisional ACL is intended, (ii) the SCR was enrolled with a Provisional ACL in the Prior Equivalent Capability Period and was required to report fewer than twenty (20) hours of metered Load verification data that correspond with the Capability Period SCR Load Zone Peak Hours based on the meter installation date of the SCR, (iii) the RIP attempting to enroll the SCR with a Provisional ACL is not the same RIP that enrolled the SCR in the Prior Equivalent Capability Period and interval billing meter data for the SCR from the Prior Equivalent Capability Period is not obtainable by the enrolling RIP and not available to be provided to the enrolling RIP by the ISO. The Provisional ACL may be applicable to a SCR for a maximum of three (3) consecutive Capability Periods when enrolled with the same RIP, beginning with the Capability Period in which the SCR is first enrolled by the RIP.

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A SCR enrolled in the Capability Period with a Provisional ACL may not be enrolled by another RIP for the remainder of the Capability Period and the Provisional ACL value shall apply to the resource for the entire Capability Period for which the value is established.

The Provisional ACL is the RIP's forecast of the SCR's ACL and shall be the basis for the upper limit of ICAP for which the RIP may enroll the SCR during the Capability Period.

Any SCR enrolled with a Provisional ACL shall be subject to actual in-period verification. A Verified ACL shall be calculated by the ISO using the top twenty (20) one-hour peak Loads reported for the SCR from the Capability Period SCR Load Zone Peak Hours that are applicable to verify the Provisional ACL in accordance with ISO Procedures and taking into account the resource's reported verified Load reductions in a Transmission Owner's demand response program that are coincident with any of the applicable Capability Period SCR Load Zone Peak Hours. ~~In addition, beginning with the Summer 2014 Capability Period, the resource's verified Load reduction in either of the ISO's economic demand response programs (the Day Ahead Demand Response Program and the Demand Side Ancillary Services Program) in hours coincident with any of the applicable Capability Period SCR Load Zone Peak Hours will be taken into account when creating the SCR Verified ACL. For the Day Ahead Demand Response Program, the verified Load reduction that occurred in response to a DADRP schedule shall be added to the Capability Period SCR Load Zone Peak Hour for which the reduction in response to a DADRP schedule occurred. For the Demand Side Ancillary Services Program, the Load value to be used in calculating the Verified ACL for each hour during the Capability Period SCR Load Zone Peak Hours in which a non-zero Base Point Signal the ISO provides to the resource, shall be the greater of (a) the DSASP Baseline MW value in the interval immediately preceding the first non-zero Base Point Signal in the Capability Period SCR Load Zone Peak~~

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~~Hour and (b) the metered Load of the resource as reported by the RIP for the Capability Period SCR Load Zone Peak Hour. When the non-zero Base Point Signal dispatch of a DSASP resource begins in one hour and continues into consecutive hours, and the consecutive hour is identified as being a Capability Period SCR Load Zone Peak Hour, the DSASP Baseline MW value in effect at the beginning of the dispatch of the non-zero Base Point Signal shall be the MW value used for purposes of determining the applicable Load value for that Capability Period SCR Load Zone Peak Hour, in accordance with the preceding sentence.~~

Following the Capability Period for which a resource with a Provisional ACL was enrolled, the RIP shall provide to the ISO the metered Load data required to compute the Verified ACL of the resource. The ISO shall compare the Provisional ACL to the Verified ACL to determine, after applying the applicable performance factor, whether the UCAP of the SCR had been oversold and whether a shortfall has occurred as provided under Section 5.14.2 of this Services Tariff. If the RIP fails to provide verification data required to compute the Verified ACL of the resource enrolled with a Provisional ACL by the deadline: (a) the Verified ACL of the resource shall be set to zero for each Capability Period in which the resource with a Provisional ACL was enrolled and verification data was not reported, and (b) the RIP may be subject to penalties in accordance with this Services Tariff.

5.12.11.1.3 Reporting a SCR Change of Load or SCR Change of Status

5.12.11.1.3.1 SCR Change of Load

The Responsible Interface Party shall report any SCR Change of Load in accordance with ISO Procedures. The RIP is required to document the SCR Change of Load and when the total Load reduction for SCRs that have a SCR Change of Load within the same Load Zone is greater

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than or equal to 5 MWs, the RIP shall report the SCR Change of Load for each SCR in accordance with ISO Procedures.

5.12.11.1.3.2 SCR Change of Status

The Responsible Interface Party shall report any SCR Change of Status in accordance with ISO Procedures. The ISO shall adjust the reported ACL of the SCR for a reported SCR Change of Status to the Net ACL, for all prospective months to which the SCR Change of Status is applicable. When a SCR Change of Status is reported under clause (i), (ii) or (iii) within the definition of a Qualified Change of Status Condition and the SCR has sold capacity, the SCR shall be evaluated for a potential shortfall under Section 5.14.2 of this Services Tariff. Failure by the RIP to report a SCR Change of Status shall be evaluated as a potential shortfall under Section 5.14.2 of this Service Tariff and evaluated for failure to report under Section 5.12.12.2 of this Services Tariff.

Beginning with the Summer 2014 Capability Period, SCRs that were required to perform in the first performance test in the Capability Period in accordance with ISO Procedures and that subsequently report or change a reported SCR Change of Status value after the first performance test in the Capability Period shall be required to demonstrate the performance of the resource against the Net ACL value in the second performance test in the Capability Period. The exceptions to this provision occur when a SCR's eligible Installed Capacity is set to zero throughout the period of the SCR Change of Status, when a SCR's eligible Installed Capacity is decreased by at least the same kW value as the reported SCR Change of Status, or if a SCR Change of Status is reported, and prior to the second performance test, the SCR returns to the full applicable ACL enrolled prior to the SCR Change of Status. Performance in both performance tests shall be used in calculation of the resource's performance factors and all associated

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performance factors, deficiencies and penalties. If the RIP fails to report the performance for a resource that was required to perform in the second performance test in the Capability Period: (a) the resource will be assigned a performance of zero (0) for the test hour, and (b) the RIP shall be evaluated for failure to report under Section 5.12.12.2 of this Services Tariff.

5.12.11.1.4 Average Coincident Load of an SCR Aggregation

The ISO shall compute the Average Coincident Load of an SCR Aggregation each month in accordance with ISO Procedures.

5.12.11.1.5 Use of an Incremental Average Coincident Load

Beginning with the Summer 2014 Capability Period, a Responsible Interface Party may report any qualifying increase to a Special Case Resource's Average Coincident Load as Incremental Average Coincident Load in the RIP enrollment file upload and in accordance with this Services Tariff and ISO Procedures.

For SCRs with a total Load increase equal to or greater than twenty (20) percent and less than thirty (30) percent of the applicable ACL, the RIP may enroll the SCR with an Incremental ACL provided that the eligible Installed Capacity does not increase from the prior enrollment months within the same Capability Period and prior to enrollment with an Incremental ACL. If the SCR is enrolled with an Incremental ACL and it is the first month of the SCR's enrollment in the applicable Capability Period, the enrolled eligible Installed Capacity value shall not exceed the maximum eligible Installed Capacity of the SCR from the Prior Equivalent Capability Period. When no enrollment exists for the SCR in the Prior Equivalent Capability Period and it is the first month of the SCR's enrollment in the applicable Capability Period, the enrolled eligible Installed Capacity of the SCR shall not exceed the ACL calculated from the Capability Period

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SCR Load Zone Peak Hours. For SCRs with a total Load increase equal to or greater than thirty (30) percent of the applicable ACL, the RIP may enroll the SCR with an Incremental ACL and an increase to the SCR's eligible Installed Capacity and is required to test as described in this section of the Service Tariff.

The ISO shall adjust the ACL of the SCR for an Incremental ACL for all months for which the Incremental ACL is reported by the RIP. For resources reporting an Incremental ACL, the Net ACL shall equal the enrolled ACL plus the reported Incremental ACL less any applicable SCR Change of Status and shall be the basis for the upper limit of ICAP for which the RIP may enroll the SCR during the Capability Period.

An Incremental ACL is a discrete change to the SCR operations that is expected to result in an increase to the Load that the SCR will consume from the NYS Transmission System and/or distribution system. It is not available to account for random fluctuations in Load, such as those caused by weather or other seasonal Load variations. Therefore, the ACL of a SCR may only be increased once per Capability Period and the amount of the increase enrolled must remain the same for all months for which the Incremental ACL is reported. A SCR enrolled in the Capability Period with an Incremental ACL may not be enrolled by another RIP for the remainder of the Capability Period. A SCR enrolled in the Capability Period with a Provisional ACL is not eligible to enroll with an Incremental ACL.

Following the Capability Period for which a SCR has been enrolled with an Incremental ACL, the RIP shall provide the hourly metered Load verification data that corresponds to the Monthly SCR Load Zone Peak Hours identified by the ISO for all months in which an Incremental ACL value was reported for the SCR. For each month for which verification data was required to be reported, the ISO shall calculate a Monthly ACL that will be used in the

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calculation of a Verified ACL. The Monthly ACL shall equal the average of the SCR's top twenty (20) one-hour metered Load values that correspond with the applicable Monthly SCR Load Zone Peak Hours, and taking into account ~~(i) the resource's reported verified Load reduction in a Transmission Owner's demand response program in hours coincident with any of these hours, and (ii) the resource's verified Load reduction in either of the ISO's economic demand response programs (the Day Ahead Demand Response Program and the Demand Side Ancillary Services Program) in hours coincident with any of these hours. For the Day Ahead Demand Response Program, the verified Load reduction that occurred in response to a DADRP schedule shall be added to the Monthly SCR Load Zone Peak Hour for which the reduction in response to a DADRP schedule occurred. For the Demand Side Ancillary Services Program, the Load value to be used in calculating the Monthly ACL for each hour during the Monthly SCR Load Zone Peak Hours in which a non-zero Base Point Signal the ISO provides to the resource, shall be the greater of (a) the DSASP Baseline MW value in the interval immediately preceding the first non-zero Base Point Signal in the Monthly SCR Load Zone Peak Hour and (b) the metered Load of the resource as reported by the RIP for the Monthly SCR Load Zone Peak Hour. When the non-zero Base Point Signal dispatch of a DSASP resource begins in one hour and continues into consecutive hours, and the consecutive hour is identified as being a Monthly SCR Load Zone Peak Hour, the DSASP Baseline MW value in effect at the beginning of the dispatch of the non-zero Base Point Signal shall be the MW value used for purposes of determining the applicable Load value for that Monthly SCR Load Zone Peak Hour, in accordance with the preceding sentence.~~ The Verified ACL shall be the average of the two (2) highest Monthly ACLs during the Capability Period in which the SCR was enrolled with an Incremental ACL within the same Capability Period.

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For any month in which verification data for the Incremental ACL is required but not timely submitted to the ISO in accordance with ISO procedures, the ISO shall set the metered Load values to zero. When a Monthly ACL is set to zero, the Verified ACL will be calculated as the average of: a) the two (2) highest Monthly ACLs during the Capability Period in which the SCR was enrolled with an Incremental ACL within the same Capability Period; plus b) the Monthly ACLs for all months in which the SCR was enrolled within the same Capability Period with an Incremental ACL in the Capability Period in which the RIP failed to provide the minimum verification data required. In addition, a RIP may be subject to a penalty for each month for which verification data was required and not reported in accordance with this Services Tariff.

For each SCR that is enrolled with an Incremental ACL, the ISO shall compare the Net ACL calculated from the resource enrollment (ACL plus Incremental ACL less any applicable SCR Change of Status) to the Verified ACL calculated for the SCR to determine if the RIP's use of an Incremental ACL may have resulted in a shortfall pursuant to Section 5.14.2.

A Special Case Resource that was required to perform in the first performance test in the Capability Period in accordance with ISO Procedures and was subsequently enrolled using an Incremental ACL and an increase in the amount of Installed Capacity that the SCR is eligible to sell, shall be required to demonstrate performance against the maximum amount of eligible Installed Capacity reported for the SCR in the second performance test in the Capability Period. Performance in this test shall be measured from the Net ACL. Performance in both performance tests shall be used in calculation of the resource's performance factor and all associated performance factors, deficiencies and penalties. If the RIP fails to report the performance for a resource that was required to perform in the second performance test in the Capability Period: (a)

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the resource will be assigned a performance of zero (0) for the test hour, and (b) the RIP shall be evaluated for failure to report under Section 5.12.12.2 of this Services Tariff.

5.12.11.2 Existing Municipally-Owned Generation

A municipal utility that owns existing generation in excess of its Unforced Capacity requirement, net of NYPA-provided Capacity may, consistent with the deliverability requirements set forth in Attachment X and Attachment S to the ISO OATT, offer the excess Capacity for sale as Installed Capacity provided that it is willing to operate the generation at the ISO's request, and provided that the Energy produced is deliverable to the New York State Power System. Such a municipal utility shall not be required to comply with the requirement of Section 5.12.7 of this Tariff that an Installed Capacity Supplier bid into the Energy market or enter into Bilateral Transactions. Municipal utilities shall, however, be required to submit their typical physical operating parameters, such as their start-up times, to the ISO. This subsection is only applicable to municipally-owned generation in service or under construction as of December 31, 1999.

5.12.11.3 Energy Limited Resources

An Energy Limited Resource or an Aggregation that is an Energy Limited Resource may, consistent with the deliverability requirements set forth in Attachment X and Attachment S to the ISO OATT, qualify as an Installed Capacity Supplier if it Bids its Installed Capacity Equivalent into the Day-Ahead Market each day and if it is able to provide the Energy equivalent of the Unforced Capacity for the number of consecutive hours that correspond to its Energy Duration Limitation at least four (4) consecutive hours each day. Energy Limited Resources or Aggregations that are Energy Limited Resources shall also Bid a Normal Upper Operating Limit

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or Emergency Upper Operating Limit, as applicable, designating their desired operating limits.

Energy Limited Resources or Aggregations that are Energy Limited Resources that are not scheduled in the Day-Ahead Market to operate at a level above their bid-in upper operating limit, may be scheduled in the RTC, or may be called in real-time pursuant to a manual intervention by ISO dispatchers, who will account for the fact that Energy Limited Resource or an Aggregation that is an Energy Limited Resource may not be capable of responding.

5.12.11.4 Intermittent Power Resources

Intermittent Power Resources that depend upon wind or solar as their fuel or Aggregations that are entirely comprised of Intermittent Power Resources that depend on the same type of fuel, with that fuel being wind or solar, may qualify as Installed Capacity Suppliers, without having to comply with the daily bidding and scheduling requirements set forth in Section 5.12.7 of this Tariff, and may, consistent with the deliverability requirements set forth in Attachment X and Attachment S to the ISO OATT, claim up to their nameplate Capacity as Installed Capacity. To qualify as Installed Capacity Suppliers, such Intermittent Power Resources shall comply with the requirements of Section 5.12.1 and the outage notification requirements of 5.12.7 of this Tariff.

5.12.11.5 Installed Capacity Suppliers with an Energy Duration Limitation

A Resource with an Energy Duration Limitation may, consistent with the deliverability requirements set forth in Attachment X and Attachment S to the ISO OATT, qualify as an Installed Capacity Supplier with an Energy Duration Limitation if it Bids its Installed Capacity Equivalent into the Day-Ahead Market each day and if it is able to provide the Energy equivalent of the Unforced Capacity for the number of consecutive hours that correspond to its Energy

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Duration Limitation each day. Installed Capacity Suppliers with an Energy Duration Limitation shall also Bid a Normal Upper Operating Limit or Emergency Upper Operating Limit, as applicable, designating their desired operating limits. Installed Capacity Suppliers with an Energy Duration Limitation that are not scheduled in the Day-Ahead Market to operate at a level above their bid-in upper operating limit, may be scheduled in the RTC, or may be called in real-time pursuant to a manual intervention by ISO dispatchers, who will account for the fact that Installed Capacity Suppliers with an Energy Duration Limitation may not be capable of responding.

5.12.12 Sanctions Applicable to Installed Capacity Suppliers and Transmission Owners

Pursuant to this section, the ISO may impose financial sanctions on Installed Capacity Suppliers and Transmission Owners that fail to comply with certain provisions of this Tariff. The ISO shall notify Installed Capacity Suppliers and Transmission Owners prior to imposing any sanction and shall afford them a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate that they should not be sanctioned and/or to offer mitigating reasons why they should be subject to a lesser sanction. The ISO may impose a sanction lower than the maximum amounts allowed by this section at its sole discretion. Installed Capacity Suppliers and Transmission Owners may challenge any sanction imposed by the ISO pursuant to the ISO Dispute Resolution Procedures.

Any sanctions collected by the ISO pursuant to this section will be applied to reduce the Rate Schedule 1 charge under this Tariff.

5.12.12.1 Sanctions for Failing to Provide Required Information

If (i) an Installed Capacity Supplier fails to provide the information required by Sections 5.12.1.1, 5.12.1.2, 5.12.1.3, 5.12.1.4, 5.12.1.7 or 5.12.1.8 of this Tariff in a timely fashion, or (ii)

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a Supplier of Unforced Capacity from External System Resources located in an External Control Area or from a Control Area System Resource that has agreed not to Curtail the Energy associated with such Installed Capacity, or to afford it the same Curtailment priority that it affords its own Control Area Load, fails to provide the information required for certification as an Installed Capacity Supplier established in the ISO Procedures, the ISO may take the following actions: On the first day that required information is late, the ISO shall notify the Installed Capacity Supplier that required information is past due and that it reserves the right to impose financial sanctions if the information is not provided by the end of the following day. Starting on the third day that the required information is late, the ISO may impose a daily financial sanction of up to the higher of \$500 or \$5 per MW of Installed Capacity that the Generator, System Resource, or Control Area System Resource in question is capable of providing. Starting on the tenth day that the required information is late, the ISO may impose a daily financial sanction of up to the higher of \$1000 or \$10 per MW of Installed Capacity that the Generator, System Resource, or Control Area System Resource in question is capable of providing.

If an Installed Capacity Supplier fails to provide the information required by Subsection 5.12.1.5 of this Tariff in a timely fashion, the ISO may take the following actions: On the first calendar day that required information is late, the ISO shall notify the Installed Capacity Supplier that required information is past due and that it reserves the right to impose financial sanctions if the information is not provided by the end of that first calendar day. Starting on the second calendar day that the required information is late, the ISO may impose a daily financial sanction up to the higher of \$500 or \$5 per MW of Installed Capacity that the Generator, System Resource, or Control Area System Resource in question is capable of providing.

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If a TO fails to provide the information required by Subsection 5.11.3 of this Tariff in a timely fashion, the ISO may take the following actions: On the first day that required information is late, the ISO shall notify the TO that required information is past due and that it reserves the right to impose financial sanctions if the information is not provided by the end of the following day. Starting on the third day that the required information is late, the ISO may impose a daily financial sanction up to \$5,000 a day. Starting on the tenth day that required information is late, the ISO may impose a daily financial sanction up to \$10,000.

5.12.12.2 Sanctions for Failing to Comply with Scheduling, Bidding, and Notification Requirements

On any day in which an Installed Capacity Supplier fails to comply with the scheduling, bidding, or notification requirements of Sections 5.12.1.6 or 5.12.1.10, or with Section 5.12.7 of this Tariff, or in which a Supplier of Installed Capacity from External System Resources or Control Area System Resources located in an External Control Area that has agreed not to Curtail the Energy associated with such Installed Capacity, or to afford it the same Curtailment priority that it affords its own Control Area Load, fails to comply with scheduling, bidding, or notification requirements for certification as an Installed Capacity Supplier established in the ISO Procedures, the ISO may impose a financial sanction up to the product of a deficiency charge (pro-rated on a daily basis for Installed Capacity Suppliers) and the maximum number of MWs that the Installed Capacity Supplier failed to schedule or Bid in any hour in that day provided, however, that no financial sanction shall apply to any Installed Capacity Supplier who demonstrates that the Energy it schedules, bids, or declares to be unavailable on any day is not less than the Installed Capacity that it supplies for that day rounded down to the nearest 0.1 MW, or rounded down to the nearest whole MW for an External Installed Capacity Supplier. For

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Installed Capacity Suppliers that have an Energy Duration Limitation, the deficiency charge will be pro-rated on a daily basis only taking into account hours during the Peak Load Window corresponding with the Resource's Energy Duration Limitation obligation, excluding Energy Storage Resources which will be evaluated over all hours during the Peak Load Window, and the maximum number of MWs that the Installed Capacity Supplier with an Energy Duration Limitation failed to schedule or Bid in any hour in the Peak Load Window of that day provided, however, that no financial sanction shall apply to any Installed Capacity Supplier who demonstrates that the Energy it schedules, bids, or declares to be unavailable on any day is not less than the Installed Capacity that it supplies for that day rounded down to the nearest 0.1 MW.

The deficiency charge may be up to one and one-half times the applicable Market-Clearing Price of Unforced Capacity determined in the ICAP Spot Market Auction corresponding to where the Installed Capacity Supplier's capacity cleared, and for each month in which the Installed Capacity Supplier is determined not to have complied with the foregoing requirements.

In addition, if an Installed Capacity Supplier fails to comply with the scheduling, bidding, or notification requirements of Sections 5.12.1.6 or 5.12.1.10, or with Section 5.12.7 of this Tariff, or if an Installed Capacity Supplier of Unforced Capacity from External System Resources or from a Control Area System Resource located in an External Control Area that has agreed not to curtail the Energy associated with such Unforced Capacity, or to afford it the same curtailment priority that it affords its own Control Area Load, fails to comply with the scheduling, bidding, or notification requirements for certification as an Installed Capacity Supplier established in the ISO Procedures during an hour in which the ISO curtails Transactions associated with NYCA Installed Capacity Suppliers, the ISO may impose an additional financial sanction equal to the product of the number of MWs the Installed Capacity Supplier failed to

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schedule during that hour and the corresponding Real-Time LBMP at the applicable Proxy Generator Bus.

If the Installed Capacity Supplier is a Responsible Interface Party that enrolled a SCR with an Incremental ACL in accordance with this Services Tariff, and also reported an increase to the Installed Capacity the SCR has eligible to sell after the first performance test in the Capability Period, the ISO may impose an additional financial sanction due to the failure of the RIP to report the required performance of the SCR against the Net ACL value in the second performance test in the Capability Period. This sanction shall be the value of the reported increase in the eligible Installed Capacity associated with the SCR that was sold by the RIP in each month of the Capability Period, during which the reported increase was in effect, multiplied by up to one and one-half times the applicable Market-Clearing Price of Unforced Capacity determined in the ICAP Spot Market Auction for each such month.

If the Installed Capacity Supplier is a Responsible Interface Party, and the Average Coincident Load of the Special Case Resource has been decreased after the first performance test in the Capability Period, due to a SCR Change of Status in accordance with this Services Tariff and ISO Procedures, the ISO may impose an additional financial sanction resulting from the failure of the RIP to report the required performance of the SCR against the Net ACL value of the SCR when the SCR was required to perform in the second performance test in the Capability Period in accordance with Section 5.12.11.1.3.2 of this Services Tariff. This sanction shall be the value of the Unforced Capacity equivalent of the SCR Change of Status MW reported for the SCR during the months for which the SCR was enrolled with a SCR Change of Status and was required to demonstrate in the second performance test as specified in Section 5.12.11.1.3.2 of

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this Services Tariff, multiplied by up to one and one-half times the applicable Market-Clearing Price of Unforced Capacity determined in the ICAP Spot Market Auction for each such month.

If a RIP fails to provide the information required by Section 5.12.11.1.3 of this Services Tariff in accordance with the ISO Procedures for reporting a Qualified Change of Status Condition, and the ISO determines that a SCR Change of Status occurred within a Capability Period, the ISO may impose a financial sanction equal to the difference, if positive, between the enrolled ACL and the maximum one hour metered Load for the month multiplied by up to one-half times the applicable Market-Clearing Price of Unforced Capacity determined in the ICAP Spot Market Auction for each month the Installed Capacity Supplier is deemed to have a shortfall in addition to the corresponding shortfall penalty as provided in Section 5.14.2.

For each month in which a RIP fails to report required verification data and the applicable ACL value is set to zero in accordance with Section 5.12.11 of this Services Tariff, the ISO shall have the right to recover any energy payments made to the RIP for performance of the SCR by reducing other payments or other lawful means.

5.12.13 Aggregations

5.12.13.1 Resources Changing Aggregations

Individual Distributed Energy Resources may elect to leave their current Aggregation and join a new Aggregation pursuant to the Resources Changing Aggregation rules set forth in this Services Tariff section below and in Services Tariff section 4.1.10.3. The Installed Capacity of a Distributed Energy Resource that enters a new Aggregation will be assigned to the new Aggregation on a monthly basis beginning on the first day of the month in which the Distributed Energy Resource enters the new Aggregation. The Installed Capacity of a Distributed Energy Resource that exits an Aggregation will be removed from the Aggregation on the last day in

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which the Distributed Energy Resource is registered in the Aggregation. The specific processes for transferring a Distributed Energy Resource and its Installed Capacity to another Aggregation are located in the ISO Procedures.

An individual resource within an Aggregation and/or an Aggregation may only change from a homogenous Aggregation that is not a DER Aggregation to a DER Aggregation at the beginning of a Capability Year, provided that the Aggregation notifies the ISO by August 1 of the year prior to the beginning of the Capability Year. An individual resource within an Aggregation and/or an Aggregation may only change from a DER Aggregation to a homogeneous Aggregation that is not a DER Aggregation at the beginning of a Capability Year, provided that the Aggregation notifies the ISO by August 1 of the year prior to the beginning of the Capability Year. If the composition of a homogeneous Aggregation that is not a DER Aggregation changes during a Capability Year such that the homogeneous Aggregation that is not a DER Aggregation would no longer qualify as a homogeneous Aggregation that is not a DER Aggregation, the homogeneous Aggregation that is not a DER Aggregation will maintain the qualifications as a homogeneous Aggregation that is not a DER Aggregation for the remainder of the Capability Year, and, it will have to elect (i) a different Aggregation by August 1, (ii) to participate in the ISO Markets as a Generator, if qualified, or (iii) to leave the ISO Markets for the following Capability Year. If the composition of a DER Aggregation changes during a Capability Year such that the DER Aggregation would no longer qualify as a DER Aggregation, the DER Aggregation will maintain the qualifications as a DER Aggregation for the remainder of the Capability Year, and, it will have to elect (i) a different Aggregation by August 1, (ii) to participate in the ISO Markets as a Generator, if qualified, or (iii) to leave the ISO Markets for the following Capability Year. An individual Distributed Energy Resource

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seeking to participate in the ISO-administered Installed Capacity auctions that has previously acted as a retail load modifier may only register as an Installed Capacity Supplier for the upcoming Capability Year, provided that Resource notified the ISO of its intention to become an Installed Capacity Supplier by August 1 of the year prior to the start of the Capability Year and provided the output data in accordance with ISO Procedures.

5.12.13.2 Time-stacking Resources in an Aggregation

An Aggregator may sequentially stack individual Distributed Energy Resources within an Aggregation in order to meet the Energy Duration Limitations specified in Section 5.12.14. In addition to the requirements and obligations described in this section 5.12.13, the following rules apply to an Aggregation that seeks to sequentially stack individual Distributed Energy Resources:

5.12.13.2.1 each individual Distributed Energy Resource must be able to provide Energy for a minimum of one 1-hour block each day;

5.12.13.2.2 individual Distributed Energy Resources duration will be rounded-down to the nearest hour and stacked in whole-hour increments;

5.12.13.2.3 Time-stacked Aggregations will be qualified for the amount of Capacity it can sustain over the run-time requirement; and

The specific processes related to time-stacking Distributed Energy Resources in an Aggregation are located in the ISO Procedures.

5.12.14 Energy Duration Limitations and Duration Adjustment Factors for Installed Capacity Suppliers

Starting with the Capability Year that begins on May 1, 2021, Resources with a limited run-time that meet the Energy Duration Limitations identified in the tables below may qualify to

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participate as Installed Capacity Suppliers. Resources with a limited run-time must elect an Energy Duration Limitation that is less than or equal to the Resource’s ability to demonstrate sustained output at its qualified MW amount. Resources that do not have an Energy Duration Limitation will have a Duration Adjustment Factor of 100%. The Adjusted Installed Capacity for an Installed Capacity Supplier shall be calculated using the applicable Energy Duration Limitations and Duration Adjustment Factors, and in accordance with ISO Procedures, starting with the 2021/2022 Capability Year, as determined by the MW count of incremental penetration of Resources with Energy Duration Limitations as listed below:

Table 1:

<u>Incremental Penetration of Resources with Energy Duration Limitations is less than 1000 MW</u>	
<u>Energy Duration Limitations (hours)</u>	<u>Duration Adjustment Factor (%)</u>
<u>8</u>	<u>100</u>
<u>6</u>	<u>100</u>
<u>4</u>	<u>90</u>
<u>2</u>	<u>45</u>

Table 2:

<u>Incremental Penetration of Resources with Energy Duration Limitations 1000 MW and above</u>	
<u>Energy Duration Limitations (hours)</u>	<u>Duration Adjustment Factor (%)</u>
<u>8</u>	<u>100</u>
<u>6</u>	<u>90</u>
<u>4</u>	<u>75</u>

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<u>2</u>	<u>37.5</u>
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While Table 1 is in effect, Resources with an Energy Duration Limitation of 6 hours or less must fulfill the availability requirements given in Section 5.12.7 for a 6-hour Peak Load Window. While Table 2 is in effect, Resources with an Energy Duration Limitation of 6 hours or less must fulfill the availability requirements given in Section 5.12.7 for an 8-hour Peak Load Window. Resources with an Energy Duration Limitation of 8 hours must always fulfill the availability requirements given in Section 5.12.7 for an 8-hour Peak Load Window. The 6 hour Peak Load Window for the Summer Capability Period is HB 13 through HB 18, and the 6 hour Peak Load Window for the Winter Capability Period is HB 16 through HB 21. The 8 hour Peak Load Window for the Summer Capability Period is HB 12 through HB 19, and the 8 hour Peak Load Window for the Winter Capability Period is HB 14 through HB 21.

5.12.14.1 Counting Incremental Penetration of Resources with Energy Duration Limitations

The penetration levels of CRIS MW will be the sum of CRIS for Resources with Energy Duration Limitations that have elected to participate in ISO Markets with less than 8 hour duration and that have entered into service after January 1, 2019 and incremental CRIS awarded after January 1, 2019 to Resources with Energy Duration Limitations that have elected to participate in ISO Markets with less than 8 hour duration as specified below.

Penetration levels of CRIS MW for Resources with Energy Duration Limitations will be calculated in accordance with ISO Procedures as the sum of CRIS for Resources with Energy Duration Limitations of 2 hours, CRIS for Resources with Energy Duration Limitations of 4 hours and CRIS for Resources with Energy Duration Limitations of 6 hours that have entered

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into service and have participated in the ISO Markets after January 1, 2019. Penetration levels of Demand Side Resources will be calculated as the sum of the Demand Side Resource MW that have elected to participate in the ISO Capacity markets with less than 8 hour duration as of July 1, as pursuant to ISO Procedures. The MW count of Resources with Energy Duration Limitations that were in service prior to January 1, 2019 and have Retired will include CRIS for Resources with Energy Duration Limitations of 2 hours, CRIS for Resources with Energy Duration Limitations of 4 hours and CRIS for Resources with Energy Duration Limitations of 6 hours that have Retired as of July 1 each year, pursuant to ISO Procedures. Resources that obtained CRIS and were in service prior to January 1, 2019 that qualify as Resources with Energy Duration Limitations at a later date will not be included in the penetration levels of Resources with Energy Duration Limitations.

The MW count of incremental penetration of Resources with Energy Duration Limitations used to determine the applicable Duration Adjustment Factors provided in Section 5.12.14 for the upcoming Capability Year will be calculated in accordance with ISO Procedures as the sum of the penetration levels of CRIS MW, as described above, and penetration levels of Demand Side Resources, as described above, less the sum of CRIS MW for Resources with Energy Duration Limitations that have Retired, as described above, and less 1309.1 MW of SCR MW. The MW count of incremental penetration of Resources with Energy Duration Limitations with their Energy Duration Limitation election will be counted as of July 1 and posted by July 15. Once there are 1000 MW or more incremental penetration of Resources with Energy Duration Limitations, the Duration Adjustment Factors listed in Table 2 provided above in Section 5.12.14 will be effective May 1 of the following Capability Year and Table 2 will be effective notwithstanding future MW count of incremental penetration of Resources with Energy

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Duration Limitations.

5.12.14.2 Adjusted Installed Capacity

Starting with the Capability Year beginning May 1, 2021, a Resource's Unforced Capacity shall reflect the applicable Duration Adjustment Factor for the Resource's elected Energy Duration Limitation. The Adjusted Installed Capacity is equal to a Resource's Installed Capacity multiplied by the Duration Adjustment Factor. If a Resource or Aggregation wants to change its duration election it must inform the ISO by August 1 preceeding the upcoming Capability Year.

5.12.14.3 Periodic Review of Capacity Values

Starting in 2022 and occurring every four (4) years, the independent consultant for the ISO shall perform a review of the Capacity Values to re-evaluate the reliability benefit of Resources with Energy Duration Limitations in meeting Resource Adequacy criteria for the four (4) year period coinciding with the four (4) Capability Years covered by the next Demand Curve Reset filing, pursuant to Services Tariff Section 5.14.1.2.2. The periodic review shall: (i) identify the methodologies and data used to determine the Duration Adjustment Factors, (ii) evaluate the appropriate Energy Duration Limitations, (iii) re-evaluate the Duration Adjustment Factors for Resources with Energy Duration Limitations, and (iv) re-evaluate the Peak Load Window associated with the bidding requirement for Resources with Energy Duration Limitations specified below.

The periodic review shall be conducted in accordance with the schedule and procedures specified in the ISO Procedures. A proposed schedule will be reviewed with stakeholders no

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later than September 1 of the second year prior to the Demand Curve Reset filing year, pursuant to Section 5.14.1.2.2. The schedule and procedures shall provide for:

5.12.14.3.1 ISO development, with stakeholder review and comment, of a request for study, scope, assumptions, and methodology to provide consulting services to determine recommended values for the Duration Adjustment Factors specified above, and appropriate methodologies for such determination;

5.12.14.3.2 Selection of a consultant in accordance with the request in Section 5.12.14.3.1;

5.12.14.3.3 Submission to the ISO and the stakeholders of a draft report from the consultant on the consultant's determination of recommended values for the Energy Duration Limitations and the associated Duration Adjustment Factors, and Peak Load Windows specified above;

5.12.14.3.4 Stakeholder review of and comment on the data, assumptions and conclusions in the consultant's draft report, with participation by the responsible person or persons providing the consulting services;

5.12.14.3.5 An opportunity for the Market Monitoring Unit to review and comment on the draft request for the proposals, the consultant's report, and the ISO's proposed Energy Duration Limitations and the associated Duration Adjustment Factors, and Peak Load Windows for Resources with Energy Duration Limitations (the responsibilities of the Market Monitoring Unit that are addressed in this section of the Service's Tariff are also addressed in Section 30.4.6.3.1 of Attachment O);

5.12.14.3.6 Issuance by the consultant of a final report;

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5.12.14.3.7 Issuance of a draft of the ISO's recommended adjustments to the Energy Duration Limitations and the associated Duration Adjustment Factors, and Peak Load Windows for Resources with Energy Duration Limitations for stakeholder review and comment; and

5.12.14.3.8 Issuance of the ISO's proposed Energy Duration Limitations and the associated Duration Adjustment Factors, and Peak Load Windows for Resources with Energy Duration Limitations, taking into account the report of the consultant, the recommendations of the Market Monitoring Unit, and the views of the stakeholders together with the rationale for accepting or rejecting any such inputs.

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5.13 Installed Capacity Auctions

5.13.1 General Auction Requirements

The ISO will administer Installed Capacity auctions to accommodate LSEs' and Installed Capacity Suppliers' efforts to enter into Unforced Capacity Transactions and to give LSEs an opportunity to acquire sufficient Unforced Capacity to meet their respective LSE Unforced Capacity Obligations. The ISO shall conduct regular auctions, at the request of an LSE, at the times specified in this section and the ISO Procedures, and may conduct additional auction as necessary.

Installed Capacity Suppliers, LSEs and Installed Capacity Marketers that are Customers under this Tariff will be allowed to participate in Installed Capacity auctions, provided that they satisfy the creditworthiness requirements set forth in Attachment K of the ISO OATT. Unforced Capacity purchased in Installed Capacity auctions may not be sold for the purposes of meeting Installed Capacity requirements imposed by operators of External Control Areas. Offers to sell and bids to purchase Unforced Capacity shall be made in \$/kW for the time period appropriate to the auction. The ISO shall impose no limits on Bids or offers in any auction, except to the extent required by any applicable Capacity market mitigation measures.

Installed Capacity Suppliers that wish to participate in an ISO-administered auction must submit completed certification forms to the ISO in accordance with the ISO Procedures, demonstrating that their Unforced Capacity has not been committed to a Bilateral Transaction.

The ISO Procedures shall specify the dates by which the ISO will post the results of Installed Capacity auctions. The ISO Procedures shall ensure that there are at least four business days between the time that auction results from monthly auctions are posted and the dates that LSEs are required to demonstrate the quantity of Unforced Capacity that has been obtained for

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the upcoming Obligation Procurement Period, pursuant to Section 5.11.2 of this Tariff. LSEs holding Unforced Capacity which they want credited against their LSE Unforced Capacity Obligations must certify such Unforced Capacity when submitting their Installed Capacity certifications.

5.13.2 Capability Period Auction

A Capability Period Auction will be conducted no later than thirty (30) days prior to the start of each Capability Period in which Unforced Capacity will be purchased and sold for the entire duration of the Capability Period. The exact date of the Capability Period Auction shall be established in the ISO Procedures. The Capability Period Auction is intended to facilitate long-term Unforced Capacity transactions between Market Participants.

The Capability Period Auction will be conducted and solved simultaneously to purchase Unforced Capacity which may be used by an LSE toward all components of its LSE Unforced Capacity Obligation for each Obligation Procurement Period. Participation shall consist of: (i) LSEs seeking to purchase Unforced Capacity; (ii) any other entity seeking to purchase Unforced Capacity; (iii) qualified Installed Capacity Suppliers; and (iv) any other entity that owns excess Unforced Capacity.

Buyers that are awarded Unforced Capacity shall pay the applicable Market-Clearing Price of Unforced Capacity in the Capability Period Auction. Sellers that are selected to provide Unforced Capacity shall receive the applicable Market-Clearing Price of Unforced Capacity in the Capability Period Auction.

The results of the Capability Period Auction will be made available to Market Participants at the time specified in the ISO Procedures, which shall be prior to the start of the Monthly Auction held prior to the beginning of each Capability Period.

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5.13.3 Monthly Auctions

Monthly Auctions will be held during which Unforced Capacity may be purchased and sold for the forthcoming Obligation Procurement Period, and any other month or months remaining in the Capability Period, as specified in the ISO Procedures. The exact dates of each Monthly Auction shall be established in the ISO Procedures. Each Monthly Auction is intended to facilitate Unforced Capacity transactions between Market Participants.

Each Monthly Auction will be conducted and solved simultaneously to purchase Unforced Capacity which may be used by an LSE toward all components of its LSE Unforced Capacity Obligation for each Obligation Period. Participation shall consist of: (i) LSEs seeking to purchase Unforced Capacity; (ii) any other entity seeking to purchase Unforced Capacity; (iii) qualified Installed Capacity Suppliers; and (iv) any other entity that owns excess Unforced Capacity.

Buyers that are awarded Unforced Capacity shall pay the applicable Market-Clearing Price of Unforced Capacity in the Monthly Auction. Sellers that are selected to provide Unforced Capacity shall receive the applicable Market-Clearing Price.

The results of each Monthly Auction will be made available to Market Participants in accordance with the ISO Procedures.

5.13.4 Detailed Installed Capacity Auction Description

Additional detail concerning the ISO's Installed Capacity auction procedures are provided in the ISO Procedures.

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5.14 Installed Capacity Spot Market Auction and Installed Capacity Supplier Deficiencies

5.14.1 LSE Participation in the ICAP Spot Market Auction

5.14.1.1 ICAP Spot Market Auction

When the ISO conducts each ICAP Spot Market Auction it will account for all Unforced Capacity that each NYCA LSE has certified for use in the NYCA to meet its NYCA Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement or Locational Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement, as applicable, whether purchased through Bilateral Transactions or in prior auctions. The ISO shall receive offers of Unforced Capacity that has not previously been purchased through Bilateral Transactions or in prior auctions from qualified Installed Capacity Suppliers for the ICAP Spot Market Auction. Interim Service Providers must offer at \$0.00/kW-month all of their Unforced Capacity into each ICAP Spot Market Auction conducted for each Obligation Procurement Period associate with a month in which it is to receive compensation under Rate Schedule 8 of the Services Tariff. If an Interim Service Provider is expressly precluded from offering all or a portion of its UCAP into an ICAP Spot Market Auction because it is obligated to provide capacity pursuant to a bilateral contract that is effective at the time of the ICAP Spot Market Auction, and was executed and effective before the NYISO received a Generator Deactivation Notice the Interim Service Provider (such contract a “Preexisting Capacity Bilateral”), then the Interim Service Provider shall only be required to offer the amount of its Unforced Capacity into that ICAP Spot Market Auction that it is not expressly required to provide pursuant to the terms of the such Preexisting Capacity Bilateral. The quantity of Unforced Capacity the Interim Service Provider is required to offer in accordance with this paragraph is the “ISP UCAP MW”. The ISO shall also receive offers of Unforced Capacity from any LSE for any amount of Unforced Capacity

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that the LSE has in excess of its NYCA Minimum Unforced Capacity Requirement or Locational Minimum Unforced Capacity Requirement, as applicable. Unforced Capacity that will be exported from the New York Control Area during the month for which Unforced Capacity is sold in an ICAP Spot Market Auction shall be certified to the NYISO by the certification deadline for that auction.

The ISO shall conduct an ICAP Spot Market Auction to purchase Unforced Capacity which shall be used by an LSE toward all components of its LSE Unforced Capacity Obligation for each Obligation Procurement Period immediately preceding the start of each Obligation Procurement Period. The exact date of the ICAP Spot Market Auction shall be established in the ISO Procedures. All LSEs shall participate in the ICAP Spot Market Auction. In the ICAP Spot Market Auction, the ISO shall submit monthly bids on behalf of all LSEs at a level per MW determined by the ICAP Demand Curves established in accordance with this Tariff and the ISO Procedures. The ICAP Spot Market Auction will set the LSE Unforced Capacity Obligation for each NYCA LSE in accordance with the ISO Procedures.

The ICAP Spot Market Auction will be conducted and solved simultaneously for Unforced Capacity that may be used by an LSE towards all components of its LSE Unforced Capacity Obligation for that Obligation Procurement Period using the applicable ICAP Demand Curves, as established in accordance with the ISO Procedures. LSEs that are awarded Unforced Capacity in the ICAP Spot Market Auction shall pay to the ISO the Market-Clearing Price of Unforced Capacity determined in the ICAP Spot Market Auction using the applicable ICAP Demand Curve. The ISO shall pay each Installed Capacity Supplier that is selected to provide Unforced Capacity the Market-Clearing Price determined in the ICAP Spot Market Auction using the ICAP Demand Curve applicable to its offer.

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5.14.1.2 Demand Curve and Adjustments

ICAP Demand Curves will be established to determine (a) the locational component of LSE Unforced Capacity Obligations for each Locality (b) the locational component of LSE Unforced Capacity Obligations for any New Capacity Zone, and (c) the total LSE Unforced Capacity Obligations for all LSEs. The ICAP Demand Curves for the 2016/2017 and 2017/2018 Capability Years shall be established at the following points (in accordance with Section 5.14.1.2.2, the ICAP Demand Curve values for the 2018/2019 through 2020/2021 Capability Years will be determined pursuant to the respective annual updates for each such Capability Year):

Capability Year	5/1/2016 to 4/30/2017	5/1/2017 to 4/30/2018	5/1/2018 to 4/30/2019	5/1/2019 to 4/30/2020	5/1/2020 to 4/30/2021
NYCA	Max @ \$14.10 \$9.23 @ 100% \$0.00 @ 112%	Max @ \$15.85 \$9.08 @ 100% \$0.00 @ 112%	To be posted on the ISO website on or before November 30, 2017	To be posted on the ISO website on or before November 30, 2018	To be posted on the ISO website on or before November 30, 2019
NYC	Max @ \$27.31 \$19.37 @ 100% \$0.00 @ 118%	Max @ \$26.14 \$18.61 @ 100% \$0.00 @ 118%	To be posted on the ISO website on or before November 30, 2017	To be posted on the ISO website on or before November 30, 2018	To be posted on the ISO website on or before November 30, 2019
LI	Max @ \$21.81 \$8.30 @ 100% \$0.00 @ 118%	Max @ \$24.37 \$12.72 @ 100% \$0.00 @ 118%	To be posted on the ISO website on or before November 30, 2017	To be posted on the ISO website on or before November 30, 2018	To be posted on the ISO website on or before November 30, 2019

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G-J	Max @ \$19.64 \$12.68 @ 100% \$0.00 @ 115%	Max @ \$21.85 \$14.84 @ 100% \$0.00 @ 115%	To be posted on the ISO website on or before November 30, 2017	To be posted on the ISO website on or before November 30, 2018	To be posted on the ISO website on or before November 30, 2019
NOTE: All dollar figures are in terms of \$/kW-month of ICAP and all percentages are in terms of the applicable NYCA Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement and Locational Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement. The defined points describe a line segment with a negative slope that will result in higher values for percentages less than 100% of the NYCA Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement or the Locational Installed Capacity Requirement (“reference point”) with the maximum value for each ICAP Demand Curve established at 1.5 times the estimated localized levelized cost per kW-month to develop a new peaking unit in each Locality or in Rest of State, as applicable.					

In subsequent years, the costs assigned by the ICAP Demand Curves to the NYCA Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement, the Locational Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement, and any Indicative NCZ Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement, will be defined by the results of the independent review conducted pursuant to this section. The ICAP Demand Curves will be translated into Unforced Capacity terms in accordance with the ISO Procedures.

5.14.1.2.1 Periodic Reviews of ICAP Demand Curves Applicable Prior to the 2017/2018 Capability Year

For ICAP Demand Curves applicable prior to the 2017/2018 Capability Year, a periodic review of the ICAP Demand Curves shall be performed every three (3) years in accordance with the ISO Procedures to determine the parameters of the ICAP Demand Curves for the next three Capability Years. The periodic review shall assess: (i) the current localized levelized embedded cost of a peaking plant in each NYCA Locality, the Rest of State, and any New Capacity Zone, to meet minimum capacity requirements, and (ii) the likely projected annual Energy and Ancillary Services revenues of the peaking plant over the period covered by the adjusted ICAP Demand Curves, net of the costs of producing such Energy and Ancillary Services. The cost and

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revenues of the peaking plant used to set the reference point and maximum value for each ICAP Demand Curve shall be determined under conditions in which the available capacity is equal to the sum of (a) the minimum Installed Capacity requirement and (b) the peaking plant's capacity equal to the number of MW specified in the periodic review and used to determine all costs and revenues. The minimum Installed Capacity requirement for each Locality shall be equal to the Locational Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement in effect for the year in which the independent consultant's final report (referenced below in Section 5.14.1.2.1.6) is issued; for the NYCA, equal to the NYCA Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement based on the Installed Reserve Margin accepted by the Commission and applicable to the Capability Year which begins in the Capability Year in which the independent consultant's final report is issued; and for any New Capacity Zone, equal to the Indicative NCZ Locational Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement determined by the ISO in accordance with Section 5.16.3. The periodic review shall also assess (i) the appropriate shape and slope of the ICAP Demand Curves, and the associated point at which the dollar value of the ICAP Demand Curves should decline to zero; (ii) the appropriate translation of the annual net revenue requirement of the peaking plant determined from the factors specified above, into monthly values that take into account seasonal differences in the amount of capacity available in the ICAP Spot Market Auctions; and (iii) the escalation factor and inflation component of the escalation factor applied to the ICAP Demand Curves. For purposes of this periodic review, a peaking unit is defined as the unit with technology that results in the lowest fixed costs and highest variable costs among all other units' technology that are economically viable, and a peaking plant is defined as the number of units (whether one or more) that constitute the scale identified in the periodic review.

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The periodic review shall be conducted in accordance with the schedule and procedures specified in the ISO Procedures. A proposed schedule will be reviewed with the stakeholders not later than May 30 of the year prior to the year of the filing specified in Section 5.14.1.2.1.11.

The schedule and procedures shall provide for:

- 5.14.1.2.1.1 ISO development, with stakeholder review and comment, of a request for proposals to provide independent consulting services to determine recommended values for the factors specified above, and appropriate methodologies for such determination;
- 5.14.1.2.1.2 Selection of an independent consultant in accordance with the request for proposals;
- 5.14.1.2.1.3 Submission to the ISO and the stakeholders of a draft report from the independent consultant on the independent consultant's determination of recommended values for the factors specified above;
- 5.14.1.2.1.4 Stakeholder review of and comment on the data, assumptions and conclusions in the independent consultant's draft report, with participation by the responsible person or persons providing the consulting services;
- 5.14.1.2.1.5 An opportunity for the Market Monitoring Unit to review and comment on the draft request for proposals, the independent consultant's report, and the ISO's proposed ICAP Demand Curves (the responsibilities of the Market Monitoring Unit that are addressed in this section of the Services Tariff are also addressed in Section 30.4.6.3.1 of Attachment O);
- 5.14.1.2.1.6 Issuance by the independent consultant of a final report;

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5.14.1.2.1.7 Issuance of a draft of the ISO's recommended adjustments to the ICAP

Demand Curves for stakeholder review and comment;

5.14.1.2.1.8 Issuance of the ISO's proposed ICAP Demand Curves, taking into account

the report of the independent consultant, the recommendations of the Market

Monitoring Unit, and the views of the stakeholders together with the rationale for

accepting or rejecting any such inputs;

5.14.1.2.1.9 Submission of stakeholder requests for the ISO Board of Directors to

review and adjust the ISO's proposed ICAP Demand Curves;

5.14.1.2.1.10 Presentations to the ISO Board of Directors of stakeholder views on the

ISO's proposed ICAP Demand Curves; and

5.14.1.2.1.11 Filing with the Commission of ICAP Demand Curves as approved by the

ISO Board of Directors incorporating the results of the periodic review, such

filing to be made not later than November 30 of the year prior to the year that

includes the beginning of the first Capability Year to which such ICAP Demand

Curves would be applied. The filing shall specify ICAP Demand Curves for a

period of three Capability Years and the inflation rate component of the escalation

factor applied to the ICAP Demand Curves.

Upon FERC approval, the ICAP Demand Curves will be translated into Unforced Capacity terms in accordance with the ISO Procedures; provided that nothing in this Tariff shall be construed to limit the ability of the ISO or its Market Participants to propose and adopt alternative provisions to this Tariff through established governance procedures.

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5.14.1.2.2 Periodic Reviews of ICAP Demand Curves Applicable Beginning with the 2017/2018 Capability Year

Beginning with the ICAP Demand Curves applicable for the 2017/2018 Capability Year, a periodic review of the ICAP Demand Curves shall be performed every four (4) years in accordance with the ISO Procedures to: (i) identify the methodologies and inputs used for determining the ICAP Demand Curves for the four Capability Years covered by the periodic review; and (ii) establish the ICAP Demand Curves for the first Capability Year covered by the periodic review.

The periodic review shall assess: (i) the current localized levelized embedded cost of a peaking plant in each NYCA Locality, the Rest of State, and any New Capacity Zone, to meet minimum capacity requirements (for purposes of this Section 5.14.1.2.2 hereinafter referred to as the “peaking plant gross cost”); and (ii) the likely projected annual Energy and Ancillary Services revenues of the peaking plant for the first Capability Year covered by the periodic review, net of the costs of producing such Energy and Ancillary Services (for purposes of this Section 5.14.1.2.2 hereinafter referred to as the “net Energy and Ancillary Services revenue offset”), including the methodology and inputs for determining such projections for the four Capability Years covered by the periodic review. The cost and revenues of the peaking plant used to set the reference point and maximum value for each ICAP Demand Curve shall be determined under conditions in which the available capacity is equal to the sum of (a) the minimum Installed Capacity requirement and (b) the peaking plant’s capacity equal to the number of MW specified in the periodic review and used to determine all costs and revenues (for purposes of this Section 5.14.1.2.2 hereinafter referred to as the “prescribed level of excess”). The minimum Installed Capacity requirement for each Locality shall be equal to the Locational Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement in effect for the year in which the independent

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consultant's final report (referenced below in Section 5.14.1.2.2.4.6) is issued; for the NYCA, equal to the NYCA Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement based on the Installed Reserve Margin accepted by the Commission and applicable to the Capability Year which begins in the Capability Year in which the independent consultant's final report is issued; and for any New Capacity Zone, equal to the Indicative NCZ Locational Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement determined by the NYISO in accordance with Section 5.16.3. The periodic review shall also assess (i) the appropriate shape and slope of the ICAP Demand Curves, and the associated point at which the dollar value of the ICAP Demand Curves should decline to zero; (ii) the appropriate translation of the annual net revenue requirement of the peaking plant determined from the factors specified above, into monthly values that take into account seasonal differences in the amount of capacity available in the ICAP Spot Market Auctions in accordance with the methodology set forth in Section 5.14.1.2.2.3; and (iii) the escalation factor and inflation component of the escalation factor applied to the peaking plant gross cost, including the methodology and inputs for determining such values. For purposes of this periodic review, a peaking unit is defined as the unit with technology that results in the lowest fixed costs and highest variable costs among all other units' technology that are economically viable, and a peaking plant is defined as the number of units (whether one or more) that constitute the scale identified in the periodic review.

In the filing referenced in Section 5.14.1.2.2.4.11 below, the ISO will: (i) identify the methodologies and inputs used for determining the ICAP Demand Curves for the four Capability Years covered by the periodic review; and (ii) propose the ICAP Demand Curves for the first Capability Year covered by the periodic review. For the subsequent three Capability Years covered by the periodic review, the ISO will establish the ICAP Demand Curves for each such

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Capability Year by updating the following factors in advance of each such subsequent Capability Year: (i) the peaking plant gross cost in accordance with Section 5.14.1.2.2.1; (ii) the net Energy and Ancillary Services revenue offset in accordance with Section 5.14.1.2.2.2; and (iii) the winter-to-summer ratio, as such term is defined in Section 5.14.1.2.2.3, in accordance with Section 5.14.1.2.2.3. The ISO will post the updated ICAP Demand Curves for each subsequent Capability Year covered by the periodic review on or before November 30th of the calendar year immediately preceding the calendar year that includes the start of the Capability Year for which the updated ICAP Demand Curves will apply.

5.14.1.2.2.1 Annual Updates for Peaking Plant Gross Cost

For purposes of the annual updates to the ICAP Demand Curves, the ISO shall determine updated values for the peaking plant gross cost for each peaking plant. Updated values for the peaking plant gross cost shall be determined by application of an escalation factor to the peaking plant gross cost values underlying the then currently effective ICAP Demand Curves. The escalation factor shall consist of the following four components: (i) changes in construction material costs (“materials component”); (ii) changes in turbine generator costs (“turbine component”); (iii) changes in labor costs (“labor component”); and (iv) changes in the general cost of goods and services (“general component”). The escalation factor shall be equal to the sum of the: (i) the twelve month percentage change in the applicable index for the materials component, multiplied by the applicable weighting factor for such component; (ii) the twelve month percentage change in the applicable index for the turbine component, multiplied by the applicable weighting factor for such component; (iii) the twelve month percentage change in the applicable index for the labor component, multiplied by the applicable weighting factor for such component; and (iv) the twelve month percentage change in the applicable index for the general

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component, multiplied by the applicable weighting factor for such component. For purposes of determining the twelve month percentage change for each component, the values utilized from each applicable index shall be as follows: (i) for indices that publish annual values, the most recently available annual value and the annual value for the calendar year immediately preceding thereto; (ii) for indices that publish monthly values, the average value of the three most recently available monthly values and the average value of values for the same three months from the calendar year immediately preceding thereto; and (iii) for indices that publish quarterly values, the value of the most recently available calendar quarter and the value for the same calendar quarter from the calendar year immediately preceding thereto. The applicable values to be used by the ISO shall be the available finalized values established by the publisher for each index as of October 1st of the same calendar year as the applicable November 30th deadline for posting the updated ICAP Demand Curves. The ISO shall not use any preliminary values published by an index in determining the applicable twelve month percentage change for any component of the escalation factor. The weighting factors applied to each component shall be determined as part of the periodic review, identified in the filing required by Section 5.14.1.2.2.4.11 and remain fixed for the entire period covered by the periodic review. The specified index for each component shall likewise be determined as part of the periodic review, identified in the filing required by Section 5.14.1.2.2.4.11 and remain fixed for the entire period covered by the periodic review, unless an index is eliminated, replaced or otherwise terminated by the publisher thereof during the period covered by the periodic review. In such circumstance, the ISO shall utilize the replacement or successor index established by the publisher, if any, or, in the absence of a replacement or successor index, shall select as a replacement a substantially similar index.

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5.14.1.2.2.2 Annual Updates for Net Energy and Ancillary Revenue Offset

For purposes of the annual updates to the ICAP Demand Curves, the ISO shall also determine updated values for the net Energy and Ancillary Services revenue offset associated with each peaking plant. Updated values for the net Energy and Ancillary Services revenue offset shall, in part, be determined using a net revenue model that will be developed as part of the periodic review and made available to stakeholders. The model will, at a minimum, determine whether each peaking plant could earn positive net revenue by producing Energy in each hour based on historical prices and the variable costs for each peaking plant over the prior 36 month period ending August 31st of the same calendar year as the applicable November 30th deadline for posting the updated ICAP Demand Curves, as well as the physical operating characteristics of each peaking plant and any operating hours constraints necessary to address any applicable environmental requirements and/or fuel availability. The commitment and dispatch logic and data sources and/or inputs used by the model, as well as the manner in which the model accounts for net Ancillary Services revenues earned by each peaking plant, the physical operating characteristics of each peaking plant and any operating hours constraints applicable to each peaking plant that are necessary to address any applicable environmental requirements and/or fuel availability, will be determined as part of the periodic review, identified in the filing required by Section 5.14.1.2.2.4.11 and remain fixed for the entire period covered by the periodic review, subject to annual updating of certain data inputs used by the model as described herein.

The model will determine whether each peaking plant could earn positive net revenue by producing Energy in each hour of the period encompassed by the model in a manner consistent with the following equation:

$$Net\ Energy\ revenue_{z,t} = \max([Output_{z,t} * (LOE_{z,t} * LBMP_{z,t})] - MC_{z,t}, 0)$$

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where:

$Output_{z,t}$ = the quantity of Energy produced by the peaking plant for Load Zone z in hour t ;

$LOE_{z,t}$ = the applicable adjustment factor for Load Zone z and hour t used to adjust for the prescribed level of excess. The adjustment factors shall be determined as part of the periodic review, identified in the filing required by Section 5.14.1.2.2.4.11 and remain fixed for the entire period covered by the periodic review;

$LBMP_{z,t}$ = the Day-Ahead zonal LBMP or time-weighted/integrated zonal RTD LBMP, as applicable, for Load Zone z and hour t ;

$MC_{z,t}$ = variable (or short-run marginal) cost of the peaking plant for Load Zone z to produce Energy in hour t , calculated as follows:

$$MC_{z,t} = [(HR_{z,t} * Fuel_{z,t}) + VOM_{z,t} + ASC_{z,t} + EC_{z,t} + RSI_{z,t}] * Output_{z,t}$$

where:

$HR_{z,t}$ = the heat rate of the peaking plant for Load Zone z and hour t . The heat rate for the peaking plant shall be determined as part of the periodic review, identified in the filing required by Section 5.14.1.2.2.4.11 and remain fixed for the entire period covered by the periodic review;

$Fuel_{z,t}$ = the applicable fuel cost for the peaking plant for Load Zone z and hour t , which shall be the lesser of the primary fuel cost and the backup fuel cost, if any, for the peaking plant for Load Zone z . The primary fuel and any backup fuel for the peaking plant for Load Zone z shall be determined as part of the periodic review, identified in the filing required by Section 5.14.1.2.2.4.11 and remain fixed for the entire period covered by the periodic review. The applicable fuel cost will be based on the applicable daily spot price for Load Zone z published in the specified data source determined as part of the periodic review (unless such data source is revised for the reasons described below), plus an adder to account for any applicable

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transportation and delivery costs and any applicable fuel taxes, which adder shall be determined as part of the periodic review, identified in the filing required by Section 5.14.1.2.2.4.11 and remain fixed for the entire period covered by the periodic review. For real-time evaluations only, the otherwise applicable fuel cost shall be increased by the applicable real-time fuel premium adder for Load Zone z and hour t , which adder shall be determined as part of the periodic review, identified in the filing required by Section 5.14.1.2.2.4.11 and remain fixed for the entire period covered by the periodic review. The data sources used for determining the applicable daily spot fuel prices shall be determined as part of the periodic review, identified in the filing required by Section 5.14.1.2.2.4.11 and remain fixed for the entire period covered by the periodic review, unless the specified data source is eliminated, replaced or otherwise terminated by the publisher thereof during the period covered by the periodic review. In such circumstance, the ISO shall utilize the replacement or successor data source established by the publisher, if any, or, in the absence of a replacement or successor data source, shall select as a replacement a substantially similar data source;

$VOM_{z,t}$ = variable operating and maintenance cost of the peaking plant for Load Zone z and hour t , which cost shall be determined as part of the periodic review, identified in the filing required by Section 5.14.1.2.2.4.11 and remain fixed for the entire period covered by the periodic review;

$ASC_{z,t}$ = amortized start-up cost for the peaking plant for Load Zone z and hour t . The model will ensure that the total value of this cost is recovered over the number of consecutive hours for which the model determines that the peaking plant should be committed or dispatched to produce Energy following each start of the peaking plant in the same market (Day-Ahead or real-time); provided, however, that in real-time, start-up costs must be recovered over a period of no more

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than two consecutive hours following the time at which the model determines that the peaking plant should be dispatched to produce Energy;

$EC_{z,t}$ = the sum of CO₂, NO_x and SO₂ emissions allowance costs for the peaking plant for Load

Zone z and hour t , which shall be calculated as follows:

$$EC_{z,t} = (CO_2 \text{ emissions rate}_{z,t} * CO_2 \text{ allowance price}_{z,t}) + (NO_x \text{ emissions rate}_{z,t} * NO_x \text{ allowance price}_{z,t}) + (SO_2 \text{ emissions rate}_{z,t} * SO_2 \text{ allowance price}_{z,t})$$

where:

The applicable emissions rates for the peaking plant for Load Zone z and hour t shall be determined as part of the periodic review, identified in the filing required by Section 5.14.1.2.2.4.11 and remain fixed for the entire period covered by the periodic review. The applicable allowance price for each emissions type shall be the price reported by the specified data source for each emissions type determined as part of the periodic review (unless such data source is revised for the reasons described below). The data sources for allowance prices shall be determined as part of the periodic review, identified in the filing required by Section 5.14.1.2.2.4.11 and remain fixed for the entire period covered by the periodic review, unless a specified data source is eliminated, replaced or otherwise terminated by the publisher thereof during the period covered by the periodic review. In such circumstance, the ISO shall utilize the replacement or successor data source established by the publisher, if any, or, in the absence of a replacement or successor data source, shall select as a replacement a substantially similar data source; and

$RS1_{z,t}$ = the applicable charges for the ISO annual budget and the annual FERC fee assessed to Injection Billing Units for Load Zone z and hour t in accordance with Rate Schedule 1 of the ISO OATT.

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The results of the model will be used to determine an average annual net revenue value earned by each peaking plant over the period encompassed by the model. Such value will be increased by an adder to account for the estimated annual value of any applicable net Ancillary Services revenue for each peaking plant that is not determined by the model, which adder shall be determined as part of the periodic review, identified in the filing required by Section 5.14.1.2.2.4.11 and remain fixed for the entire period covered by the periodic review. The resulting value for each peaking plant shall be the updated net Energy and Ancillary Services revenue offset value to be used in establishing the ICAP Demand Curves for the applicable Capability Year.

5.14.1.2.2.3 Annual Updates for ICAP Demand Curve Parameters

The ISO shall use the updated peaking plant gross cost and the updated net Energy and Ancillary Services revenue offset values in determining the parameters of the ICAP Demand Curves for the applicable Capability Year. The maximum value for each ICAP Demand Curve shall be established at 1.5 times the monthly value of the applicable updated peaking plant gross cost. The reference point for each ICAP Demand Curve shall be determined in accordance with ISO Procedures; provided, however, that the ratio of the amount of capacity available in the ICAP Spot Market Auctions in the Winter Capability Period to the amount of capacity available in the ICAP Spot Market Auctions in the Summer Capability Period used in calculating the reference point (the “winter-to-summer ratio”) shall be updated annually based on the average amount of capacity available in the ICAP Spot Market Auctions for the Summer Capability Period months and Winter Capability Period months in each 12-month period (measured from September through the following August) encompassed by the same historical period utilized by the net revenue model. The values used in determining the amount of capacity available in the

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ICAP Spot Market Auctions shall be the available Unforced Capacity values reported by the ISO and posted on its website for the relevant months, translated to Installed Capacity values based on the applicable translation factors reported by the ISO and posted on its website for each such month. For Resources other than Special Case Resources, the values posted by the ISO shall include the following adjustments to account for ICAP market entry and exit under certain circumstances: (i) if within any of the three 12-month periods (*i.e.*, September through the following August) encompassed by the data used in calculating an updated winter-to-summer ratio value, a Resource (other than a Resource returning to participate in the ICAP market from an Inactive Reserves state) begins to qualify as eligible to participate in the ICAP market in any month encompassed by such 12-month period and remains eligible to participate in the ICAP market for the subsequent months encompassed by that period, the ISO shall adjust the values for all months of that 12-month period to include the Resource's applicable available capacity; and (ii) if within any of the three 12-month periods (*i.e.*, September through the following August) encompassed by the data used in calculating an updated winter-to-summer ratio value, a Resource is Retired or enters a Mothball Outage or ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage state during any month encompassed by such 12-month period and remains ineligible to participate in the ICAP market for the subsequent months encompassed by that period, the ISO shall adjust the values for all months of that 12-month period to exclude the Resource's applicable available capacity. The applicable capacity ratings for each peaking plant utilized in calculating the reference point and the point on each ICAP Demand Curve at which the price of ICAP declines to zero shall be determined as part of the periodic review and shall remain fixed for the entire period covered by the periodic review.

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Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, for purposes of the annual updates for the 2018/2019, 2019/2020 and 2020/2021 Capability Years, the reference point for each ICAP Demand Curve shall not be permitted to increase by an amount greater than twelve percent (12%) or decrease by an amount greater than eight percent (8%) from one Capability Year to the next, compared to the then currently effective reference point for the relevant ICAP Demand Curve. If the reference point value for an ICAP Demand Curve, as calculated by the ISO pursuant to the annual update procedures, for one of the affected Capability Years exceeds the maximum allowable percentage increase or decrease, the reference point established by the ISO for that ICAP Demand Curve for the relevant Capability Year shall be an amount equal to the price that represents the applicable maximum allowable percentage increase or decrease. If an adjusted reference point value is applied to an ICAP Demand Curve for a Capability Year, the maximum allowable percentage increase or decrease for the next Capability Year shall be determined using the adjusted reference point value. As part of the required posting to establish the updated ICAP Demand Curves for each of the affected Capability Years, the ISO will provide the reference point values calculated by the ISO pursuant to the annual update procedures, as well the adjusted reference point values, if any, that result from the application of the limitation described herein. The limitation described above regarding the allowable annual change to the reference point values calculated by the ISO pursuant to the annual update procedures shall not be applied to the reference point values for any ICAP Demand Curve after the 2020/2021 Capability Year.

The peaking plant gross cost and net Energy and Ancillary Services revenue offset values utilized in determining the parameters of the ICAP Demand Curves for the 2017/2018 Capability Year are as follows:

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	Peaking Plant Gross Cost (\$ per kW-year)	Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset (\$ per kW-year)
NYCA	\$126.79	\$35.70
G-J	\$174.79	\$40.39
NYC	\$209.11	\$55.26
LI	\$194.96	\$104.20

5.14.1.2.2.4 Periodic Review Procedures

The periodic review shall be conducted in accordance with the schedule and procedures specified in the ISO Procedures. A proposed schedule will be reviewed with the stakeholders not later than May 30th of the year prior to the year of the filing specified in Section 5.14.1.2(b).11.

The schedule and procedures shall provide for:

5.14.1.2.2.4.1 ISO development, with stakeholder review and comment, of a request for proposals to provide independent consulting services to determine recommended values for the factors specified above, and appropriate methodologies and inputs for such determination;

5.14.1.2.2.4.2 Selection of an independent consultant in accordance with the request for proposals;

5.14.1.2.2.4.3 Submission to the ISO and the stakeholders of a draft report from the independent consultant on the independent consultant's determination of recommended values for the factors specified above, including, as applicable, the methodologies and inputs for determining such values;

5.14.1.2.2.4.4 Stakeholder review of and comment on the data, assumptions and conclusions in the independent consultant's draft report, with participation by the responsible person or persons providing the consulting services;

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5.14.1.2.2.4.5 An opportunity for the Market Monitoring Unit to review and comment on the draft request for proposals, the independent consultant's report, and the ISO's proposed: (i) methodologies and inputs used for determining the ICAP Demand Curves for the four Capability Years covered by the periodic review; and (ii) ICAP Demand Curves for the first Capability Year covered by the periodic review. The responsibilities of the Market Monitoring Unit that are addressed in this section of the Services Tariff are also addressed in Section 30.4.6.3.1 of Attachment O;

5.14.1.2.2.4.6 Issuance by the independent consultant of a final report;

5.14.1.2.2.4.7 Issuance of a draft of the ISO's recommended: (i) methodologies and inputs used for determining the ICAP Demand Curves for the four Capability Years covered by the periodic review; and (ii) ICAP Demand Curves for the first Capability Year covered by the periodic review, for stakeholder review and comment;

5.14.1.2.2.4.8 Issuance of the ISO's proposed: (i) methodologies and inputs used for determining the ICAP Demand Curves for the four Capability Years covered by the periodic review; and (ii) ICAP Demand Curves for the first Capability Year covered by the periodic review, taking into account the report of the independent consultant, the recommendations of the Market Monitoring Unit, and the views of the stakeholders together with the rationale for accepting or rejecting any such inputs;

5.14.1.2.2.4.9 Submission of stakeholder requests for the ISO Board of Directors to review and adjust the ISO's proposed: (i) methodologies and inputs used for

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determining the ICAP Demand Curves for the four Capability Years covered by the periodic review; and (ii) ICAP Demand Curves for the first Capability Year covered by the periodic review;

5.14.1.2.2.4.10 Presentations to the ISO Board of Directors of stakeholder views on the ISO's proposed: (i) methodologies and inputs used for determining the ICAP Demand Curves for the four Capability Years covered by the periodic review; and (ii) ICAP Demand Curves for the first Capability Year covered by the periodic review; and

5.14.1.2.2.4.11 Filing with the Commission of: (i) a description of the methodologies and inputs used for determining the ICAP Demand Curves for the four Capability Years covered by the periodic review; and (ii) the ICAP Demand Curves for the first Capability Year covered by the periodic review, as approved by the ISO Board of Directors incorporating the results of the periodic review. Such filing will be made not later than November 30th of the year prior to the year that includes the beginning of the first Capability Year covered by the periodic review. The filing will also specify the inflation rate that would have been used to calculate the general component of the escalation factor as if the escalation factor were applicable to the first Capability Year covered by the periodic review. Such inflation rate shall be equal to the twelve month percentage change in the applicable index for the general component, as determined in accordance with Section 5.14.1.2.2.1 utilizing the applicable values of the index as of October 1st in the same calendar year as the November 30th filing deadline specified above. For each of the subsequent three Capability Years encompassed by the periodic

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review, the value of this inflation rate shall be the twelve month percentage change in the applicable index for the general component of the escalation factor for the applicable Capability Year, as determined pursuant to Section 5.14.1.2.2.1.

The ICAP Demand Curves will be translated into Unforced Capacity terms in accordance with the ISO Procedures; provided that nothing in this Tariff shall be construed to limit the ability of the ISO or its Market Participants to propose and adopt alternative provisions to this Tariff through established governance procedures.

5.14.1.3 Supplemental Supply Fee

Any LSE that has not met its share of the NYCA Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement or its share of the Locational Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement after the completion of an ICAP Spot Market Auction, shall be assessed a supplemental supply fee equal to the applicable Market-Clearing Price of Unforced Capacity determined in the ICAP Spot Market Auction multiplied by the number of MWs the LSE needs to meet its share of the NYCA Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement or its share of the Locational Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement.

The ISO will attempt to use these supplemental supply fees to procure Unforced Capacity at a price less than or equal to the applicable Market-Clearing Price of Unforced Capacity determined in the ICAP Spot Market Auction from Installed Capacity Suppliers that are capable of supplying Unforced Capacity including: (1) Installed Capacity Suppliers that were not qualified to supply Capacity prior to the ICAP Spot Market Auction; (2) Installed Capacity Suppliers that offered Unforced Capacity at levels above the ICAP Spot Market Auction Market-Clearing Price; and (3) Installed Capacity suppliers that did not offer Unforced Capacity in the ICAP Spot Market Auction. In the event that different Installed Capacity Suppliers offer the

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same price, the ISO will give preference to Installed Capacity Suppliers that were not qualified to supply capacity prior to the ICAP Spot Market Auction.

Offers from Installed Capacity Suppliers are subject to review pursuant to the Market Monitoring Plan that is set forth in Attachment O to the Services Tariff, and the Market Mitigation Measures that are set forth in Attachment H to the Services Tariff. Installed Capacity Suppliers selected by the ISO to provide capacity after the ICAP Spot Market Auction will be paid a negotiated price, subject to the standards, procedures and remedies in the Market Mitigation Measures.

The ISO will not pay an Installed Capacity Supplier more than the applicable Market-Clearing Price of Unforced Capacity determined in the ICAP Spot Market Auction per MW of Unforced Capacity, or, in the case of In-City generation that is subject to **Ce**apacity market mitigation measures, the annual mitigated price cap per MW of Unforced Capacity, whichever is less, pro-rated to reflect the portion of the Obligation Procurement Period for which the Installed Capacity Supplier provides Unforced Capacity. Any remaining monies collected by the ISO pursuant to this section will be applied in accordance with Section 5.14.3 of the Services Tariff.

5.14.2 Installed Capacity Supplier Shortfalls and Deficiency Charges

5.14.2.1 General Provisions

In the event that an Installed Capacity Supplier sells in the Capability Period Auctions, in the Monthly Auctions, or through Bilateral Transactions more Unforced Capacity than it is qualified to sell in any specific month due to a de-rating or other cause, the Installed Capacity Supplier shall be deemed to have a shortfall for that month. To cover this shortfall, the Installed Capacity Supplier shall purchase sufficient Unforced Capacity in the relevant Monthly Auction or through Bilateral Transactions, and certify to the ISO consistent with the ISO Procedures that

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it has covered such shortfall. If the Installed Capacity Supplier does not cover such shortfall or if it does not certify to the ISO in a timely manner, the ISO shall, to the extent the ISO is aware of the shortfall, prospectively purchase Unforced Capacity on behalf of that Installed Capacity Supplier in the appropriate ICAP Spot Market Auction or through post ICAP Spot Market Auction Unforced Capacity purchases to cover the shortfall.

The ISO shall submit a Bid, calculated pursuant to Section 5.14.1 of this Tariff, in the appropriate ICAP Spot Market Auction on behalf of an Installed Capacity Supplier deemed to have a shortfall as if the Installed Capacity Supplier were an LSE. Such Installed Capacity Supplier shall be required to pay to the ISO the applicable Market-Clearing Price of Unforced Capacity established in that ICAP Spot Market Auction. Immediately following the ICAP Spot Market Auction, the ISO may suspend the Installed Capacity Supplier's privileges to sell or purchase Unforced Capacity in ISO-administered Installed Capacity auctions or to submit Bilateral Transactions to the NYISO. Once the Installed Capacity Supplier pays for or secures the payment obligation that it incurred in the ICAP Spot Market Auction, the ISO shall reinstate the Installed Capacity Supplier's privileges to participate in the ICAP markets.

In the event that the ICAP Spot Market Auction clears below the NYCA Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement or the Locational Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement, whichever is applicable to the Installed Capacity Supplier, and the Installed Capacity Supplier is deemed to have a shortfall, the Installed Capacity Supplier shall be assessed the applicable deficiency charge equal to the applicable Market-Clearing Price of Unforced Capacity determined using the applicable ICAP Demand Curve for that ICAP Spot Market Auction, times the amount of its shortfall.

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If an Installed Capacity Supplier is found, at any point during a Capability Period, to have had a shortfall for that Capability Period, *e.g.*, when the amount of Unforced Capacity that it supplies is found to be less than the amount it was committed to supply, the Installed Capacity Supplier shall be retrospectively liable to pay the ISO the monthly deficiency charge equal to one and one-half times the applicable Market-Clearing Price of Unforced Capacity determined using the applicable ICAP Demand Curve for that ICAP Spot Market Auction times the amount of its shortfall for each month the Installed Capacity Supplier is deemed to have a shortfall. If the Installed Capacity Supplier is a RIP or an Aggregator, it may experience a shortfall when, among other reasons, it sells ineligible or unavailable capacity MW associated with a properly or improperly enrolled SCR or Distributed Energy Resource.

The ISO, when evaluating whether an Installed Capacity Supplier has a shortfall, may use either Unforced Capacity data or Installed Capacity data; provided, however, that the ISO shall convert any shortfall MWs based on Installed Capacity data to its Unforced Capacity equivalent prior to calculating the amount of any deficiency charge. All shortfalls shall be measured in MWs in increments of 0.1 MW.

Any remaining monies collected by the ISO pursuant to Section 5.14.1 and 5.14.2 will be applied as specified in Section 5.14.3.

5.14.2.2 Additional Provisions Applicable to External Installed Capacity Suppliers

In addition to the general provisions set forth in Section 5.14.2.1 above that are applicable to External Installed Capacity Suppliers as Installed Capacity Suppliers, the following provisions shall also apply to External Installed Capacity Suppliers.

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In the event that an External Installed Capacity Supplier fails to deliver to the NYCA the Energy associated with the Unforced Capacity it committed to the NYCA due to a failure to obtain appropriate transmission service or rights, the External Installed Capacity Supplier shall be deemed to have a shortfall from the last time the External Installed Capacity Supplier “demonstrated” delivery of its Installed Capacity Equivalent (“ICE”), or any part thereof, until it next delivers its ICE or the end of the term for which it certified the applicable block of Unforced Capacity, whichever occurs first, subject to the limitation that any prior lack of demonstrated delivery will not precede the beginning of the period for which the Unforced Capacity was certified. An External Installed Capacity Supplier deemed to have a shortfall shall be required to pay to the ISO a deficiency charge equal to one and one-half times the applicable Market-Clearing Price of Unforced Capacity determined in the ICAP Spot Market Auction for the applicable month, prorated for the number of hours in the month that External Installed Capacity Supplier is deemed to have a shortfall (i.e., $((\text{deficiency charge} \div 12 \text{ months}) \div \text{total number of hours in month when shortfall occurred}) * \text{number of hours the shortfall lasted}) * \text{number of MWs of shortfall}$).

5.14.2.3 Additional Provisions Applicable to RIPS

In addition to the general provisions set forth in Section 5.14.2.1 above that are applicable to RIPS as Installed Capacity Suppliers, this Section 5.14.2.3 establishes the following four specific shortfalls applicable to RIPS: 1. shortfall for Provisional ACL; 2. shortfall for Incremental ACL; 3. shortfall for SCR Change of Status; and 4. shortfall for RIP portfolio performance. The deficiency charge for any such shortfall shall be equal to the Unforced Capacity equivalent of the shortfall multiplied by one and one-half times the applicable Market-

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Clearing Price of Unforced Capacity determined using the applicable ICAP Demand Curve for the ICAP Spot Market Auction for each month the RIP is deemed to have a shortfall.

There are three distinct measures of shortfall that are applicable to a RIP, described in this Section 15.4.2.3, where individual SCRs that have been enrolled with a Provisional ACL or an Incremental ACL, or that experience a SCR Change of Status may result in a shortfall. When a RIP is subject to multiple deficiency charges for the same SCR for the same Capability Period, the ISO shall assess to the RIP only the greatest deficiency charge related to such SCR. In addition, if the shortfall results in a reduction in the performance of a SCR, the ISO may recover from the RIP any energy payments for which the SCR was ineligible to receive.

5.14.2.3.1 Shortfall for Provisional ACL

Prior to the Summer 2014 Capability Period if the Installed Capacity Supplier is a Responsible Interface Party, after each Special Case Resource with a Provisional Average Coincident Load has its Average Coincident Load determined for the Capability Period in which it had a Provisional Average Coincident Load (such determination in accordance with ISO Procedures and without regard to whether the resource was registered to the same Responsible Interface Party at the time of the ACL determination), the ISO shall determine if there is a shortfall due to the Provisional Average Coincident Load being higher than the Average Coincident Load. This shortfall will be equal to the value, if positive, of (x) the sum of (i) the amount of UCAP a Responsible Interface Party sold in an Monthly or an ICAP Spot Market Auction or certified Bilateral Transactions for a Special Case Resource and (ii) the Special Case Resource's actual metered demand for the month in accordance with ISO Procedures, minus (y) the Special Case Resource's Average Coincident Load. If the ISO does not receive data to determine the Average Coincident Load in accordance with ISO Procedures, for each Capability

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Period a Special Case Resource had a Provisional Average Coincident Load, for purposes of determining the shortfall, the Average Coincident Load shall equal zero.

Beginning with the Summer of 2014 Capability Period if the Installed Capacity Supplier is a Responsible Interface Party, after each SCR with a Provisional ACL has its Verified ACL determined for the Capability Period in which it had a Provisional ACL (such determination in accordance with Section 5.12.11.1 and ISO Procedures) the ISO shall determine if there is a shortfall due to the Provisional ACL being greater than the Verified ACL. This shortfall shall be equal to the value, if positive, of (x) the Provisional ACL of the SCR, minus (y) the Verified ACL of the SCR. The shortfall calculated for the SCR for a month shall not exceed the amount of Installed Capacity associated with the SCR that was sold for that month. If the ISO does not receive data to determine the SCR's Verified ACL for the Capability Period for which the SCR was enrolled with a Provisional ACL the Verified ACL shall equal zero.

5.14.2.3.2 Shortfall for Incremental ACL

If the Installed Capacity Supplier is a RIP that reported an Incremental ACL, the ISO shall determine there is a shortfall when the Net ACL is greater than the Verified ACL. This shortfall shall be equal to the value, if positive, of (x) the enrolled Net ACL of the SCR, minus (y) the Verified ACL of the SCR for each month in which the RIP sold the SCR's Installed Capacity. The shortfall calculated for the SCR for a month shall not exceed the amount of Installed Capacity associated with the SCR that was sold for that month. If the ISO does not receive data to determine the Verified ACL for each month within the Capability Period that the SCR was enrolled with an Incremental ACL, the Monthly ACL for each unreported month shall equal zero (0) and be used in the calculation of the Verified ACL in accordance with Section 5.12.11.1.5.

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5.14.2.3.3 Shortfall for SCR Change of Status

If the Installed Capacity Supplier is a RIP, and a SCR Change of Status occurs, the ISO shall determine if a shortfall exists, based on the RIP's reporting of the SCR Change of Status.

When a SCR Change of Status is reported by the RIP in advance and no Installed Capacity associated with the SCR has been sold, a shortfall has not occurred. If the SCR Change of Status is reported by the RIP, but the Installed Capacity associated with the SCR has already been sold for one or more months a shortfall exists for these months, the shortfall shall be equal to the reduction to the ACL reported in the SCR Change of Status, but shall not exceed the amount of Installed Capacity sold for each month.

When the RIP fails to report the SCR Change of Status during the Capability Period, for each month in which the SCR's Installed Capacity was sold and the SCR Change of Status was in effect, the ISO shall determine the shortfall MW using the maximum one hour metered Load for the month. The shortfall amount for each month in which the SCR Change of Status was in effect shall equal the value of SCR ACL minus the maximum one hour metered Load for the month, but shall not exceed the SCR's Installed Capacity sold for the month.

5.14.2.3.4 Shortfall for RIP Portfolio Performance

In addition to the shortfall evaluations based on individual SCRs, a RIP is subject to a shortfall evaluation, by Load Zone, for its entire SCR portfolio. In this evaluation the shortfall shall be determined for each Load Zone separately. A shortfall will occur if the total of the amount of UCAP sold by the RIP for a month in a Capability Period Auction or a Monthly Auction and certified prior to that month's ICAP Spot Market Auction, the UCAP sold in that month's ICAP Spot Market Auction, and the UCAP sold as a Bilateral Transaction and certified prior to that month's ICAP Spot Market Auction is greater than the greatest quantity MW

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reduction achieved during a single hour in a test or event called by the ISO in the Capability Period as confirmed by data by the ISO in accordance with ISO Procedures (or the value of zero if data is not received by the ISO in accordance with such procedures).

5.14.3 Application of Installed Capacity Supplier Deficiency Charges

Any remaining monies collected by the ISO through supplemental supply fees or Installed Capacity Supplier deficiency charges pursuant to Section 5.14.1 but not used to procure Unforced Capacity on behalf of LSEs or Installed Capacity suppliers deemed to have a shortfall shall be applied as provided in this Section 5.14.3.

5.14.3.1 General Application of Deficiency Charges

Except as provided in Section 5.14.3.2, remaining monies will be applied to reduce the Rate Schedule 1 charge in the following month.

5.14.3.2 Installed Capacity Rebates

(i) New York City

If an Unforced Capacity shortfall exists during any month, the ISO shall rebate any remaining unspent deficiency charges or supplemental supply fees collected for that month for the New York City Locality allocated among all LSEs in that Locality in proportion to their share of the applicable Locational Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement. Rebates shall include interest accrued between the time payments were collected and the time that rebates are paid.

(ii) Long Island

If an Unforced Capacity shortfall exists during any month, the ISO shall rebate any remaining unspent deficiency charges or supplemental supply fees collected for that month for

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the Long Island Locality, allocated among all LSEs in that Locality in proportion to their share of the applicable Locational Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement. Rebates shall include interest accrued between the time payments were collected and the time that rebates are paid.

(iii) G-J

If an Unforced Capacity shortfall exists during any month, the ISO shall rebate any remaining unspent deficiency charges or supplemental supply fees collected for that month for the G-J Locality, allocated among all LSEs in that Locality in proportion to their share of the applicable Locational Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement. Rebates shall include interest accrued between the time payments were collected and the time that rebates are paid.

(iv) Rest of State

If an Unforced Capacity shortfall exists during any month, the ISO shall rebate any remaining unspent deficiency charges or supplemental supply fees collected for that month for the Rest of State requirements, allocated among all LSEs in each of the Localities and in Rest of State, in proportion to each LSE's share of the NYCA Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement less that LSE's Locational Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement. Rebates shall include interests accrued between the time payments were collected and the time that rebates are paid.

5.15 Payment and Allocation of Installed Capacity Auction Rebates

The ISO shall rebate to all LSEs with Locational Minimum Installed Capacity Requirements in the New York City Locality, except NYPA, any Excess Amount that remains after the completion of an auction. Such rebates shall be allocated among all New York City LSEs, except NYPA, in proportion to their share of the Locational New York City Installed Capacity Requirement, regardless of whether they actually took part in the Capability Period Auctions or Monthly Auctions. The ISO shall allocate such rebates among In-City LSEs except NYPA on a monthly basis. Rebates shall include interest accrued between the time they were collected and the time that they are paid.

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5.16 New Capacity Zone Study and Procedures

Capitalized terms used in this Section 5.16 and not defined in this Services Tariff shall have the meaning set forth in the Open Access Transmission Tariff.

The ISO shall conduct the New Capacity Zone study in accordance with this Section (“NCZ Study”) and provide a written report of the results to stakeholders on or before January 15 in each ICAP Demand Curve Reset Filing Year.

5.16.1 NCZ Study Methodology.

5.16.1.1 The NCZ Study, developed in accordance with ISO Procedures, will test, under summer peak system conditions, using the following assumptions and methodology:

5.16.1.1.1 The following assumptions will be applied: (i) transmission facilities (other than existing Class Year Transmission Project) identified as existing in the ISO’s Load and Capacity Data report most recently published prior to the NCZ Study Start Date; (ii) all firm plans for changes to transmission facilities by Transmission Owners in the ISO’s Load and Capacity Data report most recently published prior to the NCZ Study Start Date scheduled to be in-service prior to the NCZ Study Capability Period; (iii) planned generation projects or Class Year Transmission Project that have accepted either (a) Deliverable MW or (b) a System Deliverability Upgrade cost allocation and provided cash or posted required security pursuant to OATT Attachment S, which for (a) and (b) is from a Class Year Final Decision Round that occurs prior to the NCZ Study Start Date (subject to Section 5.16.1.1.2); (iv) System Upgrade Facilities and System

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Deliverability Upgrades associated with planned projects identified in (iii) above, except that System Deliverability Upgrades where construction of the System Deliverability Upgrade has been deferred pursuant to OATT Attachment S Sections 25.7.12.2 and 25.7.12.3 will only be included if construction of the System Deliverability Upgrades has been triggered under OATT Attachment S Section 25.7.12.3; (v) all transmission retirements and derates identified in the ISO's Load and Capacity Data report most recently published prior to the NCZ Study Start Date and scheduled to occur prior to the NCZ Study Capability Period; (vi) all existing Generators with CRIS identified in, and all projects with Unforced Capacity Deliverability Rights on the date of, the ISO's Load and Capacity Data report most recently published prior to the NCZ Study Start Date; and all CRIS rights from resources considered "CRIS-inactive" as defined in OATT Attachment S Section 25.9.3.1 unless the ability to transfer those rights has expired without completing a transfer as permitted under OATT Attachment S Section 25.9.4 or 25.9.5 as of the NCZ Study Start Date; and (vii) any transfer of CRIS rights pursuant to OATT Attachment S not identified in the Load and Capacity Data report most recently published prior to the NCZ Study Start Date but is completed and the transferee is operational prior to the NCZ Study Start Date.

5.16.1.1.2 Planned generation and Class Year Transmission Projects identified pursuant to Section 5.16.1.1.1 will be excluded and not recognized in the NCZ Study if (a) the Commission has accepted the cancellation or termination of a rate schedule consisting of an Interconnection Agreement (absent the filing of another

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Interconnection Agreement for the project), or (b) for projects that either do not have an executed Interconnection Agreement or have an executed Interconnection Agreement that is (i) not required to be filed with the Commission or (ii) is required to be filed but has not yet been filed, the ISO receives written notice from the project that it is withdrawing from the interconnection queue and/or a Notice of Termination under the interconnection agreement.

5.16.1.1.3 The Load forecast used will be the NCZ Study Capability Period peak demand forecast contained in the ISO's Load and Capacity Data report most recently published prior to the NCZ Study Start Date.

5.16.1.1.4 The base case conditioning steps contained in OATT Attachment S Sections 25.7.8.2.3 (excluding and not recognizing MW of CRIS requested by Developers other than CRIS identified in Section 5.16.1.1.1 (iii)), 25.7.8.2.4, 25.7.8.2.5, 25.7.8.2.10, and 25.7.8.2.11, will be applied to the above inputs and assumptions.

5.16.1.1.5 The ISO will perform the NCZ Study by applying to the above inputs and assumptions the methodology contained in OATT Attachment S Sections 25.7.8.2.6, 25.7.8.2.7, 25.7.8.2.8, 25.7.8.2.9, 25.7.8.2.12, and 25.7.8.2.13 to Highways. Deliverability will be determined through a shift from generation to generation within each Capacity Region that contains Highways. Each such Capacity Region will be tested on an individual basis.

5.16.1.2 On or before October 1 of the year prior to an ICAP Demand Curve Reset Filing Year, the ISO will review the inputs and assumptions for the NCZ Study with stakeholders and provide an opportunity for stakeholders to comment.

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5.16.1.3 The ISO shall provide an opportunity for the Market Monitoring Unit to review and comment on the NCZ Study consistent with Services Tariff

Attachment O Section 30.4.6.3.2.

5.16.2 New Capacity Zone Boundary

The ISO shall identify the boundary of a New Capacity Zone if there is a constrained Highway interface into one or more Load Zones. The boundary of the New Capacity Zone may encompass a single constrained Load Zone or group of Load Zones including one or more constrained Load Zones on the constrained side of the Highway. In determining the New Capacity Zone boundary, the ISO shall consider the extent to which incremental Capacity in individual constrained Load Zones could impact the reliability and security of constrained Load Zones, taking into account interface capability between constrained Load Zones.

5.16.3 Indicative NCZ Locational Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement

For each Load Zone or groups of Load Zones identified in the NCZ Study as having a constrained Highway Interface, on or before March 1 of each ICAP Demand Curve Reset Filing Year, the ISO shall determine Indicative NCZ Locational Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement. The ISO shall provide an opportunity to stakeholders to review and comment on the Indicative NCZ Locational Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement. This Indicative NCZ Locational Minimum Installed Capacity Requirement will be used solely for establishing revised ICAP Demand Curves in accordance with 5.14.1.2.

5.16.4 NCZ Report

On or before March 31 of an ICAP Demand Curve Reset Filing Year,

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- (a) If the NCZ Study identifies a constrained Highway Interface, the ISO shall file for Commission review proposed tariff revisions necessary to establish and recognize the New Capacity Zone or Zones, and shall include in the filing a report of the results of the NCZ Study. If the ISO proposes that a New Capacity Zone that is comprised of a group of Load Zones instead of a single Load Zone, the ISO shall include in the filing the basis for its determination, consistent with Section 5.16.2.
- (b) If the NCZ Study does not identify a constrained Highway interface, the ISO shall file with the Commission the ISO's determination that the NCZ Study did not indicate that any New Capacity Zone is required pursuant to this process, along with a report of the results of the NCZ Study.

The ISO shall provide an opportunity for the Market Monitoring Unit to review and comment on the NCZ Study and any proposed tariff revisions, consistent with Services Tariff Attachment O Section 30.4.6.3.2.

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5.17 Expedited Dispute Resolution Procedures

5.17.1 Five-Day Consultation Period

Parties to a dispute involving a matter that is subject to the procedures of this section must immediately confer and attempt to resolve the dispute on an informal basis. If the parties are unable to resolve the dispute within five (5) calendar days by mutual agreement, the dispute shall be immediately submitted to the ISO's Dispute Resolution Administrator ("DRA").

5.17.2 Written Submissions

Immediately upon conclusion of the five-day consultation period, the party requesting the dispute resolution shall submit to the DRA and all other parties to the dispute, a concise written statement specifying that expedited dispute resolution under this section is requested and describing the nature of the dispute, the issues to be resolved and the specific award requested. The party opposing the requested relief shall then have five (5) calendar days to submit to the DRA and the party requesting the dispute resolution, a concise written response which shall include a proposed disposition of the dispute.

5.17.3 Appointment of the Arbitrator

The DRA shall keep at all times a list of ten (10) qualified arbitrators for matters which may be subject to the procedures of this section. Within five (5) calendar days of receipt of a request for dispute resolution under this section, the DRA shall appoint one arbitrator from that list to preside over the dispute. The arbitrator shall be selected by the DRA by randomly drawing names from the list until an available arbitrator is found. If none of the arbitrators on the list is available, the DRA shall appoint a qualified arbitrator to preside over the dispute. No person shall be eligible to act as an arbitrator who is a past or present officer, employee of, or

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consultant to any of the disputing parties, or of an entity related to or affiliated with any of the disputing parties, or is otherwise interested in the matter to be arbitrated except upon the express written consent of the parties. Any individual appointed as an arbitrator shall make known to the disputing parties any such disqualifying relationship or interest and a new arbitrator shall be appointed by the DRA, unless express written consent is provided by each party.

5.17.4 Arbitration Proceeding

There shall be no right to discovery between the parties, including, but not limited to, depositions, interrogatories or other information requests. The arbitrator may request, and the parties shall produce, any information in addition to the written statements that is deemed by the arbitrator to be relevant to the issues presented. The arbitrator shall resolve the arbitration matter solely on the basis of the written statements and evidence submitted by the parties unless, in the sole discretion of the arbitrator, a hearing is deemed necessary. Any such hearing shall be limited to one (1) day and conducted in accordance with the procedures determined by the arbitrator. Absent agreement to the contrary by all parties to the dispute, no person or entity shall be permitted to intervene. Except as otherwise set forth in this section, the arbitrator will follow the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association and the expedited procedures contained therein.

5.17.5 Arbitration Award

Within fifteen (15) calendar days of the appointment of the arbitrator, the arbitrator shall select as an arbitration award the award proposed by one of the parties in their written submission (except that, in disputes concerning the development of regional Load growth factors pursuant to Section 5.10 of this Tariff, the arbitration award shall be either the forecast

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developed by the Transmission Owner or by the ISO) and shall render a concise written decision including findings of fact and the basis for the decision. All costs associated with the time, expenses, and other charges of the arbitrator shall be borne by the unsuccessful party. Each party shall bear its own costs, including attorney and expert fees, if any. No award shall be deemed to be precedential in any other arbitration related to a different dispute.

5.17.6 Limited Appeal

The decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding upon the parties, except that, within one year of the arbitration decision, a party may request that any federal, state regulatory or judicial authority (in the State of New York) having jurisdiction take such action as may be appropriate with respect to any arbitration decision that is based on fraudulent conduct or demonstrable bias of the arbitrator.

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5.18 Generator Outages and Generator Obligations While in These Outages

This Section 5.18 shall apply to a Generator in any outage state that started on or after May 1, 2015, except for a Generator participating in the ISO Markets as part of an Aggregation. Section 5.18 shall apply to a Generator that is in an outage state at the time that it joins an Aggregation until that Generator returns to operation.

A Market Participant with a Generator in the NYCA that is in any outage state, which is not part of an Aggregation, shall report ~~this-its~~ status to the ISO pursuant to ISO Procedures.

5.18.1 Forced Outages and Commenced Repair Determinations

5.18.1.1 A Market Participant with a Generator in a Forced Outage shall keep the ISO informed as to progress of its Generator's repairs pursuant to ISO Procedures. A Market Participant may keep its Generator in a Forced Outage beyond the last day of the month which contains the 180th day of its Forced Outage only if it has Commenced Repair of its Generator. A Market Participant that anticipates its Generator will not be able to return to the Energy market before the last day of the month which contains the 180th day of its Forced Outage and which desires to remain eligible to be in the Installed Capacity market beyond the 180th day shall provide a Repair Plan to the ISO by the 120th day of the Forced Outage.

5.18.1.2 A Repair Plan shall include a work plan, with milestones, or set of necessary actions, and shall provide the time it is expected to take to complete each task and describe the repair of the Generator's equipment related to electric production, fuel or station power supply or transmission interconnection, as

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appropriate, that was either affected by the Forced Outage or otherwise makes the unit available for the Energy market. The Repair Plan's milestones shall include, in appropriate circumstances: damage assessments, engineering assessments, initial cost estimates, purchase orders, inspection reports, initial safety assessments, hazardous material abatement plans, and labor mobilization plans. The Repair Plan shall include the date the Market Participant expects the Generator to be repaired and available for the Energy market (return date) which return date: i) shall be reasonable, ii) may be provided as a good faith estimate, and iii) shall be updated to the extent new information becomes available. The return date or good faith estimate of a return date that a Market Participant provides for its Generator shall be reasonable if it is comparable to the return date that would be included in a Credible Repair Plan pursuant to Section 5.18.1.5 of this Services Tariff.

5.18.1.3 Market Participants requesting that the NYISO determine, pursuant to Services Tariff Section 23.4.5.6.2, that their Generator has experienced a Catastrophic Failure, or that Exceptional Circumstances will delay the submission of data necessary for the ISO to perform an audit and review pursuant to Section 23.4.5.6.2, shall submit their requests, with necessary supporting data, to the NYISO by the 120th day of the Forced Outage if they desire the determination to be issued by the 160th day of the Forced Outage of their Generator.

5.18.1.4 A Market Participant has Commenced Repair of its Generator if it: i) has decided to pursue the repair of its Generator, and based on the ISO's technical/engineering evaluation, ii) has a Repair Plan for the Generator that is

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consistent with a Credible Repair Plan, and iii) has made appropriate progress in pursuing the repair of its Generator when measured against the milestones of a Credible Repair Plan.

5.18.1.5 For purposes of the determinations required by Section 5.18.1.3(ii) and (iii), and 5.18.1.6 of this Services Tariff, a Credible Repair Plan is the Repair Plan that would be expected from a supplier: i) with a generating facility that is reasonably the same as or similar to the type and vintage of the Generator; ii) intending to return its generating facility to service. A Credible Repair Plan for a Generator that suffered a Forced Outage is a Repair Plan that would also be expected from a supplier with a generating facility that suffered a forced outage that was reasonably the same as or comparable to the Forced Outage suffered by the Generator and which forced outage occurred under the same, or reasonably similar, circumstances as the Generator's. A Credible Repair Plan for a Generator in a Mothball Outage is a Repair Plan that would also be expected from a supplier pursuing a repair to its generating facility which repair is reasonably the same as or comparable to the repair being pursued by the Generator.

5.18.1.6 The determination that a Market Participant has Commenced Repair of its Generator in a Forced Outage shall be made by the ISO by the 160th day of the Forced Outage. If the Market Participant provides updated information after the 120th day of the Forced Outage and before the 180th day of its Generator's Forced Outage, the ISO will, as applicable, take such information into consideration to make its determination or it will update its previously issued determination to the extent practicable.

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The determination that a Market Participant has Commenced Repair of its Generator in an ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage, which Market Participant has been determined by the ISO to have one or more Exceptional Circumstances that delay the acquisition of necessary data for an audit and review for economic justification pursuant to Section 23.4.5.6.2 of this Services Tariff, shall be made by the ISO as soon as practicable following receipt of necessary data.

The determination that a Market Participant has Commenced Repair of its Generator in an ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage or Mothball Outage, which Market Participant is seeking to toll expiration of its outage and CRIS rights pursuant to Sections 5.18.2.3.2 or 5.18.3.3.2 of this Services Tariff, will be made by the ISO as soon as practicable following receipt of the necessary data.

5.18.1.7 If a Market Participant has not Commenced Repair of its Generator by the last day of the month which contains the 180th day of the Forced Outage, the Generator's Forced Outage shall expire on the last day of the month which contains the 180th day of the Forced Outage. The Forced Outage of a Generator that Commenced Repair but ceased or unreasonably delayed the Generator's repair shall terminate on the last day of the month containing the date that the Market Participant ceased or unreasonably delayed the repair. The ISO will determine a Market Participant has unreasonably delayed the repair of its Generator if such delay would not have been included in a Credible Repair Plan from a supplier experiencing the situation which caused the Market Participant to delay the repair of its Generator.

5.18.1.8 Upon the expiration or termination of a Generator's Forced Outage, the

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Generator shall be in an ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage unless the Generator has been Retired by the Market Participant.

5.18.2 ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage

5.18.2.1 A Market Participant may voluntarily reclassify its Generator from a Forced Outage to an ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage only if the Generator has been in a Forced Outage for at least sixty (60) days. A Generator that has been voluntarily reclassified from a Forced Outage to an ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage shall begin its ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage on the first day of the month following the month in which it was voluntarily reclassified to an ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage.

A Generator in an ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage as a result of the expiration or termination of its Forced Outage pursuant to Section 5.18.1.6 of this Services Tariff, shall begin its ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage on the day following the day the Generator's Forced Outage expired or terminated.

A Generator in an ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage as a result of substantial actions that have been taken, such as dismantling or disabling essential equipment, which actions are inconsistent with an intention to operate the Generator in the Energy market shall begin its ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage on the day following the day such actions began.

5.18.2.2 A Generator in an ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage is not eligible to participate in the Installed Capacity market and shall automatically cease to qualify to participate in the Installed Capacity market beginning with the first day of its ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage. The Generator shall no longer be ineligible

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to participate in the Installed Capacity market, by virtue of its ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage, as of the first day the Generator returns to operation and offers its Energy into the Day-Ahead Market without declaring an outage. The month for which the Generator will first be eligible to participate in the Installed Capacity market will be based on the date the Generator returns to operation and offers its Energy into the Day-Ahead Market without declaring an outage and ISO Procedures.

5.18.2.3 ICAP Ineligible Force Outage Expiration

5.18.2.3.1 Except as provided in Section 5.18.2.3.2, a Generator's ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage shall expire if: i) its CRIS rights have expired; or ii) it did not have CRIS rights and has been in the ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage for 36 consecutive months. A Generator shall be Retired if its ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage expires.

5.18.2.3.2 If a Market Participant with a Generator in an ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage has Commenced Repair prior to when the ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage would expire pursuant to Section 5.18.2.3.1 and has provided a reasonable return date as that term is described in Section 5.18.1.2 of this Services Tariff that occurs after such expiration date, then the outage and the Generator's CRIS rights will be tolled until, and the ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage will expire on, the earlier of:

- i) 120 days from when the outage would have expired under Section 5.18.2.3.1; or
- ii) an ISO determination that the Market Participant has ceased or unreasonably delayed the repair of its Generator. The ISO will determine if a Market Participant has unreasonably delayed the repair of its Generator if such delay

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would not have been included in a Credible Repair Plan from a supplier experiencing the situation which caused the Market Participant to delay the repair of its Generator. The tolling of CRIS rights occurs under this Section 5.18.2.3.2 notwithstanding the three year period in which CRIS-inactive facilities may maintain CRIS rights pursuant to Section 25.9.3.1 of Attachment S to the OATT; provided, however, the expiration period for transfers of CRIS rights provided in Section 25.9.3.1 of Attachment S to the OATT shall not be tolled. A Market Participant seeking to toll its outage and CRIS rights pursuant to this Section 5.18.2.3.2 must submit a Repair Plan no later than 60 days prior to when the ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage would expire under Section 5.18.2.3.1.

5.18.2.4 A Market Participant with a Generator in an ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage that is notified by a Transmission Owner or the ISO that the return to service of its Generator could address a reliability issue shall provide an updated good faith estimate of the Generator's return date. A Market Participant with a Generator in an ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage shall make a timely return to service to resolve a reliability issue, in accordance with Section 5.18.4, as the term "timely return" is described in Section 5.18.4.2 of this Services Tariff. A Market Participant with a Generator in an ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage shall provide temporary use of its Generator's interconnection point in accordance with Section 5.18.5 of this Services Tariff when a transmission solution using the Generator's interconnection point has been selected as the Generator Deactivation Solution, the Gap Solution, or to resolve a reliability issue arising on a non-New York State Bulk Power Transmission Facility during its outage. The

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Transmission Owner shall provide that power to the station remains available notwithstanding its temporary use of the Generator's interconnection point.

5.18.3 Mothball Outage

5.18.3.1 Prior to entering a Mothball Outage, the Generator must satisfy the prior notice requirement contained in Section 38.3.1 of Attachment FF to the ISO OATT, among other applicable requirements. A Generator in a Mothball Outage is not eligible to participate in the Installed Capacity market and shall automatically cease to qualify to participate in the Installed Capacity market beginning with the date the Generator begins its Mothball Outage. The Generator shall no longer be ineligible to participate in the Installed Capacity market, by virtue of its Mothball Outage, as of the first day the Generator returns to operation and offers its Energy into the Day-Ahead Market without declaring an outage. The month for which the Generator will first be eligible to participate in the Installed Capacity market will be based on the date the Generator returns to operation and offers its Energy into the Day-Ahead Market without declaring an outage and ISO Procedures.

5.18.3.2 As part of the Generator Deactivation Notice required prior to entering a Mothball Outage pursuant to Section 38.3.1 of Attachment FF to the ISO OATT, a Market Participant shall notify the ISO whether its Generator will be physically able to return within 180 days to resolve a reliability issue or it has good cause for an alternate period of time, stated in days, to return its Generator to service to resolve a reliability issue. The Market Participant shall establish good cause, to the satisfaction of the ISO, by providing empirical evidence demonstrating the

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need for the alternate period of time to return its Generator to service to resolve a reliability issue. The number of days within which a Generator in a Mothball Outage can be returned to service to resolve a reliability issue will be shared with the applicable Transmission Owner(s).

5.18.3.3 Mothball Outage Expiration

5.18.3.3.1 Except as provided in Section 5.18.3.3.2, a Generator's Mothball Outage shall expire if: i) its CRIS rights have expired; or ii) it did not have CRIS rights and has been in the Mothball Outage for 36 consecutive months. A Generator shall be Retired if its Mothball Outage expires.

5.18.3.3.2 If a Market Participant with a Generator in a Mothball Outage has Commenced Repair prior to when the Mothball Outage would expire pursuant to Section 5.18.3.3.1 and has provided a reasonable return date as that term is described in Section 5.18.1.2 of this Services Tariff that occurs after such expiration date, then the outage and the Generator's CRIS rights will be tolled until, and the Mothball Outage will expire on, the earlier of: i) 120 days from when the outage would have expired under Section 5.18.3.3.1; or ii) an ISO determination that the Market Participant has ceased or unreasonably delayed the repair of its Generator. The ISO will determine if a Market Participant has unreasonably delayed the repair of its Generator if such delay would not have been included in a Credible Repair Plan from a supplier experiencing the situation which caused the Market Participant to delay the repair of its Generator. The tolling of CRIS rights occurs under this Section 5.18.3.3.2 notwithstanding the three year period in which CRIS-inactive facilities may maintain CRIS rights

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pursuant to Section 25.9.3.1 of Attachment S to the OATT; provided, however, the expiration period for transfers of CRIS rights provided in Section 25.9.3.1 of Attachment S to the OATT shall not be tolled. A Market Participant seeking to toll its outage and CRIS rights pursuant to this Section 5.18.3.3.2 must submit a Repair Plan no later than 60 days prior to when the Mothball Outage would expire under Section 5.18.3.3.1.

5.18.3.4 A Market Participant with a Generator in a Mothball Outage shall timely return the Generator to service to resolve a reliability issue, in accordance with Section 5.18.4, as the term ‘timely return’ is described in Section 5.18.4.2 of this Services Tariff. A Market Participant with a Generator in a Mothball Outage shall provide temporary use of its Generator’s interconnection point, in accordance with Section 5.18.5 of this Services Tariff, when a transmission solution using the Generator’s interconnection point has been selected as the Generator Deactivation Solution, the Gap Solution, or to resolve a reliability issue on a non-New York State Bulk Power Transmission Facility arising during the Generator’s outage. The Transmission Owner shall provide that power to the station remains available notwithstanding its temporary use of the Generator’s interconnection point.

5.18.4 Return to Service of Generators in a Mothball Outage or an ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage to Resolve a Reliability Issue

5.18.4.1 Following: i) notification to a Market Participant that the return to service of its Generator in a Mothball Outage or an ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage for a specified minimum time period has been identified as a Generator Deactivation

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Solution, a Gap Solution, or to resolve a reliability issue on a non-New York State Bulk Power Transmission Facility arising during the Generator's outage; and ii) an order establishing compensation for such return from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("Compensation Order"), the Market Participant shall timely return the Generator to service, as the term "timely return" is defined in Section 5.18.4.2 of this Services Tariff.

5.18.4.1.1 Except for Generators selected through the Generator Deactivation Process, within 30 days of a determination by the ISO and the Market Participant that negotiations on compensation for the return to service of the Market Participant's Generator are at an impasse, the Market Participant may submit a filing to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act for compensation. No later than ten days after such filing is made, the ISO shall file with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission an unexecuted compensation agreement that includes the non-rate terms and conditions for the return to service of the Market Participant's Generator.

5.18.4.2 A Market Participant's return to service of its Generator in a Mothball Outage to resolve a reliability issue shall be deemed to be a timely return if such return to service was i) within 180 days from the date of the Compensation Order, ii) within the alternate period of time following the date of the Compensation Order pursuant to Section 5.18.3.2, or iii) by such other date agreed to by the parties.

A Market Participant's return to service of its Generator in an ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage to resolve a reliability issue shall be deemed to be a

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timely return if it is returned to service according to the date established by the Compensation Order; *provided, however*, the Market Participant will not be required to return the Generator to service before its estimated return date unless otherwise agreed.

5.18.4.2.1 A Generator's return to service shall not be untimely if the Generator provided the Transmission Owner with access to its interconnection point and is available for a timely return, and the Transmission Owner is unable to reconnect the Generator within the timeframes provided for a timely return to service, pursuant to Section 5.18.4.2 of this Services Tariff.

5.18.5 Temporary Use of Interconnection Point to Resolve a Reliability Issue

5.18.5.1 A Market Participant shall provide a Transmission Owner with temporary use of the interconnection point of its Generator in a Mothball Outage or ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage when a transmission solution using the Generator's interconnection point has been selected as the Generator Deactivation Solution, Gap Solution, or to resolve a reliability issue arising on a non-New York State Bulk Power Transmission Facility during its outage.

5.18.5.2 A Market Participant that provided temporary use of the interconnection point of its Generator in a Mothball Outage or ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage pursuant to Section 5.18.5.1 of this Services Tariff shall be permitted to reconnect its Generator to the transmission system by submitting to the ISO a Notice of Intent to Return that provides the date it intends to return to service which submission shall be provided no later than six months before the expiration of its outage, unless otherwise agreed. A Market Participant that submitted a Notice of

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Intent to Return and that was not requested to return its Generator to service to resolve a reliability issue pursuant to Section 5.18.4.1 of this Services Tariff during its immediately previous Mothball Outage or ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage, shall be permitted to reconnect at no cost.

The Transmission Owner shall reconnect the Generator on or before the indicated return date using efforts that are timely, consistent with Good Utility Practice and that are otherwise substantially equivalent to those the Transmission Owner would use for its own purposes. The Transmission Owner shall report periodically to the ISO and the Generator on the progress of reconnecting such Generator and shall advise the ISO and the Generator promptly if it expects it will not be able to complete the reconnection of the Generator before its indicated return date.

If the Generator returning to service pursuant to this Section 5.18.5.2 of the Services Tariff is available to return but the Transmission Owner is unable to reconnect the Generator before its outage expires, the outage expiration, and expiration of its CRIS rights, where applicable, will be tolled until the date the Transmission Owner reconnects the Generator notwithstanding the three year period in which CRIS-inactive facilities may maintain CRIS rights pursuant to Section 25.9.3.1 of Attachment S to the OATT; provided, however, the expiration period for transfers of CRIS rights provided in Section 25.9.3.1 of Attachment S to the OATT shall not be tolled.

5.18.6 Retired and Termination of Existing Interconnection Agreements

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The classification of a Generator with an interconnection agreement other than a Small Generator Interconnection Agreement (SGIA) or Standard Large Generator Interconnection Agreement (LGIA) as Retired may be grounds for the termination of the interconnection agreement depending on the terms and conditions of the applicable agreement. Any termination of such an interconnection agreement will be effective on the filing with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission of a notice of termination, which notice and proposed effective date have been accepted by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Either party to the interconnection agreement may file the notice of termination, as appropriate. If and when termination of the interconnection agreement is effective, access to the Point of Interconnection of the Generator will be available on a non-discriminatory basis pursuant to the NYISO's applicable interconnection and transmission expansion processes and procedures. If the existing interconnection agreement is not terminated, the Retired Generator would retain its right to the specific point of interconnection as provided for in the interconnection agreement and access to this point would not be available for new projects.

The impact on a Generator with a LGIA or SGIA that has been classified as Retired is described in OATT Sections 30 and 32 respectively.